Showing posts with label Citigroup. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Citigroup. Show all posts

Sunday, November 13, 2011

Foreclosure firm has Halloween party dressed as depressed homeowners


Andrew Jones
Saturday, October 29, 2011
http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/10/29/foreclosure-firm-has-halloween-party-dressed-as-sad-homeowners

Based on their Halloween costumes from last year, it would not be surprising if employees from foreclosure firm giant Steven J. Baum dressed up this year as homeowners who’ve lost their property thanks to firms like them.

In a column from The New York Times Joe Nocera, a former employee of the Baum firm revealed that his former co-workers did indeed dress as downtrodden individuals with signs representing their depressed state. The ex-Baum employee, who Nocera kept anonymous, told the Times reporter that she wanted to show how the firm had a “cavalier attitude” towards foreclosing people’s homes.

After getting word of Nocera’s story, the firm vehemently defended itself, saying the column was “another attempt by The New York Times to attack our firm and our work.”

The Baum firm represents virtually all the prominent mortgage lending Wall Street giants, including Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and Wells Fargo.

Thursday, December 9, 2010

Federal Reserve's 'astounding' report: We loaned banks trillions

http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1201/Federal-Reserve-s-astounding-report-We-loaned-banks-trillions

Federal Reserve's 'astounding' report: We loaned banks trillions
The Federal Reserve offers details on the loans it gave to banks and others at the height of the financial crisis. One program alone doled out nearly $9 trillion.
Mark Trumbull, Staff writer / December 1, 2010

The Federal Reserve has lifted its veil of secrecy regarding special lending programs during the financial crisis, responding to a mandate from Congress by revealing the specifics of transactions with firms like Goldman Sachs and Citigroup.

Critics of the Federal Reserve are poring over the data, seeking red flags regarding potential improprieties. And Congress has asked its Government Accountability Office to sift through the numbers and offer its own analysis.

At the same time, it's possible that the release of details will end up largely vindicating the Fed for the massive financial support that it gave the economy at a time of severe stress. The emergency loans, in the view of many finance experts, helped to avert a much deeper economic slump. And those loans have now been largely paid back without losses to the central bank.

The numbers are staggering, encompassing more than a dozen emergency programs set up starting in 2007 or 2008. In one program alone the Fed doled out nearly $9 trillion in funds to borrowers such as Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch, largely at interest rates below 1 percent. (This program involved overnight loans, so the amount of Fed credit outstanding at any single point in time was much smaller.)

Other programs, with longer-term loans also measured in the trillions of dollars.

The Fed actions were just part of a larger array of government bailouts for the financial industry, which were deeply unpopular with most Americans. Rescue programs run outside the Fed included insurance-style backstops for bank debts and the investments from the Treasury's $700 billion TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program).

Despite the public outrage stirred by the actions to prop up firms like Citigroup and AIG, the Fed's biggest mistakes may have come before the recession rather than in response to it.

"My view is that the Fed has done an excellent job since the crisis started, but they didn't do a very good job before the crisis started," says Pete Kyle, a finance expert at the University of Maryland. He says the central bank, as a key financial regulator, should have ensured that US banks had plenty of capital on hand to weather a storm.

Some other economists echo that view, arguing that the Fed and other bank regulators should have done much more to safeguard against a surge in high-risk mortgage lending during the years leading up to the crisis, at a time when US home prices were soaring.

Once a crisis is under way, however, the standard view among economists is that a central bank should act as a "lender of last resort," providing credit as freely as possible to prevent widespread bank failures at a time when ordinary investors are in a panic.

Even if the Fed's general approach was the correct one, Wednesday's data release is sure to prompt close analysis of the money lent, and who got it.

Sen. Bernie Sanders, a Vermont independent who led the charge for Fed transparency, characterized the new details as "astounding" and called for an investigation to determine whether banks borrowed at near-zero interest and then loaned money back to the government at higher rates.

He said the bailouts may have helped to line the pockets not only of banks in general, but also of their top executives.

“How many big banks [that] repaid Treasury Department bailouts in order to avoid limits on executive compensation received no-strings attached loans from the Federal Reserve?" Mr. Sanders asked in a statement released Wednesday.

