Suspicious death of two FBI agents creates controversy

Mon May 27, 2013
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/27/305627/death-of-fbi-agents-creates-controversy/

Two well-trained Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents who were involved in the killing of a Boston bombing suspect have suspiciously died.

The FBI said in a statement that 41-year-old Christopher Lorek and 40-year-old Stephen Shaw were killed on May 17 as they fell out of a helicopter into water during a training mission off the coast of Virginia Beach.

US officials have blamed bad weather for the tragedy but some have questioned the credibility of the official account, considering it a cover-up.

They say the agents’ death adds to the suspicious death of a friend of the Boston bombing suspect, Ibragim Todashev, who was killed in his own apartment by an FBI agent.

Lorek and Shaw were part of the bureau's Critical Incident Response Group and were both members of the team investigating the Boston Marathon bombings in mid-April.

“You could always take it as one of an endless group of coincidences. We have so many [of them], when you look at the Boston investigation that these two individuals were involved in, everything had the stamp of CIA and FBI on it, from the first steps,” Gordon Duff, senior editor of Veterans Today, told Press TV.

“What we have in the US is that we don’t report, we don’t have the least free press here. There are powerful dissident elements within our military, intelligence services and government that are under the control of... I’ll call them organized crime on a worldwide basis. If you refer to hundreds of billions of dollars worth of narcotics and trillions of dollars worth of financial crimes, it is simply organized crime, it is the understatement of all time,” he added.

The incident has reminded many of the dramatic death of top US commandos in Afghanistan, who lost their lives three months after their involvement in the alleged killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in 2011.

On August 6, 2011, the helicopter of the Navy SEAL Team VI was shot down in Afghanistan.

The families of Navy SEAL members have blamed the government for the tragedy, saying the shooting down of the helicopter and the subsequent cover-up was planned by the government.

They said that US President Barack Obama turned the SEALs group into a Taliban target after the administration revealed they had conducted the bin Laden raid.

The families also claimed Taliban militants had received leaked information from the US government regarding the landing site of the commandos’ helicopter.

Moreover, the SEAL Team VI members were reportedly flown to the landing site with a Vietnam-era Chinook helicopter rather than with their customary Special Forces choppers.

“There is absolutely nothing that is credible about that; this is not a mission they would have been on, this is not a helicopter they would have been on,” Duff pointed out.

True Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

By Bradley Manning, Reader Supported News
02 March 13
http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/370-wikileaks/16288-focus-true-cost-of-the-wars-in-iraq-and-afghanistan

In full statement, whistleblower says most alarming was the "delightful bloodlust" of US soldiers in Collateral Murder video.

This statement below was read by Bradley E. Manning at a providence inquiry for his formal plea of guilty to one specification as charged and nine specifications for lesser included offenses. He pled not guilty to 12 other specifications. This rush transcript was taken by journalist Alexa O'Brien at the Article 39(a) session of United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning on February 28, 2013 at Fort Meade, MD, USA.

Judge Lind: Pfc. Manning you may read your statement.

Pfc. Bradley Manning: Yes, your Honor. I wrote this statement in the confinement facility. The following facts are provided in support of the providence inquiry for my court martial, United States v. Pfc. Bradley E. Manning.

Personal Facts.

I am a twenty-five year old Private First Class in the United States Army currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, HHC, US Army Garrison (USAG), Joint Base Myer, Henderson Hall, Fort Meyer, Virginia.

My [missed word] assignment I was assigned to HHC, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, NY. My primary military occupational specialty or MOS is 35 Foxtrot intelligence analyst. I entered active duty status on 2 October 2007. I enlisted with the hope of obtaining both real world experience and earning benefits under the GI Bill for college opportunities.

Facts regarding my position as an intelligence analyst.

In order to enlist in the Army I took the Standard Armed Services Aptitude Battery or [ASVAB?]. My score on this battery was high enough for me to qualify for any enlisted MOS positon. My recruiter informed me that I should select an MOS that complimented my interests outside the military. In response, I told him that I was interested in geopolitical matters and information technology. He suggested that I consider becoming an intelligence analyst.

After researching the intelligence analyst position, I agreed that this would be a good fit for me. In particular, I enjoyed the fact that an analyst could use information derived from a variety of sources to create work products that informed the command of its available choices for determining the best course of action or COA's. Although the MOS required working knowledge of computers, it primarily required me to consider how raw information can be combined with other available intelligence sources in order to create products that assisted the command in it's situational awareness or SA.

I accessed that my natural interest in geopolitical affairs and my computer skills would make me an excellent intelligence analyst. After enlisting I reported to the Fort Meade military entrance processing station on 1 October 2007. I then traveled to and reported at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri on 2 October 2007 to begin basic combat training or BCT.

Once at Fort Leonard Wood I quickly realized that I was neither physically nor mentally prepared for the requirements of basic training. My BCT experience lasted six months instead of the normal ten weeks. Due to medical issues, I was placed on a hold status. A physical examination indicated that I sustained injuries to my right soldier and left foot.

Due to those injuries I was unable to continue 'basic'. During medical hold, I was informed that I may be out processed from the Army, however, I resisted being chaptered out because I felt that I could overcome my medical issues and continue to serve. On 2[8 or 20?] January 2008, I returned to basic combat training. This time I was better prepared and I completed training on 2 April 2008.

I then reported for the MOS specific Advanced Individual Training or AIT on 7 April 2008. AIT was an enjoyable experience for me. Unlike basic training where I felt different from the other soldiers, I fit in did well. I preferred the mental challenges of reviewing a large amount of information from various sources and trying to create useful or actionable products. I especially enjoyed the practice of analysis through the use of computer applications and methods that I was familiar with.

I graduated from AIT on 16 August 2008 and reported to my first duty station, Fort Drum, NY on 28 August 2008. As an analyst, Significant Activities or SigActs were a frequent source of information for me to use in creating work products. I started working extensively with SigActs early after my arrival at Fort Drum. My computer background allowed me to use the tools of organic to the Distributed Common Ground System-Army or D6-A computers to create polished work products for the 2nd Brigade Combat Team chain of command.

The non-commissioned officer in charge, or NCOIC, of the S2 section, then Master Sergeant David P. Adkins recognized my skills and potential and tasked me to work on a tool abandoned by a previously assigned analyst, the incident tracker. The incident tracker was viewed as a back up to the Combined Information Data Network Exchange or CIDNE and as a unit, historical reference to work with.

In the months preceding my upcoming deployment, I worked on creating a new version of the incident tracker and used SigActs to populate it. The SigActs I used were from Afghanistan, because at the time our unit was scheduled to deploy to the Logar and Wardak Provinces of Afghanistan. Later my unit was reassigned to deploy to Eastern Baghdad, Iraq. At that point, I removed the Afghanistan SigActs and switched to Iraq SigActs.

As and analyst I viewed the SigActs as historical data. I believed this view is shared by other all-source analysts as well. SigActs give a first look impression of a specific or isolated event. This event can be an improvised explosive device attack or IED, small arms fire engagement or SAF engagement with a hostile force, or any other event a specific unit documented and recorded in real time.

In my perspective the information contained within a single SigAct or group of SigActs is not very sensitive. The events encapsulated within most SigActs involve either enemy engagements or causalities. Most of this information is publicly reported by the public affairs office or PAO, embedded media pools, or host nation HN media.

As I started working with SigActs I felt they were similar to a daily journal or log that a person may keep. They capture what happens on a particular day in time. They are created immediately after the event, and are potentially updated over a period of hours until final version is published on the Combined Information Data Network Exchange. Each unit has it's own Standard Operating Procedure or SOP for reporting recording SigActs. The SOP may differ between reporting in a particular deployment and reporting in garrison.

In garrison a SigAct normally involves personnel issues such as driving under the influence or DUI incidents or an automobile accident involving the death or serious injury of a soldier. The reports starts at the company level and goes up to the battalion, brigade, and even up to the division level.

In deployed environment a unit may observe or participate in an event and a platoon leader or platoon sergeant may report the event as a SigAct to the company headquarters and the radio transmission operator or RTO. The commander or RTO will then forward the report to the battalion battle captain or battle non-commissioned officer or NCO. Once the battalion battle captain or battle NCO receives the report they will either (1) notify the battalion operations officer or S3; (2) conduct an action, such as launching a quick reaction force; or (3) record the event and report and further report it up the chain of command to the brigade.

The reporting of each event is done by radio or over the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network or SIPRNet, normally by an assigned soldier, usually junior enlisted E-4 and below. Once the SigAct is recorded, the SigAct is further sent up the chain of command. At each level, additional information can either be added or corrected as needed. Normally within 24 to 48 hours, the updating and reporting or a particular SigAct is complete. Eventually all reports and SigActs go through the chain of command from brigade to division and division to corp. At corp level the SigAct is finalized and [missed word].

The CIDNE system contains a database that is used by thousands of Department of Defense - DoD personel including soldiers, civilians, and contractors support. It was the United States Central Command or CENTCOM reporting tool for operational reporting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two separate but similar databases were maintained for each theater - CIDNE-I for Iraq and CIDNE-A for Afghanistan. Each database encompasses over a hundred types of reports and other historical information for access. They contain millions of vetted and finalized directories including operational intelligence reporting.

CIDNE was created to collect and analyze battle-space data to provide daily operational and Intelligence Community (IC) reporting relevant to a commander's daily decision making process. The CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A databases contain reporting and analysis fields for multiple disciplines including Human Intelligence or HUMINT reports, Psychological Operations or PSYOP reports, Engagement reports, Counter Improvised Explosive Device or CIED reports, SigAct reports, Targeting reports, Social and Cultural reports, Civil Affairs reports, and Human Terrain reporting.

As an intelligence analyst, I had unlimited access to the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A databases and the information contained within them. Although each table within the database is important, I primarily dealt with HUMINT reports, SigAct reports and Counter IED reports, because these reports were used to create a work-product I was required to published as an analyst.

In working on an assignment I looked anywhere and everywhere for information. As an all-source analyst, this was something that was expected. The D6-A systems had databases built in, and I utilized them on a daily basis. This simply was--the search tools available on the D6-A systems on SIPRNet such as Query Tree and the DoD and Intellink search engines.

Primarily, I utilized the CIDNE database using the historical and HUMINT reporting to conduct my analysis and provide a back up for my work product. I did statistical analysis on historical data including SigActs to back up analysis that were based on HUMINT reporting and produce charts, graphs, and tables. I also created maps and charts to conduct predictive analysis based on statistical trends. The SigAct reporting provided a reference point for what occurred and provided myself and other analysts with the information to conclude possible outcome.