The transaction details may also call into question whether the Fed was too loose in the quality of collateral that it accepted in making loans to banks and in some cases to industrial firms. (McDonald's and Verizon got Fed help.)

Scores of banks, from large to small, came to the Fed's lending windows. But in some cases the rescue programs ended up targeting aid at a few prominent firms.

For example, at the height of the crisis, just four large securities firms were the main recipients of loans from the Fed's Primary Dealer Credit Facility, an overnight loan program for securities firms. Of $3.6 trillion doled out in the six weeks after Sept. 15, 2008 (when Lehman Brothers failed), nearly $3.1 trillion went to Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, or Merrill Lynch.

The Fed argued against disclosing the names of firms that recieved loans from this and other programs, saying that in a crisis firms should not be worried about a possible stigma attached to getting emergency funds.

Since the loans have largely been repaid in full, the crisis response appears on one level to impose little direct cost on the public. The biggest cost of the rescues may be indirect. Propping up financial firms can encourage risky behavior, and thus sow the seeds of future crises, by making financial firms believe they are too important to be allowed to fail.

Congress recently passed financial reforms designed to address this problem, but Mr. Kyle and other finance experts say the measure has not fully resolved that problem.

A Real Jaw Dropper at the Federal Reserve

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/a-real-jaw-dropper-at-the_b_791091.html

Sen. Bernie Sanders
Independent U.S. Senator from Vermont
December 2, 2010
A Real Jaw Dropper at the Federal Reserve

At a Senate Budget Committee hearing in 2009, I asked Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to tell the American people the names of the financial institutions that received an unprecedented backdoor bailout from the Federal Reserve, how much they received, and the exact terms of this assistance. He refused. A year and a half later, as a result of an amendment that I was able to include in the Wall Street reform bill, we have begun to lift the veil of secrecy at the Fed, and the American people now have this information.

It is unfortunate that it took this long, and it is a shame that the biggest banks in America and Mr. Bernanke fought to keep this secret from the American public every step of the way. But, the details on this bailout are now on the Federal Reserve's website, and this is a major victory for the American taxpayer and for transparency in government.

Importantly, my amendment also required the Government Accountability Office to conduct a top-to-bottom audit of all of the emergency lending the Fed provided during the financial crisis to be completed on July 21, 2011, which will take a hard look at all of the potential conflicts of interest that took place with respect to this bailout. So, in many respects, details that the Fed was forced to divulge on Wednesday about the $3.3 trillion in emergency loans that until now were totally kept from public scrutiny, marked the beginning, not the end, of lifting the veil of secrecy at the Fed.

After years of stonewalling by the Fed, the American people are finally learning the incredible and jaw-dropping details of the Fed's multi-trillion-dollar bailout of Wall Street and corporate America. As a result of this disclosure, other members of Congress and I will be taking a very extensive look at all aspects of how the Federal Reserve functions and how we can make our financial institutions more responsive to the needs of ordinary Americans and small businesses.

What have we learned so far from the disclosure of more than 21,000 transactions? We have learned that the $700 billion Wall Street bailout signed into law by President George W. Bush turned out to be pocket change compared to the trillions and trillions of dollars in near-zero interest loans and other financial arrangements the Federal Reserve doled out to every major financial institution in this country. Among those are Goldman Sachs, which received nearly $600 billion; Morgan Stanley, which received nearly $2 trillion; Citigroup, which received $1.8 trillion; Bear Stearns, which received nearly $1 trillion, and Merrill Lynch, which received some $1.5 trillion in short term loans from the Fed.

We also learned that the Fed's multi-trillion bailout was not limited to Wall Street and big banks, but that some of the largest corporations in this country also received a very substantial bailout. Among those are General Electric, McDonald's, Caterpillar, Harley Davidson, Toyota and Verizon.

Perhaps most surprising is the huge sum that went to bail out foreign private banks and corporations including two European megabanks -- Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse -- which were the largest beneficiaries of the Fed's purchase of mortgage-backed securities.

Deutsche Bank, a German lender, sold the Fed more than $290 billion worth of mortgage securities. Credit Suisse, a Swiss bank, sold the Fed more than $287 billion in mortgage bonds.

Has the Federal Reserve of the United States become the central bank of the world?

The Fed said that this bailout was necessary to prevent the world economy from going over a cliff. But three years after the start of the recession, millions of Americans remain unemployed and have lost their homes, life savings and ability to send their kids to college. Meanwhile, big banks and corporations have returned to making huge profits and paying their executives record-breaking compensation packages as if the financial crisis they started never happened.

What this disclosure tells us, among many other things, is that despite this huge taxpayer bailout, the Fed did not make the appropriate demands on these institutions necessary to rebuild our economy and protect the needs of ordinary Americans.

For example, at a time when big banks have nearly a trillion dollars in excess reserves parked at the Fed, the Fed did not require these institutions to increase lending to small- and medium-sized businesses as a condition of the bailout.

At a time when large corporations are more profitable than ever, the Fed did not demand that corporations that received this backdoor bailout create jobs and expand the economy once they returned to profitability.

I intend to investigate whether these secret Fed loans, in some cases, turned out to be direct corporate welfare to big banks that used these loans not to reinvest in the economy but rather to lend back to the federal government at a higher rate of interest by purchasing Treasury Securities. Instead of using this money to reinvest in the productive economy, I suspect a large portion of these near-zero interest loans were used to buy Treasury Securities at a higher interest rate providing free money to some of the largest financial institutions in this country. That is something that we have got to closely examine.

At a time when Wall Street executives are now making more money than before the financial crisis, how many big banks that paid back TARP funds in 2009 to avoid limits on executive compensation received no-strings-attached loans from the Federal Reserve?

At a time when millions of Americans are paying outrageously high credit card interest rates, why didn't the Fed require credit card issuers to lower interest rates as a condition of the bailout?

The four largest banks in this country (Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, and Citigroup) issue half of all mortgages in this country. We now know that these banks received hundreds of billions from the Fed. How many Americans could have remained in their homes, if the Fed required these bailed-out banks to reduce mortgage payments as a condition of receiving these secret loans?

We have begun to lift the veil of secrecy at one of most important agencies in our government. What we are seeing is the incredible power of a small number of people who have incredible conflicts of interest getting incredible help from the taxpayers of this country while ignoring the needs of the people.

Friday, July 30, 2010

Feinberg: Unfair to Ask Firms to Return Payouts

On a related Ken Feinberg note...

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575385120617510164.html

BUSINESS JULY 23, 2010
Feinberg: Unfair to Ask Firms to Return Payouts
VICTORIA MCGRANE

WASHINGTON — U.S. "pay czar" Kenneth Feinberg on Friday declined to request 17 financial firms that doled out $1.6 billion in "ill advised" executive compensation to return the excessive payouts, saying to do so would be unfair to the companies and could trigger private lawsuits and additional Congressional investigation.

Mr. Feinberg released a report that found 17 firms—including Goldman Sachs Group Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc.—made the bonus-like payouts to top executives in late 2008 and early 2009 even as the companies were receiving taxpayer assistance.

Mr. Feinberg, the Obama administration's special master for compensation, said he deemed these payments as "ill advised" both for the sheer amount—some individual payouts exceed $10 million, he said—and the lack of reasonable rationale for their payment.

Other firms Mr. Feinberg criticized for poor judgment included: American Express Co., American International Group Inc., Bank of America Corp., Boston Private Financial Holdings Inc., Capital One Financial Corp., CIT Group Inc., M&T Bank Corp., Regions Financial Corp., Sun Trust Banks Inc., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Morgan Stanley, PNC Financial Services Group Inc., U.S. Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co.

But he stopped short of saying any of the firms violated the public interest, the highest criticism allowed by the law mandating his review. None of the firms violated any law or regulation when they made the payouts, Mr. Feinberg told reporters during a briefing Friday.

Mr. Feinberg's study, which was required by the 2009 stimulus law that also created his post, covered the five-month window during which firms were getting government assistance but policy makers hadn't yet enacted executive-compensation restrictions. Those rules came into force in early February 2009.