Although SigAct reporting is sensitive at the time of their creation, their sensitivity normally dissipates within 48 to 72 hours as the information is either publicly released or the unit involved is no longer in the area and not in danger.

It is my understanding that the SigAct reports remain classified only because they are maintained within CIDNE-- because it is only accessible on SIPRnet. Everything on CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A to include SigAct reporting was treated as classified information.

Facts regarding the storage of SigAct Reports.

As part of my training at Fort Drum, I was instructed to ensure that I create back ups of my work product. The need to create back ups was particularly acute given the relative instability and reliability of the computer systems we used in the field during deployment. These computer systems included both organic and theater provided equipment (TPE) D6-A machines.

The organic D6-A machines we brought with us into the field on our deployment were Dell [missed word] laptops and the TPE D6-A machines were Alienware brand laptops. The [M90?] D6-A laptops were the preferred machine to use as they were slightly faster and had fewer problems with dust and temperature than the theater provided Alienware laptops. I used several D6-A machines during the deployment due to various technical problems with the laptops.

With these issues several analysts lost information, but I never lost information due to the multiple backups I created. I attempted to backup as much relevant information as possible. I would save the information so that I or another analyst could quickly access it whenever a machine crashed, SIPRnet connectivity was down, or I forgot where the data was stored.

When backing up information I would do one or all of the following things based on my training:

Physical back up. I tried to keep physical back up copies of information on paper so that the information could be grabbed quickly. Also, it was easier to brief from hard copies of research and HUMINT reports.

Local drive back up. I tried to sort out information I deemed relevant and keep complete copies of the information on each of the computers I used in the Temporary Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility or T-SCIF, including my primary and secondary D6-A machines. This was stored under my user profile on the desktop.

Shared drive backup. Each analyst had access to a 'T' drive-- what we called 'T' drive shared across the SIPRnet. It allowed others to access information that was stored on it. S6 operated the 'T' drive.

Compact disk rewritable or CD-RW back up. For larger datasets I saved the information onto a re-writable disk, labeled the disks, and stored them in the conference room of the T-SCIF. This redundancy permitted us to not worry about information loss. If the system crashed, I could easily pull the information from a secondary computer, the 'T' drive, or one of the CD-RWs.


If another analysts wanted to access my data, but I was unavailable she could find my published products directory on the 'T' drive or on the CD-RWs. I sorted all of my products or research by date, time, and group; and updated the information on each of the storage methods to ensure that the latest information was available to them.

During the deployment I had several of the D6-A machines crash on me. Whenever one of the computer crashed, I usually lost information but the redundancy method ensured my ability to quickly restore old backup data and add my current information to the machine when it was repaired or replaced.

I stored the backup CD-RW with larger datasets in the conference room of the T-SCIF or next to my workstation. I marked the CD-RWs based on the classification level and its content. Unclassified CD-RWs were only labeled with the content type and not marked with classification markings. Early on in the deployment, I only saved and stored the SigActs that were within or near operational environment.

Later I thought it would be easier to just to save all of the SigActs onto a CD-RW. The process would not take very long to complete and so I downloaded the SigActs from CIDNE-I onto a CD-RW. After finishing with CIDNE-I, I did the same with CIDNE-A. By retrieving the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs I was able to retrieve the information whenever I needed it, and not rely upon the unreliable and slow SIPRnet connectivity needed to pull. Instead, I could just find the CD-RW and open up a pre-loaded spreadsheet.

This process began in late December 2009 and continued through early January 2010. I could quickly export one month of the SigAct data at a time and download in the background as I did other tasks.

The process took approximately a week for each table. After downloading the SigAct tables, I periodically updated them, by pulling the most recent SigActs and simply copying them and pasting them into the database saved on the CD-RW. I never hid the fact that I had downloaded copies of both the SigAct tables from CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A. They were stored on appropriately labeled and marked CD-RW, stored in the open.

I viewed this the saving copies of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A as for both for my use and the use of anyone within the S2 section during the SIPRnet connectivity issues.

In addition to the SigAct tables, I had a large repository of HUMINT reports and Counter IED reports downloaded from CIDNE-I. These contained reports that were relevant to the area in and around our operational environment in Eastern Baghdad and the Diyala Province of Iraq.

In order to compress the data to fit onto a CD-RW, I used a compression algorithm called 'bzip2'. The program used to compress the data is called 'WinRAR'. WinRAR is an application that is free, and can be easily downloaded from the internet via the Non-Secure Internet Relay Protocol Network or NIPRnet. I downloaded WinRAR on NIPRnet and transfered it to the D6-A machine user profile desktop using a CD-RW. I did not try to hide the fact that I was downloading WinRAR onto my SIPRnet D6-A machine or computer.

With the assistance of the bzip2 algorithm using the WinRAR program, I was able to fit All of the SigActs onto a single CD-RW and relevant HUMINT and Counter ID reports onto a separate CD-RW.

Facts regarding my knowledge of the WikiLeaks Organization or WLO.

I first became vaguely aware of the WLO during my AIT at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, although I did not fully pay attention until the WLO released purported Short Messaging System or SMS messages from 11 September 2001 on 25 November 2009. At that time references to the release and the WLO website showed up in my daily Google news open source search for information related to US foreign policy.

The stories were about how WLO published about approximately 500,000 messages. I then reviewed the messages myself and realized that the posted messages were very likely real given the sheer volume and detail of the content.

After this, I began conducting research on WLO. I conducted searched on both NIPRnet and SIPRnet on WLO beginning in late November 2009 and early December 2009. At this time I also began to routinely monitor the WLO website. In response to one of my searches in 2009, I found the United States Army Counter Intelligence Center or USACIC report on the WikiLeaks organization. After reviewing the report, I believed that this report was possibly the one that my AIT referenced in early 2008.

I may or may not have saved the report on my D6-A workstation. I know I reviewed the document on other occasions throughout early 2010, and saved it on both my primary and secondary laptops. After reviewing the report, I continued doing research on WLO. However, based upon my open-source collection, I discovered information that contradicted the 2008 USACIC report including information that indicated that similar to other press agencies, WLO seemed to be dedicated to exposing illegal activities and corruption.

WLO received numerous award and recognition for its reporting activities. Also, in reviewing the WLO website, I found information regarding US military SOPs for Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and information on the then outdated rules of engagement for ROE in Iraq for cross-border pursuits of former members of Saddam Hussein [missed word] government.

After seeing the information available on the WLO website, I continued following it and collecting open sources information from it. During this time period, I followed several organizations and groups including wire press agencies such as the Associated Press and Reuters and private intelligence agencies including Strategic Forecasting or Stratfor. This practice was something I was trained to do during AIT, and was something that good analysts were expected to do.

During the searches of WLO, I found several pieces of information that I found useful in my work product in my work as an analyst, specifically I recall WLO publishing documents related to weapons trafficking between two nations that affected my OP. I integrated this information into one or more of my work products.

In addition to visiting the WLO website, I began following WLO using Instand Relay Chat or IRC Client called 'XChat' sometime in early January 2010.

IRC is a protocol for real time internet communications by messaging and conferencing, colloquially referred to as chat rooms or chats. The IRC chat rooms are designed for group communication discussion forums. Each IRC chat room is called a channel - similar to a Television where you can tune in or follow a channel - so long as it is open and does not require [missed word].

Once you [missed word] a specific IRC conversation, other users in the conversation can see that you have joined the room. On the Internet there are millions of different IRC channels across several services. Channel topics span a range of topics covering all kinds of interests and hobbies. The primary reason for following WLO on IRC was curiosit - particularly in regards to how and why they obtained the SMS messages referenced above. I believed that collecting information on the WLO would assist me in this goal.

Initially I simply observed the IRC conversations. I wanted to know how the organization was structured, and how they obtained their data. The conversations I viewed were usually technical in nature but sometimes switched to a lively debate on issue the particular individual may have felt strongly about.

Over a period of time I became more involved in these discussions especially when conversations turned to geopolitical events and information technology topics, such as networking and encryption methods. Based on these observations, I would describe the WL organization as almost academic in nature. In addition to the WLO conversations, I participated in numerous other IRC channels acros at least three different networks. The other IRC channels I participated in normally dealt with technical topics including with Linux and Berkley Secure Distribution BSD operating systems or OS's, networking, encryption algorithms and techniques and other more political topics, such as politics and [missed word].

I normally engaged in multiple IRC conversations simultaneously--mostly publicly, but often privately. The XChat client enabled me to manage these multiple conversations across different channels and servers. The screen for XChat was often busy, but its screens enabled me to see when something was interesting. I would then select the conversation and either observe or participate.

I really enjoyed the IRC conversations pertaining to and involving the WLO, however, at some point in late February or early March of 2010, the WLO IRC channel was no longer accessible. Instead, regular participants of this channel switched to using the Jabber server. Jabber is another internet communication [missed word] similar but more sophisticated than IRC.

The IRC and Jabber conversations, allowed me to feel connected to others even when alone. They helped pass the time and keep motivated throughout the deployment.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the SigActs.

As indicated above I created copies of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct tables as part of the process of backing up information. At the time I did so, I did not intend to use this information for any purpose other than for back up. However, I later decided to release this information publicly. At that time, I believe and still believe that these tables are two of the most significant documents of our time.

On 8 January 2010, I collected the CD-RW I stored in the conference room of the T-SCIF and placed it into the cargo pocket of my ACU or Army Combat Uniform. At the end of my shift, I took the CD-RW out of the T-SCIF and brought it to my Containerized Housing Unit of CHU. I copied the data onto my personal laptop. Later at the beginning of my shift, I returned the CD-RW back to the conference room of the T-SCIF. At the time I saved the SigActs to my laptop, I planned to take them with me on mid-tour leave and decide what to do with them.

At some point prior to my mid-tour, I transfered the information from my computer to a Secure Digital memory card from my digital camera. The SD card for the camera also worked on my computer and allowed me to store the SigAct tables in a secure manner for transport.

I began mid-tour leave on 23 January 2010, flying from Atlanta, Georgia to Reagan National Airport in Virginia. I arrived at the home of my aunt, Debra M. Van Alstyne, in Potomac, Maryland and quickly got into contact with my then boyfriend, Tyler R. Watkins. Tyler, then a student at Brandeis University in Waltham, Massachusetts, and I made plans for me to visit him him Boston, Massachusetts [missed word].