The payments "were ill advised, they were troublesome. But I do not believe it is fair to declare...that the payments were 'contrary to the public interest,'" he said. In fact, Mr. Feinberg said he undertook the compensation review, which was required by the 2009 stimulus law, with "some reluctance."

"This is arm-chair quarterbacking," he said.

Mr. Feinberg also said he felt it was inappropriate for him to ask any of the 17 firms to claw back or reimburse taxpayers for the bonus payouts. Under the law he has no authority to demand repayment, but Congress did direct him to request reimbursement if appropriate.

Nonetheless, Mr. Feinberg felt these payouts were misguided enough to push the firms to adopt a policy that would limit their ability to pay out large sums during the next crisis.

Specifically, Mr. Feinberg's plan would enable a company's compensation committee to restructure, reduce or cancel pending executive payouts once the company's board of directors judged the firm to be in a crisis situation.

It remains unclear if any of the 17 firms will actually adopt Mr. Feinberg's recommendations. The proposal is voluntary, and the government's influence over many of the cited firms has waned. Eleven of the 17 firms have fully repaid taxpayers.

But Mr. Feinberg, who has discussed his proposal with each of the 17 firms cited by his report, said he is "hopeful" the firms will comply. "I have not heard much pushback."

The study is the result of four months spent reviewing pay at 419 firms that took government money during the crisis. The task was in addition to Mr. Feinberg's core assignment to review pay at a handful of firms that received "extraordinary" assistance from the government.

Mr. Feinberg narrowed his study to "highly compensated employees" with annual pay packages of more than $500,000 that received payments that were later curbed by Congress and Treasury, including cash bonuses, retention rewards, stock grants and golden parachutes.

Saturday, April 24, 2010

Big Banks Mask Risk Levels

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304830104575172280848939898.html
APRIL 9, 2010
Big Banks Mask Risk Levels
Quarter-End Loan Figures Sit 42% Below Peak, Then Rise as New Period Progresses; SEC Review
By KATE KELLY, TOM MCGINTY and DAN FITZPATRICK

Major banks have masked their risk levels in the past five quarters by temporarily lowering their debt just before reporting it to the public, according to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

A group of 18 banks—which includes Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc.—understated the debt levels used to fund securities trades by lowering them an average of 42% at the end of each of the past five quarterly periods, the data show. The banks, which publicly release debt data each quarter, then boosted the debt levels in the middle of successive quarters.

Citi Execs Deny Responsibility Excessive borrowing by banks was one of the major causes of the financial crisis, leading to catastrophic bank runs in 2008 at firms including Bear Stearns Cos. and Lehman Brothers. Since then, banks have become more sensitive about showing high levels of debt and risk, worried that their stocks and credit ratings could be punished.

That practice, while legal, can give investors a skewed impression of the level of risk that financial firms are taking the vast majority of the time.

Major banks masked their risk levels during the most recent five quarters by lowering debt levels just before announcing quarterly earnings, according to data from the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Kate Kelly and Evan Newmark discuss.

"You want your leverage to look better at quarter-end than it actually was during the quarter, to suggest that you're taking less risk," says William Tanona, a former Goldman analyst who now heads U.S. financials research at Collins Stewart, a U.K. investment bank.

Though some banks privately confirm that they temporarily reduce their borrowings at quarter's end, representatives at Goldman, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan and Citigroup declined to comment specifically on the New York Fed data. Some noted that their firm's financial filings include language saying borrowing levels can fluctuate during the quarter.

"The efforts to manage the size of our balance sheet are appropriate and our policies are consistent with all applicable accounting and legal requirements," a Bank of America spokesman said.

Masking Risk

An official at the Federal Reserve Board noted that the Fed continuously monitors asset levels at the large bank-holding companies, but the financing activities captured in the New York Fed's data fall under the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which regulates brokerage firms. The New York Fed declined to comment.

The data highlight the banks' levels of short-term financing in the repurchase, or "repo," market. Financial firms use cash from the loans to buy securities, then use the purchased securities as collateral for other loans, and buy more securities. The loans boost the firms' trading power, or "leverage," allowing them to make big trades without putting up big money. This amplifies gains—and losses, which were disastrous in 2008.