I was excited to see Tyler and planned on talking to Tyler about where our relationship was going and about my time in Iraq. However, when I arrived in the Boston area Tyler and I seemed to become distant. He did not seem very excited about my return from Iraq. I tried talking to him about our relationship but he refused to make any plans.

I also tried to raising the topic of releasing the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigAct tables to the public. I asked Tyler hypothetical questions about what he would do if he had documents that he thought the public needed access to. Tyler really didn't have a specific answer for me. He tried to answer the questions and be supportive, but seemed confused by the question in this context.

I then tried to be more specific, but he asked too many questions. Rather than try to explain my dilemma, I decided to just drop the conversation. After a few days in Waltham, I began to feel really bad. I was over staying my welcome, and I returned to Maryland. I spent the remainder of my time on leave in the Washington, DC area.

During this time a blizzard bombarded the mid-atlantic, and I spent a significant period of time essentially stuck in my aunt's house in Maryland. I began to think about what I knew and the information I still had in my possession. For me, the SigActs represented the on the ground reality of both the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I felt that we were risking so much for people that seemed unwilling to cooperate with us, leading to frustration and anger on both sides. I began to become depressed with the situation that we found ourselves increasingly mired in year after year. The SigActs documented this in great detail and provide a context of what we were seeing on the ground.

In attempting to conduct counter-terrorism or CT and counter-insurgency COIN operations we became obsessed with capturing and killing human targets on lists and not being suspicious of and avoiding cooperation with our Host Nation partners, and ignoring the second and third order effects of accomplishing short-term goals and missions. I believe that if the general public, especially the American public, had access to the information contained within the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables this could spark a domestic debate on the role of the military and our foreign policy in general as [missed word] as it related to Iraq and Afghanistan.

I also believed the detailed analysis of the data over a long period of time by different sectors of society might cause society to reevaluate the need or even the desire to even to engage in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations that ignore the complex dynamics of the people living in the effected environment everyday.

At my aunt's house I debated what I should do with the SigActs - in particular whether I should hold on to them - or expose them through a press agency. At this point I decided that it made sense to try to expose the SigAct tables to an American newspaper. I first called my local news paper, The Washington Post, and spoke with a woman saying that she was a reporter. I asked her if the Washington Post would be interested in receiving information that would have enormous value to the American public.

Although we spoke for about five minutes concerning the general nature of what I possessed, I do not believe she took me seriously. She informed me that the Washington Post would possibly be interested, but that such decisions were made only after seeing the information I was referring to and after consideration by senior editors.

I then decided to contact [missed word] the most popular newspaper, The New York Times. I called the public editor number on The New York Times website. The phone rang and was answered by a machine. I went through the menu to the section for news tips. I was routed to an answering machine. I left a message stating I had access to information about Iraq and Afghanistan that I believed was very important. However, despite leaving my Skype phone number and personal email address, I never received a reply from The New York Times.

I also briefly considered dropping into the office for the Political Commentary blog, Politico, however the weather conditions during my leave hampered my efforts to travel. After these failed efforts I had ultimately decided to submit the materials to the WLO. I was not sure if the WLO would actually publish these SigAct tables [missed a few words]. I was concerned that they might not be noticed by the American media. However, based upon what I read about the WLO through my research described above, this seemed to be the best medium for publishing this information to the world within my reach.

At my aunts house I joined in on an IRC conversation and stated I had information that needed to be shared with the world. I wrote that the information would help document the true cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One of the individuals in the IRC asked me to describe the information. However, before I could describe the information another individual pointed me to the link for the WLO web site online submission system. After ending my IRC connection, I considered my options one more time. Ultimately, I felt that the right thing to do was to release the SigActs.

On 3 February 2010, I visited the WLO website on my computer and clicked on the submit documents link. Next I found the submit your information online link and elected to submit the SigActs via the onion router or TOR anonymizing network by special link. TOR is a system intended to provide anonymity online. The software routes internet traffic through a network of servers and other TOR clients in order to conceal the user's location and identity.

I was familiar with TOR and had it previously installed on a computer to anonymously monitor the social media website of militia groups operating within central Iraq. I followed the prompts and attached the compressed data files of CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs. I attached a text file I drafted while preparing to provide the documents to the Washington Post. It provided rough guidelines saying 'It's already been sanitized of any source identifying information. You might need to sit on this information - perhaps 90 to 100 days to figure out how best to release such a large amount of data and to protect its source. This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century asymmetric warfare. Have a good day.'

After sending this, I left the SD card in a camera case at my aunt's house in the event I needed it again in the future. I returned from mid-tour leave on 11 February 2010. Although the information had not yet been publicly by the WLO, I felt this sense of relief by them having it. I felt I had accomplished something that allowed me to have a clear conscience based upon what I had seen and read about and knew were happening in both Iraq and Afghanistan everyday.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of 10 Reykjavik 13.

I first became aware of the diplomatic cables during my training period in AIT. I later learned about the Department of State or DoS Net-centric Diplomacy NCD portal from the 2/10 Brigade Combat Team S2, Captain Steven Lim. Captain Lim sent a section wide email to the other analysts and officer in late December 2009 containing the SIPRnet link to the portal along with the instructions to look at the cables contained within them and to incorporate them into our work product.

Shortly after this I also noticed the diplomatic cables were being reported to in products from the corp level US Forces Iraq or US-I. Based upon Captain Lim's direction to become familiar with its contents, I read virtually every published cable concerning Iraq.

I also began scanning the database and reading other random cables that piqued my curiosity. It was around this time - in early to mid-January of 2010, that I began searching the database for information on Iceland. I became interested in Iceland due to the IRC conversations I viewed in the WLO channel discussing an issue called Icesave. At this time I was not very familiar with the topic, but it seemed to be a big issue for those participating in the conversation. This is when I decided to investigate and conduct a few searches on Iceland and find out more.

At the time, I did not find anything discussing the Icesave issue either directly or indirectly. I then conducted an open source search for Icesave. I then learned that Iceland was involved in a dispute with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands concerning the financial collapse of one or more of Iceland's banks. According to open source reporting much of the public controversy involved the United Kingdom's use of anti-terrorism legislation against Iceland in order to freeze Icelandic access for payment of the guarantees for UK depositors that lost money.

Shortly after returning from mid-tour leave, I returned to the Net Centric Diplomacy portal to search for information on Iceland and Icesave as the topic had not abated on the WLO IRC channel. To my surprise, on 14 February 2010, I found the cable 10 Reykjavik 13, which referenced the Icesave issue directly.

The cable published on 13 January 2010 was just over two pages in length. I read the cable and quickly concluded that Iceland was essentially being bullied diplomatically by two larger European powers. It appeared to me that Iceland was out viable options and was coming to the US for assistance. Despite the quiet request for assistance, it did not appear that we were going to do anything.

From my perspective it appeared that we were not getting involved due to the lack of long term geopolitical benefit to do so. After digesting the contents of 10 Reykjavik 13 I debated whether this was something I should send to the WLO. At this point the WLO had not published or acknowledged receipt of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A tables. Despite not knowing that the SigActs were a priority for the WLO, I decided the cable was something that would be important. I felt that I would be able to right a wrong by having them publish this document. I burned the information onto a CD-RW on 15 February 2010, took it to my CHU, and saved it onto my personal laptop.

I navigated to the WLO website via a TOR connection like before and uploaded the document via the secure form. Amazingly, when WLO published 10 Reykjavik 13 within hours, proving that the form worked and that they must have received the SigAct tables.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team or AW team video.

During the mid-February 2010 time frame the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division targeting analysts, then Specialist Jihrleah W. Showman discussed a video that Ms. Showman had found on the 'T' drive.

The video depicted several individuals being engaged by an aerial weapons team. At first I did not consider the video very special, as I have viewed countless other war porn type videos depicting combat. However, the recording of audio comments by the aerial weapons team crew and the second engagement in the video of an unarmed bongo truck troubled me.

As Showman and a few other analysts and officers in the T-SCIF commented on the video and debated whether the crew violated the rules of engagement or ROE in the second engagement, I shied away from this debate, instead conducting some research on the event. I wanted to learn what happened and whether there was any background to the events of the day that the event occurred, 12 July 2007.

Using Google I searched for the event by its date by its general location. I found several new accounts involving two Reuters employees who were killed during the aerial weapon team engagement. Another story explained that Reuters had requested for a copy of the video under the Freedom of Information Act or FOIA. Reuters wanted to view the video in order to understand what had happened and to improve their safety practices in combat zones. A spokesperson for Reuters was quoted saying that the video might help avoid the reoccurrence of the tragedy and believed there was a compelling need for the immediate release of the video.

Despite the submission of the FOIA request, the news account explained that CENTCOM replied to Reuters stating that they could not give a time frame for considering a FOIA request and that the video might no longer exist. Another story I found written a year later said that even though Reuters was still pursuing their request. They still did not receive a formal response or written determination in accordance with FOIA.

The fact neither CENTCOM or Multi National Forces Iraq or MNF-I would not voluntarily release the video troubled me further. It was clear to me that the event happened because the aerial weapons team mistakenly identified Reuters employees as a potential threat and that the people in the bongo truck were merely attempting to assist the wounded. The people in the van were not a threat but merely 'good samaritans'. The most alarming aspect of the video to me, however, was the seemly delightful bloodlust they appeared to have.

The dehumanized the individuals they were engaging and seemed to not value human life by referring to them as quote "dead bastards" unquote and congratulating each other on the ability to kill in large numbers. At one point in the video there is an individual on the ground attempting to crawl to safety. The individual is seriously wounded. Instead of calling for medical attention to the location, one of the aerial weapons team crew members verbally asks for the wounded person to pick up a weapon so that he can have a reason to engage. For me, this seems similar to a child torturing ants with a magnifying glass.

While saddened by the aerial weapons team crew's lack of concern about human life, I was disturbed by the response of the discovery of injured children at the scene. In the video, you can see that the bongo truck driving up to assist the wounded individual. In response the aerial weapons team crew-- as soon as the individuals are a threat, they repeatedly request for authorization to fire on the bongo truck and once granted they engage the vehicle at least six times.

Shortly after the second engagement, a mechanized infantry unit arrives at the scene. Within minutes, the aerial weapons team crew learns that children were in the van and despite the injuries the crew exhibits no remorse. Instead, they downplay the significance of their actions, saying quote 'Well, it's their fault for bringing their kid's into a battle' unquote.

The aerial weapons team crew members sound like they lack sympathy for the children or the parents. Later in a particularly disturbing manner, the aerial weapons team verbalizes enjoyment at the sight of one of the ground vehicles driving over a body - or one of the bodies. As I continued my research, I found an article discussing the book, The Good Soldiers, written by Washington Post writer David Finkel.

In Mr. Finkel book, he writes about the aerial weapons team attack. As, I read an online excerpt in Google Books, I followed Mr. Finkel's account of the event belonging to the video. I quickly realize that Mr. Finkel was quoting, I feel in verbatim, the audio communications of the aerial weapons team crew.

It is clear to me that Mr. Finkel obtained access and a copy of the video during his tenue as an embedded journalist. I was aghast at Mr. Finkel's portrayal of the incident. Reading his account, one would believe the engagement was somehow justified as 'payback' for an earlier attack that lead to the death of a soldier. Mr. Finkel ends his account by discussing how a soldier finds an individual still alive from the attack. He writes that the soldier finds him and sees him gesture with his two forefingers together, a common method in the Middle East to communicate that they are friendly. However, instead of assisting him, the soldier makes an obscene gesture extending his middle finger.

The individual apparently dies shortly thereafter. Reading this, I can only think of how this person was simply trying to help others, and then he quickly finds he needs help as well. To make matter worse, in the last moments of his life, he continues to express his friendly gesture - only to find himself receiving this well known gesture of unfriendliness. For me it's all a big mess, and I am left wondering what these things mean, and how it all fits together. It burdens me emotionally.

I saved a copy of the video on my workstation. I searched for and found the rules of engagement, the rules of engagement annexes, and a flow chart from the 2007 time period - as well as an unclassified Rules of Engagement smart card from 2006. On 15 February 2010 I burned these documents onto a CD-RW, the same time I burned the 10 Reykjavik 13 cable onto a CD-RW. At the time, I placed the video and rules for engagement information onto my personal laptop in my CHU. I planned to keep this information there until I redeployed in Summer 2010. I planned on providing this to the Reuters office in London to assist them in preventing events such as this in the future.

However, after the WLO published 10 Reykjavik 13 I altered my plans. I decided to provide the video and the rules of engagement to them so that Reuters would have this information before I re-deployed from Iraq. On about 21 February 2010, I described above, I used the WLO submission form and uploaded the documents. The WLO released the video on 5 April 2010. After the release, I was concern about the impact of the video and how it would been received by the general public.

I hoped that the public would be as alarmed as me about the conduct of the aerial weapons team crew members. I wanted the American public to know that not everyone in Iraq and Afghanistan are targets that needed to be neutralized, but rather people who were struggling to live in the pressure cooker environment of what we call asymmetric warfare. After the release I was encouraged by the response in the media and general public, who observed the aerial weapons team video. As I hoped, others were just as troubled-- if not more troubled that me by what they saw.

At this time, I began seeing reports claiming that the Department of Defense an CENTCOM could not confirm the authenticity of the video. Additionally, one of my supervisors, Captain Casey Fulton, stated her belief that the video was not authentic. In her response, I decided to ensure that the authenticity of the video would not be questioned in the future. On 25 February 2010, I emailed Captain Fulton, a link to the video that was on our 'T' drive, and a copy of the video published by WLO that was collected by the open source center, so she could compare them herself.

Around this time frame, I burned a second CD-RW containing the aerial weapons team video. In order to made it appear authentic, I placed a classification sticker and wrote Reuters FOIA REQ on its face. I placed the CD-RW in one of my personal CD cases containing a set of 'Starting Out in Arabic CD's.' I planned on mailing out the CD-RW to Reuters after our re-deployment, so they could have a copy that was unquestionably authentic.

Almost immediately after submitting the aerial weapons team video and rules of engagement documents I notified the individuals in the WLO IRC to expect an important submission. I received a response from an individual going by the handle of 'ox' - at first our conversations were general in nature, but over time as our conversations progressed, I accessed this individual to be an important part of the WLO.

Due to the strict adherence of anonymity by the WLO, we never exchanged identifying information. However, I believe the individual was likely Mr. Julian Assange [he pronounced it with three syllables], Mr. Daniel Schmidt, or a proxy representative of Mr. Assange and Schmidt.

As the communications transfered from IRC to the Jabber client, I gave 'ox' and later 'pressassociation' the name of Nathaniel Frank in my address book, after the author of a book I read in 2009.

After a period of time, I developed what I felt was a friendly relationship with Nathaniel. Our mutual interest in information technology and politics made our conversations enjoyable. We engaged in conversation often. Sometimes as long as an hour or more. I often looked forward to my conversations with Nathaniel after work.

The anonymity that was provided by TOR and the Jabber client and the WLO's policy allowed me to feel I could just be myself, free of the concerns of social labeling and perceptions that are often placed upon me in real life. In real life, I lacked a closed friendship with the people I worked with in my section, the S2 section.

In my section, the S2 section supported battalions and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team as a whole. For instance, I lacked close ties with my roommate to his discomfort regarding my perceived sexual orientation. Over the next few months, I stayed in frequent contact with Nathaniel. We conversed on nearly a daily basis and I felt that we were developing a friendship.

Conversations covered many topics and I enjoyed the ability to talk about pretty much everything, and not just the publications that the WLO was working on. In retrospect that these dynamics were artificial and were valued more by myself than Nathaniel. For me these conversations represented an opportunity to escape from the immense pressures and anxiety that I experienced and built up through out the deployment. It seems that as I tried harder to fit in at work, the more I seemed to alienate my peers and lose respect, trust, and support I needed.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of documents related to the detainments by the Iraqi Federal Police or FP, and the Detainee Assessment Briefs, and the USACIC United States Army Counter Intelligence Center report.

On 27 February 2010, a report was received from a subordinate battalion. The report described an event in which the Federal Police or FP detained 15 individuals for printing anti-Iraqi literature. On 2 March 2010, I received instructions from an S3 section officer in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Tactical Operation Center or TOC to investigate the matter, and figure out who the quote 'bad guys' unquote were and how significant this event was for the Federal Police.

Over the course of my research I found that none of the individuals had previous ties to anti-Iraqi actions or suspected terrorist militia groups. A few hours later, I received several [playlist?] from the scene - from this subordinate battalion. They were accidentally sent to an officer on a different team on the S2 section and she forwarded them to me.

These photos included picture of the individuals, pallets of unprinted paper and seized copies of the final printed material or the printed document; and a high resolution photo of the printed material itself. I printed up one [missed word] copy of a high resolution photo-- I laminated it for ease of use and transfer. I then walked to the TOC and delivered the laminated copy to our category two interpreter.

She reviewed the information and about a half and hour later delivered a rough written transcript in English to the S2 section. I read the transcript and followed up with her, asking her for her take on the content. She said it was easy for her to transcribe verbatim, since I blew up the photograph and laminated it. She said the general nature of the document was benign. The document, as I had sensed as well, was merely a scholarly critique of the then current Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

It detailed corruption within the cabinet of al-Maliki's government and the financial impact of his corruption on the Iraqi people. After discovering this discrepancy between the Federal Police's report and the interpreter's transcript, I forwarded this discovery to the top OIC and the battle NCOIC. The top OIC and the overhearing battle captain informed me that they didn't need or want to know this information anymore. They told me to quote "drop it" unquote and to just assist them and the Federal Police in finding out, where more of these print shops creating quote' anti-Iraqi literature' unquote.

I couldn't believe what I heard and I returned to the T-SCIF and complained to the other analysts and my section NCOIC about what happened. Some were sympathetic, but no one wanted to do anything about it.

I am the type of person who likes to know how things work. And, as an analyst, this means I always want to figure out the truth. Unlike other analysts in my section or other sections within the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, I was not satisfied with just scratching the surface and producing canned or cookie cutter assessments. I wanted to know why something was the way it was, and what we could to correct or mitigate a situation.

I knew that if I continued to assist the Baghdad Federal Police in identifying the political opponents of Prime Minister al-Maliki, those people would be arrested and in the custody of the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police and very likely tortured and not seen again for a very long time-- if ever.

Instead of assisting the Special Unit of the Baghdad Federal Police, I decided to take the information and expose it to the WLO, in the hope that before the upcoming 7 March 2010 election, they could generate some immediate press on the issue and prevent this unit of the Federal Police from continuing to crack down in political opponents of al-Maliki.

On 4 March 2010, I burned the report, the photos, the high resolution copy of the pamphlet, and the interpreters hand written transcript onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and copied the data onto my personal computer. Unlike the times before, instead of uploading the information through the WLO website submission form. I made a Secure File Transfer Protocol or SFTP connection to a file drop box operated by the WLO.

The drop box contained a folder that allowed me to upload directly into it. Saving files into this directory. Allowed anyone with log in access to server to view and download them. After uploading these files to the WLO, on 5 March 2010, I notified Nathaniel over Jabber. Although sympathetic, he said that the WLO needed more information to confirm the event in order for it to be published or to gain interest in the international media.

I attempted to provide the specifics, but to my disappointment, the WLO website chose not to publish this information. At the same time, I began sifting through information from the US Southern Command or SOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Cuba or JTF-GTMO. The thought occurred to me - although unlikely, that I wouldn't be surprised if the individuals detainees by the Federal Police might be turned over back into US custody - and ending up in the custody of Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

As I digested through the information on Joint Task Force Guantanamo, I quickly found the Detainee Assessment Briefs or DABs. I previously came across the document's before in 2009 but did not think much about them. However, this time I was more curious in this search and I found them again.

The DABs were written in standard DoD memorandum format and addressed the commander US SOUTHCOM. Each memorandum gave basic and background information about a detainee held at some point by Joint Task Force Guantanamo. I have always been interested on the issue of the moral efficacy of our actions surrounding Joint Task Force Guantanamo. On the one hand, I have always understood the need to detain and interrogate individuals who might wish to harm the United States and our allies, however, I felt that what we were trying to do at Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

However, the more I became educated on the topic, it seemed that we found ourselves holding an increasing number of individuals indefinitely that we believed or knew to be innocent, low level foot soldiers that did not have useful intelligence and would be released if they were still held in theater.

I also recall that in early 2009 the, then newly elected president, Barack Obama, stated that he would close Joint Task Force Guantanamo, and that the facility compromised our standing over all, and diminished our quote 'moral authority' unquote.

After familiarizing myself with the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I agree. Reading through the Detainee Assessment Briefs, I noticed that they were not analytical products, instead they contained summaries of tear line versions of interim intelligence reports that were old or unclassified. None of the DABs contained the names of sources or quotes from tactical interrogation reports or TIR's. Since the DABs were being sent to the US SOUTHCOM commander, I assessed that they were intended to provide very general background information on each of the detainees and not a detailed assessment.