According to the data, the banks' outstanding net repo borrowings at the end of each of the past five quarters were on average 42% below their peak in net borrowings in the same quarters. Though the repo market represents just a slice of banks' overall activities, it provides a window into the risks that financial institutions take to trade.

The SEC now is seeking detailed information from nearly two dozen large financial firms about repos, signaling that the agency is looking for accounting techniques that could hide a firm's risk-taking. The SEC's inquiry follows recent disclosures that Lehman used repos to mask some $50 billion in debt before it collapsed in 2008.

The practice of reducing quarter-end repo borrowings has occurred periodically for years, according to the data, which go back to 2001, but never as consistently as in 2009.

The repo market played a role in recent accusations leveled by an examiner in Lehman's bankruptcy case. But rather than reducing quarter-end debt, Lehman took steps to hide it.

Anxious to maintain favorable credit ratings, Lehman engaged in an accounting device known within the firm as "Repo 105" to essentially park about $50 billion of assets away from Lehman's balance sheet, according to the examiner. The move helped Lehman look like it had less debt on its books, the examiner said.

Other Wall Street firms, including Goldman and Morgan Stanley, have denied characterizing their short-term borrowings as sales, the way Lehman did in employing Repo 105. Both of those firms also make standard disclaimers about debt.

For instance, Goldman disclosed in its 2009 annual report that although its balance sheet can "fluctuate," asset levels at the ends of quarters are "typically not materially different" from their levels in the midst of the quarter. Total assets at the end of 2009 were 7% lower than average assets during the year, the report states.

Some banks make big trades that don't show up in quarter-end balance sheets. That is what happened recently at Bank of America involving a trade designed to mature before the end of 2009's first quarter, people familiar with the matter say.

Two Bank of America traders bought $40 billion of mortgage-backed securities from clients for one month, while at the same time agreeing to sell the securities back before quarter's end, according to people familiar with the matter. This "roll" trade provided the clients with cash and the bank with fees.

Robert Qutub, then Bank of America's chief financial officer for global markets, told Michael Nierenberg, a former Bear Stearns trader who oversaw the traders who made the roll trade, to cap the size of the short-term transaction, people familiar with the matter say.

A week later, however, the amount tied to the trade shot up to $60 billion, these people say, before dropping to $25 billion, one of these people said, appearing to some at headquarters that the group had defied the order to cap the trade.

A bank spokeswoman said "the team was aware of and worked within its risk limits."

Write to Kate Kelly at kate.kelly@wsj.com, Tom McGinty at tom.mcginty@wsj.com and Dan Fitzpatrick at dan.fitzpatrick@wsj.com

Friday, September 18, 2009

The Continuing Disaster of Wall Street

http://robertreich.blogspot.com/2009/09/continuing-disaster-of-wall-street-one.html

Robert Reich's Blog
Robert Reich was the nation's 22nd Secretary of Labor and is a professor at the University of California at Berkeley. His latest book is Supercapitalism.

Sunday, September 13, 2009
The Continuing Disaster of Wall Street, One Year Later

As he attempted to do with health care reform last week, the President is trying to breathe new life into financial reform. He's using the anniversary of the death of Lehman Brothers and the near-death experience of the rest of the Street, culminating with a $600 billion taxpayer financed bailout, to summon the political will for change. Yet the prospects seem dubious. As with health care reform, he has stood on the sidelines for months and allowed vested interests to frame the debate. Nor has he come up with a sufficiently bold or coherent set of reforms likely to change the way the Street does business, even if enacted.

Let's be clear: The Street today is up to the same tricks it was playing before its near-death experience. Derivatives, derivatives of derivatives, fancy-dance trading schemes, high-risk bets. “Our model really never changed, we’ve said very consistently that our business model remained the same,” says Goldman Sach's chief financial officer.

The only difference now is that the Street's biggest banks know for sure they'll be bailed out by the federal government if their bets turn sour -- which means even bigger bets and bigger bucks.

Meanwhile, the banks' gigantic pile of non-performing loans is also growing bigger, as more and more jobless Americans can't pay their mortgages, credit card bills, and car loans. So forget any new lending to Main Street. Small businesses still can't get loans. Even credit-worthy borrowers are having a hard time getting new mortgages.