In addition to the manner in which the DAB's were written, I recognized that they were at least several years old, and discussed detainees that were already released from Joint Task Force Guantanamo. Based on this, I determined that the DAB's were not very important fro either an intelligence or a national security standpoint. On 7 March 2010, during my Jabber conversation with Nathaniel, I asked him if he thought the DAB's were of any use to anyone.

Nathaniel indicated, although he did not believe that they were of political significance, he did believe that they could be used to merge into the general historical account of what occurred at Joint Task Force Guantanamo. He also thought that the DAB's might be helpful to the legal counsel of those currently and previously held at JTF-GTMO.

After this discussion, I decided to download the data. I used an application called Wget to download the DAB's. I downloaded Wget off of the NIPRnet laptop in the T-SCIF, like other programs. I saved that onto a CD-RW, and placed the executable in my 'My Documents' directory on my user profile, on the D6-A SIPRnet workstation.

On 7 March 2010, I took the list of links for the detainee assessment briefs, and Wget downloaded them sequentially. I burned the data onto a CD-RW, and took it into my CHU, and copied them onto my personal computer. On 8 March 2010, I combined the Detainee Assessment Briefs with the United States Army Counterintelligence Center reports on the WLO, into a compressed IP file. Zip files contain multiple files which are compressed to reduce their size.

After creating the zip file, I uploaded the file onto their cloud drop box via Secure File Transfer Protocol. Once these were uploaded, I notified Nathaniel that the information was in the 'x' directory, which had been designated for my own use. Earlier that day, I downloaded the USACIC report on WLO.

As discussed about, I previously reviewed the report on numerous occasions and although I saved the document onto the work station before, I could not locate it. After I found the document again, I downloaded it to my work station, and saved it onto the same CD-RW as the Detainee Assessment Briefs described above.

Although my access included a great deal of information, I decided I had nothing else to send to WLO after sending the Detainee Assessment Briefs and the USACIC report. Up to this point I had sent them the following: the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SigActs tables; the Reykjavik 13 Department of State Cable; the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team video and the 2006-2007 rules of engagement documents; the SigAct report and supporting documents concerning the 15 individuals detained by the Baghdad Federal Police; the USSOUTHCOM and Joint Task Force Guantanamo Detainee Assessment Briefs; a USACIC report on the WikiLeaks website and the WikiLeaks organization.

Over the next few weeks I did not send any additional information to the WLO. I continued to converse with Nathaniel over the Jabber client and in the WLO IRC channel. Although I stopped sending documents to WLO, no one associated with the WLO pressures me into giving more information. The decisions that I made to send documents and information to the WLO and the website were my own decisions, and I take full responsibility for my actions.

Facts regarding the unauthorized disclosure of Other Government Documents.

One 22 March 2010, I downloaded two documents. I found these documents over the course of my normal duties as an analysts. Based on my training and the guidance of my superiors, I look at as much information as possible.

Doings so provided me with the ability to make connections that others might miss. On several occasions during the month of March, I accessed information from a Government entity. I read several documents from a section within this Government entity. The content of two of these documents upset me greatly. I had difficulty believing what this section was doing.

On 22 March 2010, I downloaded the two documents that I found troubling. I compressed them into a zip file named blah.zip and burned them onto a CD-RW. I took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved the file to my personal computer.

I uploaded the information to the WLO website using the designated prompts.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of the Net Centric Diplomacy Department of State Cables.

In late March of 2010, I received a warning over Jabber from Nathaniel, that the WLO website would be publishing the aerial weapons team video. He indicated that the WLO would be very busy and the frequency and intensity of our Jabber conversations decrease significantly. During this time, I had nothing but work to distract me.

I read more of the diplomatic cables published on the Department of State Net Centric Diplomacy. With my insatiable curiosity and interest in geopolitics I became fascinated with them. I read not only the cables on Iraq, but also about countries and events that I found interesting.

The more I read, the more I was fascinated with the way that we dealt with other nations and organizations. I also began to think the documented backdoor deals and seemingly criminal activity that didn't seem characteristic of the de facto leader of the free world.

Up to this point,during the deployment, I had issues I struggled with and difficulty at work. Of the documents release, the cables were the only one I was not absolutely certain couldn't harm the United States. I conducted research on the cables published on the Net Centric Diplomacy, as well as how Department of State cables worked in general.

In particular, I wanted to know how each cable was published on SIRPnet via the Net Centric Diplomacy. As part of my open source research, I found a document published by the Department of State on its official website.

The document provided guidance on caption markings for individual cables and handling instructions for their distribution. I quickly learned the caption markings clearly detailed the sensitivity of the Department of State cables. For example, NODIS or No Distribution was used for messages at the highest sensitivity and were only distributed to the authorized recipients.

The SIPDIS or SIPRnet distribution caption was applied only to recording of other information messages that were deemed appropriate for a release for a wide number of individuals. According to the Department of State guidance for a cable to have the SIPDIS [missed word] caption, it could not include other captions that were intended to limit distribution.

The SIPDIS caption was only for information that could only be shared with anyone with access to SIPRnet. I was aware that thousands of military personel, DoD, Department of State, and other civilian agencies had easy access to the tables. The fact that the SIPDIS caption was only for wide distribution made sense to me, given that the vast majority of the Net Centric Diplomacy Cables were not classified.

The more I read the cables, the more I came to the conclusion that this was the type of information that should become public. I once read a and used a quote on open diplomacy written after the First World War and how the world would be a better place if states would avoid making secret pacts and deals with and against each other.

I thought these cables were a prime example of a need for a more open diplomacy. Given all of the Department of State cables that I read, the fact that most of the cables were unclassified, and that all the cables have a SIPDIS caption.

I believe that the public release of these cables would not damage the United States, however, I did believe that the cables might be embarrassing, since they represented very honest opinions and statements behind the backs of other nations and organizations.

In many ways these cables are a catalogue of cliques and gossip. I believed exposing this information might make some within the Department of State and other government entities unhappy. On 22 March 2010, I began downloading a copy of the SIPDIS cables using the program Wget, described above.

I used instances of the Wget application to download the Net Centric Diplomacy cables in the background. As I worked on my daily tasks, the Net centric Diplomacy cables were downloaded from 28 March 2010 to 9 April 2010. After downloading the cables, I saved them on to a CD-RW.

These cables went from the earliest dates in Net Centric Diplomacy to 28 February 2010. I took the CD-RW to my CHU on 10 April 2010. I sorted the cables on my personal computer, compressed them using the bzip2 compression algorithm described above, and uploaded them to the WLO via designated drop box described above.

On 3 May 2010, I used Wget to download and update of the cables for the months of March 2010 and April 2010 and saved the information onto a zip file and burned it to a CD-RW. I then took the CD-RW to my CHU and saved those to my computer. I later found that the file was corrupted during the transfer. Although I intended to re-save another copy of these cables, I was removed from the T-SCIF on 8 May 2010 after an altercation.

Facts regarding the unauthorized storage and disclosure of Garani, Farah Province Afghanistan 15-6 Investigation and Videos.

[NB Pfc. Manning plead 'not guilty' to the Specification 11, Charge II for the Garani Video as charged by the government, which alleged as November charge date. Read more here.]

In late March 2010, I discovered a US CENTCOM directly on a 2009 airstrike in Afghanistan. I was searching CENTCOM I could use as an analyst. As described above, this was something that myself and other officers did on a frequent basis. As I reviewed the incident and what happened. The airstrike occurred in the Garani village in the Farah Province, Northwestern Afghanistan. It received worldwide press coverage during the time as it was reported that up to 100 to 150 Afghan civilians - mostly women and children - were accidentally killed during the airstrike.

After going through the report and the [missed word] annexes, I began to review the incident as being similar to the 12 July 2007 aerial weapons team engagements in Iraq. However, this event was noticeably different in that it involved a significantly higher number of individuals, larger aircraft and much heavier munitions. Also, the conclusions of the report are more disturbing than those of the July 2007 incident.

I did not see anything in the 15-6 report or its annexes that gave away sensitive information. Rather, the investigation and its conclusions were - what those involved should have done, and how to avoid an event like this from occurring again.

After investigating the report and its annexes, I downloaded the 15-6 investigation, PowerPoint presentations, and several other supporting documents to my D6-A workstation. I also downloaded three zip files containing the videos of the incident. I burned this information onto a CD-RW and transfered it to the personal computer in my CHU. I did later that day or the next day - I uploaded the information to the WL website this time using a new version of the WLO website submission form.

Unlike other times using the submission form above, I did not activate the TOR anonymizer. Your Honor, this concludes my statement and facts for this providence inquiry.

Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News.

Done in by the PATRIOT Act

The Grand Irony of the Petraeus Sex Scandal
Dave Lindorff
Mon, 11/12/2012
http://www.thiscantbehappening.net/node/1424

There is a delicious irony to the story of the crash-and-burn career of Four-Star General and later (at least briefly) CIA Director David Petraeus.

The man who was elevated to the ethereal ranks of a General Eisenhower or Robert E. Lee by swooning corporate myth makers like the Philadelphia Inquirer’s Trudy Rubin, the Washington Post’s David Iglesias, and the NY Times’ Michael Gordon, was never really that brilliant. It wasn’t his “surge” after all that quieted things down (temporarily) in Iraq; rather it was a deal to pay off the insurgents with cash to stand down until the US could gracefully pull out without the departing troops having to be shoot their way down to Kuwait in full retreat. As for his allegedly “brilliant” counterinsurgency policy of “winning hearts and minds,” we have already seen how well that has worked in Iraq, which is now basically a client state of Iran, and the writing is already on the wall in Afghanistan, where the US is almost universally loathed, with US forces spending most of their time looking out for Afghan soldiers who might turn their guns on their supposed ally and “mentor” American troops.

For a real measure of Gen. Petraeus, go to Admiral William Fallon -- that rare military leader who had the guts to tell President Bush and Cheney he would not allow an attack on Iran “on his watch,” thereby quite possibly saving us all from being at war with Iran years ago. Fallon, who at the time in 2007 was head of Centcom, the military command region covering the entire Middle East, once reportedly called, Petraeus, who was being put in charge of the Iraq theater, an “ass-licking little chicken-shit” -- to his face.

Anyhow, what makes the epic collapse of this consummate political general’s career so exquisite is that it was the post-9-11 spying capabilities of the FBI that allowed its agents to slip unannounced into the email of the General’s paramour, Paula Broadwell (a name that could have been selected by Ian Fleming!), and possibly into the general’s own email too, there to find the evidence, allegedly in the form of X-rated letters, of a covert adulterous relationship underway.

We now know that the FBI was alerted to this breach of decorum (if the illicit romance began while Petraeus was on active duty in Afghanistan, he could be prosecuted under the same rules that have led to the prosecution of many lower ranking offers: bringing ill-repute upon the military) and lack of judgement on the part of the head of the nation’s spooks, by a second woman, Jill Kelley, who was a volunteer military liaison and family friend of the Petraeus clan. Kelley’s closeness to Petraeus allegedly caused the jealous Broadwell to allegedly send threatening emails to her imagined rival, including one that told her to “stay away from my guy!”

It seems likely Kelley, in asking the FBI to put a halt to the threatening emails, would have been quick to point out that Broadwell was having an affair with Petraeus. In any event, once the FBI successfully go the telecom company she was using to allow them into Broadwell’s email, that would have been clear, and it would have been easy work to move on to the general’s own cache of love letters (in which he may have been referred to by Broadwell by what she told The Daily Show's John Stewart was his childhood nickname: "Peaches").

The CIA chief was thus done in by the Patriot Act and other assorted violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, all backed by Gen. Petraeus and his political promoters in Congress and the White House, as well as in the corporate media.

Of course, while we can enjoy this payback, and speculate on how it must be giving the shivers to many a philandering White House staffer and member of Congress, it should also be a warning to us all that the FBI, the CIA, and the myriad other intelligence agencies littering the US landscape, these days have virtually limitless ability to monitor our every email message, tweet and phone call.

Maybe we should invite the now humbled Petreaeus to become the poster child for a renewed battle to restore the Bill of Rights.

NATO rebrands “occupation” of Afghanistan?

22 May, 2012
http://www.rt.com/news/nato-summit-afghanistan-chicago-835

On the last day of the NATO summit in Chicago, the bloc’s leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to ending the war in Afghanistan in 2014 and vowed support to the Afghans. But is it going to be the end of the occupation?

Afghanistan dominated the two-day summit in Chicago that brought together more than 50 nations, including 28 NATO countries, as well as the Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, and Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari.

The alliance declared in a summit communiqué that while NATO will maintain a significant presence in Afghanistan after 2014, “this will not be a combat mission.''

“As transition of security responsibility is completed at the end of 2014, NATO will have made the shift from a combat mission to a new training, advising and assistance mission, which will be of a different nature to the current ISAF mission,” NATO said in the Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.

The document also vowed to provide a “sound legal basis” for the new NATO-led mission, such as a UN Security Council Resolution.

Obama called the transition “the next milestone'' in bringing the near 11-year long war to an end.

NATO stated that the preliminary model of the Afghan National Security Forces envisages a force of 228,500 with an estimated annual budget of US$4.1billion.

However the Afghan situation in reality seems to be less optimistic than the Chicago summit suggested.

NATO’s chief Anders Fog Rasmussen acknowledged that enormous progress must be made for their plan to become a reality.

“We still have a lot of work to do, and there will be great challenges ahead,'' President Obama said after his lengthy talks with Hamid Karzai. “The loss of life continues in Afghanistan.''

Last month, Obama went on a secret trip to Afghanistan where he signed an agreement pledging US financial and military support to the country for 10 years beyond the 2014 withdrawal.

The US president also thanked other nations in Central Asia and Russia for their roles in providing “critical transit'' for supplies, though pointedly made no mention of Pakistan, highlighting tensions between Washington and Islamabad. Pakistan closed the supply lines in November following a US airstrike that killed two dozen Pakistani soldiers.

However NATO chief has said at a summit that he is optimistic Pakistan will reopen the supply route to Afghanistan. Rasmussen said he expected such a move "in the very near future".

The United States has indicated that it is not willing to pay for the whole mission and invited other NATO members to contribute, and they’re expected to provide about US$1.3 billion. Around US$1 billion of that has already been pledged, a senior Western official said Sunday.

Meanwhile public frustration with the long lasting war is growing in NATO countries. Sixty six percent of Americans oppose the war, while only 27 percent support the effort, according to an AP-GfK poll released this month.

The US, Germany and NATO are not intending to give up Afghanistan, a resource-rich, strategic part of the world, for a very long time, believes Brian Becker, the director of the ANSWER anti-war coalition.

“NATO forces and the US are in the process of rebranding what they anticipate will be a long-term occupation, going way beyond 2014,” he told RT.

“They can call it troop’s trainers or Afghan military bases instead of NATO military bases,” he said. “Whatever they do, however they brand it, NATO and US forces intend to stay as we know from the strategic partnership agreements signed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai and US President Obama and then by President Karzai and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.”
The US scripted the situation in Afghanistan in a particular way, Becker stresses. “They have created what is a proxy government that lacks credibility, and lacking credibility it is thus dependent on foreign occupation forces.”

The real goal of the US is to secure military bases in this strategic area and, broadly speaking, in southern Asia, the anti-war activist maintains

“What we’re looking at is a different form of US and NATO presence in Afghanistan,” says political analyst and writer Rick Rozoff.

“It is clear that NATO wants to expand its military presence throughout Central Asia as well as maintaining some sort of presence in Afghanistan,” he told RT.

“The unprecedented insurgent assault on Kabul in April suggested that the Afghan government cannot even protect its own capital, much less the country as a whole,” Rozoff said.

Over 700,000 New Vets Seek Health Care, Half with Mental Problems

Mark Benjamin Monday, October 3, 2011
http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2011/10/03/over-700000-new-vets-seek-health-care-half-with-mental-problems/

Nearly three-quarters of a million veterans back from Iraq and Afghanistan who are now out of the military have sought medical care from the government, and more than half of those service members suffer from a mental health condition, including post-traumatic stress disorder.

These are among the stunning numbers in a new report compiled by Veterans for Common Sense, a veterans' advocacy organization. VCS shared the new report with TIME prior to public release scheduled for this week. The group culled the information from government data mostly obtained through a raft of Freedom of Information Act requests submitted to the Defense Department and the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The bullet-point report portrays the sweeping impact of a decade of war on U.S. troops, including the fact that over 2.2 million service members have fought in Iraq and Afghanistan and 42 percent of those troops have deployed to war two times or more.

The study reports the 6,211 deaths and 45,889 troops wounded in action so far, but it also sheds light on a dirty little secret about how the Pentagon has long minimized the number of reported casualties by excluding the number of injuries that are not the direct result of the bullets and bombs of the enemy. Another 56,874 service members have been medically evacuated from Iraq or Afghanistan because of accidents and other injuries. That brings the total number of casualties to 108,974.

The Pentagon says those 56,874 troops mostly are not casualties, but troops evacuated for medical problems unrelated to service. Go visit Walter Reed and chat with the troops banged up in Humvee wrecks and other incidents and tell them that. Also, the Pentagon's own dictionary (yes, they have one) defines a casualty as, “Any person who is lost to the organization by having been declared dead, duty status - whereabouts unknown, missing, ill, or injured.”

The precise number of service members back from war, out of the military, and seeking treatment from the VA is 711,986, according to VCS. More that half of those troops, 367,749, suffers from a mental health condition.

A typical veteran is in his early twenties. The U.S. will be caring for hundreds of thousands of these vets for decades.

The CIA’s Fake “Arab Spring” Becoming A Long, Hot Summer Of War

Obama Regime Courts World Conflagration: Imperial Overstretch Threatens as US, NATO Wage Five Wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, and Yemen – Are Syria, Iran, Lebanon Next?
Webster G. Tarpley, Ph.D.
TARPLEY.net
June 20, 2011
http://tarpley.net/2011/06/20/cia-fake-arab-spring-becoming-summer-of-war

Washington DC, June 20 - With the previously covert US bombing of Yemen out in the open, the Obama administration is now waging illegal wars against at least five countries – Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, and Yemen. Given Obama’s absurd and Orwellian theory that acts of war from the air in the sea do not constitute hostilities under the terms of the War Powers Act, this list may be incomplete, and stealth US attacks may be going on elsewhere as well. As spring turns into summer along the banks of the Potomac, there are signs that Obama’s next move may be a trifecta of aggression – an attack on Syria which would also embroil the US in war with Iran and with the Hezbollah forces of Lebanon. Or, the Obama rampage may strike Pakistan. The “Arab Spring” of color revolutions, military coups, and destabilizations is moving inexorably towards a possible world conflagration whose outlines are already visible.

According to military sources speaking on the Alex Jones radio program on June 15, US Special Forces units based at Fort Hood, Texas, have been told to prepare for deployment to Libya no later than July. Also on alert, reportedly for September or October, are the heavy armored units of the First Cavalry Division, currently located in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with other components of the US III Corps at various US bases. Observers point out that US Special Forces have been in Libya since February at the latest. They also note that, while the Libyan destination is highly plausible, some of these units may also find themselves on the way to Yemen, Syria, Iran, or beyond. At the same time, the Russian Foreign Ministry was denouncing the presence of the US Aegis cruiser Monterrey in the Black Sea. The amphibious assault ship USS Bataan and its task force are presently off the coast of Syria. One very plausible explanation for these deployments might be that a US attack on Syria, under the pretext of protecting civilians, is imminent.

On June 19, CNN reported1 a large-scale US Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps military drill, the biggest of its type in history, along much of the American Atlantic coast under the code name of Exercise Mailed Fist, to be conducted from June 19-24. “The exercise is designed to test the capability of every type of Marine Corps aircraft, including MV-22 Ospreys and F/A 18 Hornets, as well as some Navy ships and Air Force planes,” CNN reported. This drill appears designed to train for amphibious landings on the coast of the Mediterranean, as in Libya or Syria.

June-July Turning Point, as in 1848

The US-UK putsch wave of 2011 continues to exhibit similarities to an earlier historical model, the insurrections of 1848 in Europe. The 1848 events started with a revolt in Sicily (not far from Tunisia), and forced the ouster of King Louis Philippe of France in February and of the powerful Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, in March. These insurrections drew on the pent-up tensions accumulated over decades under the post-1815 Holy Alliance system, but they were by and large detonated by the networks of Italian ultra-nationalist firebrand Giuseppe Mazzini, an agent of the British Admiralty. Tides of unrest swept through central Europe.

The turning point came in June-July 1848. When a Czech nationalist insurrection broke out in Prague, it was crushed by the Austrian army of Gen. Windischgrätz after June 12. An attempted coup by the radical working class and city mob of Paris, organized in Louis Blanc’s National Workshops, was defeated by the reactionary Gen. Cavaignac in the June Days – June 24-26, 1848. In northern Italy, the army of the Italian Kingdom of Sardinia – which had declared war2 on Vienna in support of a rebellion in Milan and with the hope of using the upheaval to drive the Austrians out of Italy and thus achieve national unity – was defeated on July 25 by Marshal Radetsky at Custozza. In September and October, Hungarian nationalist radicals under the Mazzini disciple Kossuth set off a civil war with the Croatians, leading to social chaos and (as R. R. Palmer put it), “the war of all against all.” Somewhat later, Russian troops were invited in to put down the Hungarian rebellion. There was a renewed flare-up of insurrectionary activity in the spring of 1849, notably with the creation of Mazzini’s Roman Republic, before the insurrectionary movements subsided during the late summer of 1849, and gave way to a phase of oppression, cynicism, and reaction. It may be useful to keep this time frame in mind as a rough guide to evaluating events today, while of course bearing in mind no mechanistic or cyclical repetition should be anticipated.

Ahmadinejad of Iran to Obama: Only the US Mask Has Changed, Hands Off Syria

On June 8, President Ahmadinejad of Iran warned the US-NATO bloc not to assail Syria: “Syria is a pioneer of resistance. The Syrian government and nation can settle their issues and there is no need for the interference of others,” Ahmadinejad said. He cautioned certain US-led countries in the region to “stop interfering in Syria’s affairs,” and added that Washington will turn against these states immediately after it achieves its objectives in Syria.3 These warnings may be addressed to Jordan, the Iraqi Kurds, or Turkey, whose territories may have been used by CIA/MI-6 networks to smuggle weapons and commandos into Syria to help constitute the armed gangs of the Moslem Brotherhood which have killed 400 Syrian military and security forces so far. “The Americans want to gain popularity among the regional nations through the implementation of this plan and portray themselves as the upholder of people’s rights,” Ahmadinejad went on, and noted that while a new regime took power in the U.S. in 2009, the nature of the ruling system has not changed: “Only the masks have changed. Campaign against terrorism was the mask of the previous U.S. administration, but the mask of the current administration is supporting human rights.”4 More recently, the Iranian Foreign Ministry and leading Iranian generals have issued stern warnings against any aggression at the expense of Syria, which they evidently would regard as casus belli. Increased attacks on US forces by Shiite militias in Iraq in recent weeks may be a token of Tehran’s alarm over the possible loss of its main ally.

“Gay Girl in Damascus” a US Hoax – Like So Many Reports on Syria and Libya?

On June 14, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued an unusual dual condemnation of both Damascus and Tehran, repeating the US line that Iran is assisting in the repression of Syrian protests. “Today in Syria, Iran is supporting the Assad regime’s vicious assaults on peaceful protesters and military actions against its own cities,” said Clinton. Back in the real world, suspicions were growing up that much media reporting concerning events in Syria represented pure fiction in the tradition of the Kuwait incubator babies and Jessica Lynch: the much-touted “Gay Girl in Damascus” blog, which had been cited as a primary source of information about Syria by mainstream news media across the western world, was exposed as a total hoax. This hoax was the handiwork of Tom McMaster, a 40-year-old American man, and his wife Britta Froelicher, an activist with the American Friends Service Committee, an organization linked to the US intelligence community since the Cold War. How many of the films, photos, and interviews broadcast and posted about supposed war crimes in Libya, Syria, and other countries have also been invented out of whole cloth by this CIA cottage industry of disinformation and black propaganda? How much of the social media hype associated with the “Arab Spring” derives from the trolls at US Cyber Command?

Egypt’s Asterisk Revolution: Run by Samantha Power and McFaul From the White House

The “Gay Girl in Damascus” stunt may be seen in retrospect as a microcosm of the entire “Arab Spring”: a cynical manipulation of idealistic (or nihilistic) young dupes under the aegis of US-designed color revolutions and people power coups, playing these affluent computer-oriented young people against the fragile structures of the modern state under conditions of world economic depression. But even so, the activities of the golden youth in the public squares have been largely a media spectacle, a diversion, a smokescreen. Street demonstrations do not amount to a struggle for power. The overthrow of governments has been accomplished behind the scenes by generals and government officials who have been bribed, blackmailed, and otherwise subverted into mounting putsches sponsored by CIA/MI-6/DGSE. In Tunisia this worked well, with Ben Ali fleeing the country when the general staff made clear that they had turned against him. In Egypt, the procedure finally ousted Mubarak, but with much greater difficulty. US assets like Tantawi and Enan proved unable to drive out the Rais until the Obama White House made some heavy-duty threats of direct US action, the exact nature of which has yet to be determined, but which may have involved the menace of US action against the Suez Canal.

As US Egyptian asset Saad Eddin Ibrahim told Lally Weymoth of the Washington Post: “The Egyptian chief of staff [Tantawi] on orders from the White House was escalating the pressure. President Obama’s advisers, who are good friends — Samantha Power and Michael McFaul — asked me to come [to Washington]. They relied on me as a source. .?.?. After Mubarak’s second speech, Obama became convinced [that Mubarak had to go].”5 Nationalist colonels in the Egyptian Army may be interested to know that their supreme commander, now the virtual dictator of Egypt, acted on orders from the likes of McFaul and Power, who control the “democratic” opposition as well.

In Libya, the color revolution has worked far less well, as armed al Qaeda gangs have been unable to conquer the loyalist stronghold of Tripoli, and are also having trouble subduing loyalists in the Benghazi-Darna-Tobruk corridor. In Syria, the color revolution model has not worked at all, since the middle class is not interested in undergoing a total Iraq-style bloodbath and Moslem Brotherhood reign of terror for the sake of some vapid slogans about democracy. In Algeria, where the population has immediate experience of the nightmarish slaughter wrought by the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) a few years back, no appetite whatever for new adventures has been observed. Al Jazeera has now shifted target to destabilize Morocco, and we will see how that turns out. The destabilization of Jordan has gone nowhere.

An attack on Syria could come soon. “It has gotten to the point where Qaddafi’s behavior and Assad’s behavior are indistinguishable,” commented warmonger GOP Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, who noted “You need to put on the table all options, including a model like we have in Libya.”6 This meant a much wider war.

Yemen: Government of Wounded President Saleh Crumbles, US Drone Strikes Begin

Yemen’s President Saleh was seriously wounded on June 3 when rockets allegedly fired by insurgent tribesmen struck his palace. Saleh was flown to Saudi Arabia the next day for emergency treatment. While Saleh’s relatives and allies tried to hold onto power, the Pentagon exploited the resulting power vacuum to begin large-scale Predator drone attacks in the country. It was revealed that the US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA were operating out of a headquarters in Sanaa, and that the CIA would soon begin a wide-ranging program of Predator drone assassinations outside of any rules of military engagement. There were also reports that the US was building a large Predator drone base for operations in Yemen. In the meantime, Islamic militants of the Ansar al-Sharia group, equated by the US media to “al Qaeda,” seized parts of a provincial capital in southern Yemen. It should be remembered that the two leading spokesman for “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (“AQAP”) are US citizen Anwar Awlaki and Guantanamo alumnus al-Shiri, both obvious US double agents. The purpose of the entire Yemen destabilization is to open an avenue of attack against Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s immediate neighbor.

US Strike Against Pakistan Nukes On Front Burner

On June 17, Pakistan said “NATO aircraft attacked one of its military posts in the northwest near the Afghan border and it had expressed its serious concern to the U.S. embassy in Islamabad…. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry said NATO aircraft intruded around 2.5 km (1.5 miles) inside Pakistani territory” to make the attack.7 These probes by NATO aggressors along Pakistan’s border are now a frequent occurrence, and threaten to break out in an open, shooting war – all the more so since any one of these raids could represent a US attempt to cripple Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent with a conventional first strike below the nuclear threshold. Afghanistan President Karzai has officially announced that peace talks with State Department participation are now going on with Mullah Omar and others leaders of the Afghan Taliban. These talks have nothing to do with peace; they rather represent a US attempt to recruit the Afghan and other Taliban and Pushtuns generally as kamikaze puppets to be launched against Pakistan in military attacks.

Certain parts of the US media – particularly the ones addressed to policy elites — have mounted a sustained campaign of demonization against Pakistan. Here are some recent samples of top front-page headlines from the Washington Post:

May 28: “Infiltrators worry Pakistani military; ‘We are under attack’; US unsure of army’s commitment to purging ranks”
May 30: “In Afghan war, Haqqani group is ‘resilient’ foe; Operations based in Pakistan; Network is seen as least reconcilable insurgent faction”
June 11: “Thwarted raids add to tension with Pakistan; US shared intelligence; Bomb-making sites were later found vacant”
June 16: “Pakistan Relations Reach a new low; security ties fraying; Anti-US sentiment in Pakistani army on rise”

Iran’s Ahmadinejad was also taking seriously the spate of media reports about a coming US attack on Pakistan’s nuclear forces. “We have precise information that America wants to sabotage Pakistan’s nuclear facilities in order to control Pakistan and to weaken the government and the people of Pakistan,” he said on June 6. The U.S. is also seeking to “use the United Nations Security Council and some other international organizations as a lever to pave the way for its increased presence in Pakistan with the aim of undermining Pakistan’s national sovereignty,” said the Iranian President.8 The Pakistani government has requested that Iran share with them the detailed intelligence that was the basis for this report.

The Pakistan nukes scenario was the centerpiece of a widely noticed study entitled “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” by British academic Shaun Gregory, published on June 1 in the CTC Sentinel, the house organ of the Combating Terrorism Center of the US Military Academy at West Point, NY. Gregory’s thesis is that Pakistan, now equipped with over 100 nuclear weapons, will not be able to defend all of them against a determined terrorist attack. He estimates that some 70,000 Pakistanis are now involved in the nation’s nuclear program, and that terrorists would inevitably be able to infiltrate and subvert some of this personnel, including by recruiting rogue commanders of the tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons which Pakistan is currently deploying to guard against an attack by India. Gregory also asserts that it would be enough for terrorists to get possession of fissile materials that would allow the construction of a dirty bomb. Even a failed attack on a nuclear site would cause world hysteria: “The successful location and penetration of such a site by terrorists, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in accessing nuclear assets, would itself be a transformative event both in terms of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship and in terms of international anxiety about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons,” writes Gregory.9

Reuters commented: “It’s a nightmare scenario: al Qaeda militants gain control of a Pakistani nuclear weapon, either through a base assault, theft or a rogue commander’s cooperation, possibly in the event of hostilities with nuclear-armed neighbor India.10 The Pakistanis were on full alert: “We know that the ultimate objective of the United States here is not to get a piece of land but to target our nuclear facilities….” said a Pakistani source quoted by Ansar Abbasi in News International on June 9.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff head Admiral Mike Mullen confirmed that this is indeed what the Pentagon has in mind, saying of Pakistan: “It’s a country with an awful lot of terrorists on that border… Things that I fear in the future, it’s the proliferation of that [nuclear] technology, and it’s the opportunity and the potential that it could fall into the hands of terrorists, many of whom are alive and well and seek that in that region.”

As if to provide a suitable pretext for such an attack, the US media has been trumpeting the alleged selection of notorious MI-6 asset Ayman al-Zawahiri as Bin Laden’s successor as top dog of “al Qaeda.” Zawahiri has allegedly sworn to avenge the death of Bin Laden, meaning that the door to new false flag terror events is wide open. This coverage was accompanied by the assurance that Zawahiri’s home base was nowhere else but Pakistan. Mullen immediately proclaimed that Zawahiri would soon meet the same fate as his predecessor, meaning that the US is determined to carry out more unilateral attacks on Pakistani territory, despite the virtual certainty that these will meet with Pakistani countermeasures. Pakistan’s Federal Interior Minister Rehman Malik “has said that a foreign hand is involved in terror incidents in Pakistan,” and called for national unity against terrorists in “the fight for our survival.”11

The other main US goal is to block the creation of the Pakistan energy corridor, the fabled Pipelinestan. These projects involve oil and gas pipelines from Iran to China and India, all crossing through Pakistan. The US and UK are determined to block such peaceful infrastructure development, which would give all these countries a rational common economic interest. One key part of the Pakistan energy corridor has been halted; on June, IANS reported that “the proposed Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline has run into delays as Islamabad has failed to raise the necessary funds…. Pakistani officials have told their Iranian counterparts that the pipeline was unlikely to be completed by the scheduled deadline of December 2014, the Urdu daily Jang reported. According to reliable sources, Pakistan has neither been able to raise the necessary $1.24 billion funding nor plan out the proposed route for the pipeline within its territory.”12

An Anti-US Coup d’État by Nationalist Colonels in Islamabad?

On June 15, the New York Times and Washington Post both published front-page articles highlighting the rapid growth of anti-American resentment in the Pakistani officer corps. The New York Times wrote that many military officers were so disgusted by the servility of army chief Kayani towards Washington that “a colonels’ coup, while unlikely, was not out of the question,” according to “a well-informed Pakistani who has seen the general in recent weeks, as well as an American military official involved with Pakistan for many years.”13

The neocon National Review, genuinely alarmed by the prospect of a new generation of modernizing military officers in the great tradition of Colonel Nasser of Egypt, spun out some grim scenarios and asked, “would the outcome of a break between America and Pakistan be war–whether low-level or outright?”14 In reality, a regime of progressive colonels might provide a better outcome than Islamic fundamentalists not just for Pakistan, but also for Egypt.

Panetta’s New Pearl Harbor of Virtual Flag Cyber-Attacks

Islamabad continues to enjoy support from China, which pledged a month ago to regard any attack on Pakistan as an attack on the Middle Kingdom itself. China has military options for retaliation, ranging from ICBMs to sensitive points like the Taiwan Straits, but these are less likely. China could also express displeasure by divesting some U.S. Treasury bonds. More likely might be operations in the cyber-realm. US sources allege that Lockheed Martin, the CIA, and other websites are under cyber assault, and some commentators have tried to pin this on China. CIA Director Panetta, now moving over to the Pentagon, told a Senate Committee, “The next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a cyber attack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems.”15 Since no known cyber-attack has thus far been able to create such devastating effects, we may assume that Panetta is preparing the way for virtual flag terrorism, in which the US government would simply assert that some catastrophic event had been caused by a country it wishes to target. In a possibly related development, German attorney Thorsten van Geest is in court seeking a temporary restraining order against the Merkel government to shut down all anti-terror drills around at the June 26 opening of the World the Women’s Soccer Championship in Berlin, citing the danger that these exercises might be flipped live.

Saudi Arabia Signals Break from Washington

Saudi Arabia is known to be seeking cooperation with Pakistan and with other countries as part of its attempted exit from the collapsing US empire. Prince Turki al-Faisal, a leading figure of the royal family, signaled Riyadh’s broad-based rage against Washington with a June 7 op-ed warning Obama that “there will be disastrous consequences for U.S.-Saudi relations if the United States vetoes UN recognition of a Palestinian state.” Turki concluded with a threat: “We Arabs used to say no to peace, and we got our comeuppance in 1967 [with a crushing military defeat] …. Now, it is the Israelis who are saying no. I’d hate to be around when they face their comeuppance.”16 These blunt words, which reflect a Saudi hostility to the Obama regime that goes beyond the Palestinian issue to include the whole range of national strategy, has caused shock behind closed doors in official Washington.

The March visit of Saudi Prince Bandar to Pakistan is widely regarded as having sealed a defensive alliance between these two powers, which may be regarded (along with Egypt) as regional pillars of the US empire. Both are seeking to exit the empire. Pakistan is thought to have guaranteed the Saudis protection under Islamabad’s nuclear umbrella, as well as a division or more of Pakistani troops to quell any color revolution or other destabilization the CIA might attempt. A possible signal of US rage over this cooperation came on May 16, when “motorcycle-riding assassins gunned down a Saudi diplomat in the Pakistani city of Karachi, four days after a grenade attack on the Saudi consulate there.”17

NATO Facing Logistical Overstretch in Libya

Resistance by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya against the attacking US-NATO forces has exposed the grave logistical and political weakness of the supposedly omnipotent Western alliance. A US military source speaking on the Alex Jones broadcast reported that US stocks of depleted uranium (DU) munitions are currently very low. This may be the reality behind outgoing Defense Secretary Gates’ complaint last week that NATO is running out of bombs in Libya, and similar remarks by French NATO General Stephane Abrial in Belgrade. The US still has some stocks, but how long would these last against Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran?

Obama is Impeachment Bait for Violating the War Powers Act

At a recent Republican presidential debate, candidates Bachman, Gingrich, and Cain hinted that the Libyan rebels include al Qaeda terrorists. Obama’s arrogant and cynical management of the attack on Libya has raised the possibility of congressional action to cut off funds for the war. The Republican fanatics of the Tea Party are seeking to force the US government to default on Treasury securities payments as a way of destroying Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, unemployment benefits, and other economic rights of the American people recognized under the New Deal. However, it is possible that the zombie bankers and hedge fund hyenas of Wall Street who fund and generally own the Republican Party will use threats and bribes to force these Tea Party extremists to knuckle under and increase the debt ceiling over the next month. That will leave the Tea Party fanatics in desperate need of an issue they can use to make a loud show of hostility to Obama to placate their extremist supporters, and that issue may be the aggression against Libya, which has become thoroughly unpopular despite Obama’s attempts to conceal that it is going on.

Libya: A War Too Far, even for GOP

The House of Representatives has voted to demand that Obama seek congressional approval for his stealth Libya war. Democratic Congressman Dennis Kucinich and others are suing Obama in federal court to force him to get such approval. Speaker of the House John Boehner has warned Obama that, if he does not come to Congress for approval by June 20, he will be in violation of the War Powers Act. Senators like Lugar, Corker, and Webb have also called on Obama to get a congressional resolution to prosecute hostilities. It has also been revealed that Obama was told by lawyers from the Department of Justice and the Pentagon that the Libyan war was indeed covered by the War Powers Act, but that Obama chose to endorse legal opinions from White House and State Department lawyers telling him he did not need to get any go-ahead from Congress. Naturally, Obama’s flagrant violation of the War Powers Act in Libya would make him subject to impeachment, and this possibility might become more likely if the US economy continues to deteriorate. Another approach would be for Congress to cut off the money for the Libyan aggression. Usually, such a move would be blocked with the argument that US troops would be left stranded in harm’s way. But in this case, by Obama’s own assurances, no US ground troops are officially involved (although they are already there nonetheless). Since Obama claims that only air and naval attacks are being mounted, it may prove easier to cut off the funding and end the illegal attacks on Libya.

As Chinese political scientist Kiyul Chung told RT on June 16, the world was at an historic crossroads, on the brink of deciding whether US and NATO military interventions on the Libyan model would subdue the entire world, or whether Russia, China, and other participants in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization would be able to create a worldwide movement to counterbalance the “unilateral, aggressive, and colonial” methods of the NATO bloc.

References

1 http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/17/marine.corps.exercise/index.html?&hpt=hp_c2

2 King Carlo Alberto of Sardinia declared war on Austria on March 23, 1848. He was joined by a coalition which included the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, the Papal States under Pope Pius IX, and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. This marked the first transformation of the domestic insurrections of 1848 into cross-border wars. There is an eerie congruence between this event and the initiation of the NATO bombing of Libya on March 19, 2011.

3 Iran censures US interference in Syria, Press TV, June 8, 2011, at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/183696.html

4 http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=242059

5 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-egypt-a-revolution-with-an-asterisk/2011/05/20/AF0W3M9G_print.html, emphasis added.

6 http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/165943-graham-military-intervention-in-syria-should-be-on-the-table

7 http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110617/wl_nm/us_pakistan_nato/print

8 http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=242059

9 Shaun Gregory, “Terrorist Tactics in Pakistan Threaten Nuclear Weapons Safety,” West Point CTC Sentinel, June 1, 2011, at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/terrorist-tactics-in-pakistan-threaten-nuclear-weapons-safety; see also http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110614_5737.php; Professor Shaun Gregory is Director of the Pakistan Security Research Unit at the University of Bradford, UK.

10 Reuters, June 1, 2011, at http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/01/how-pakistans-nuclear-weapons-could-be-jeopardised.html

11 http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=98524

12 http://in.finance.yahoo.com/news/Pakistan-Iran-gas-pipeline-ians-490610859.html?x=0

13 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/world/asia/16pakistan.html?_r=1

14 Stanley Kurtz, “Anti-American Coup in Pakistan?,” National Review, June 16, 2011, http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/269822/anti-american-coup-pakistan-stanley-kurtz

15 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/13/panetta-cyberattack-next-pearl-harbor_n_875889.html

16 http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/palestinian-rights-wont-be-denied-by-the-united-states-and-israel/2011/06/07/AGmnK2OH_story_1.html

17 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/16/saudi-diplomat-killed-pakistan