The mega-bailout of Wall Street accomplished little. The only big winners have been top bank executives and traders, whose pay packages are once again in the stratosphere. Banks have been so eager to lure and keep top deal makers and traders they've even revived the practice of offering ironclad, multimillion-dollar payments – guaranteed no matter how the employee performs. Goldman Sachs is on course to hand out bonuses that could rival its record pre-meltdown paydays. In the second quarter this year it posted its fattest quarterly profit in its 140-year history, and earmarked $11.4 billion to compensate its happy campers. Which translates into about $770,000 per Goldman employee on average, just about what they earned at height of boom. Of course, top executives and traders will pocket much more.

Every other big bank feels it has to match Goldman's pay packages if it wants to hold on to its "talent." Citigroup, still on life-support courtesy of $45 billion from American taxpayers, has told the White House it needs to pay its twenty-five top executives an average of $10 million each this year, and award its best trader $100 million.

A few banks like Goldman have officially repaid their TARP money but look more closely and you'll find that every one of them is still on the public dole. Goldman won't repay taxpayers the $13 billion it never would have collected from AIG had we not kept AIG alive. (In one of the most blatant conflicts of interest in all of American history, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein attended the closed-door meeting last fall where then Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, who was formerly Goldman's CEO, and Tim Geithner, then at the New York Fed, made the decision to bail out AIG.) Meanwhile, Goldman is still depending on $28 billion in outstanding debt issued cheaply with the backing of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Which means you and I are still indirectly funding Goldman's high-risk operations.

So will the President succeed on financial reform? I wish I could be optimistic. His milktoast list of proposed reforms is inadequate to the task, even if adopted. The Street's behavior since its bailout should be proof enough that halfway measures won't do. The basic function of commercial banking in our economic system -- linking savers to borrowers -- should never have been confused with the casino-like function of investment banking. Securitization, whereby loans are turned into securities traded around the world, has made lenders unaccountable for the risks they take on. The Glass-Steagall Act should be resurrected. Pension and 401 (k) plans, meanwhile, should never have been allowed to subject their beneficiaries to the risks that Wall Street gamblers routinely run. Put simply, the Street has been given too many opportunities to play too many games with other peoples' money.

But, like the health care industry, Wall Street has platoons of lobbyists and an almost unlimited war chest to protect its interests and prevent change. And with the Dow Jones Industrial Average trending upward again -- and the public's and the media's attention focused elsewhere, especially on health care -- it will be difficult to summon the same sense of urgency financial reform commanded six months ago.

Yet without substantial reform, the nation and the world will almost certainly be plunged into the same crisis or worse at some point in the not-too-distant future. Wall Street's major banks are already en route to their old, dangerous ways -- now made more dangerous by their sure knowledge that they are too big to fail.

Wednesday, August 5, 2009

Citigroup’s $100 million banker

http://wsws.org/articles/2009/jul2009/pers-j29.shtml

Citigroup’s $100 million banker
29 July 2009

The Wall Street Journal reported Saturday that a top Citigroup trader is demanding that the bank follow through on a 2009 pay package estimated at $100 million. Andrew J. Hall, who runs Citigroup’s energy trading division, has threatened to quit should the bank fail to honor his pay deal in full.

According to the Journal, Hall, an energy speculator and top money-maker for the bank, received more than $100 million last year. Such nine-digit salaries exemplify the plundering of social resources that has become a hallmark of American capitalism and the American financial elite.

The crash of 2008 and Great Recession of 2009 have had no impact on the obscene levels of wealth that flow to a parasitic elite at the top of the economic ladder. On the contrary, the power of the aristocracy has, if anything, been enhanced as a result of the policies of the Obama administration, which has made the bailout of Wall Street at public expense its number one priority.

It would take a minimum wage worker, working full-time without vacations, 6,269 years to earn $100 million. Hall’s yearly pay is roughly equivalent to the annual wage of 2,000 workers in the US. He makes in an hour about the same amount most American workers earn in a year.

Hall’s two-year take of $200 million will be greater than the budget deficits confronting a large number of US cities and their public school systems.

Hall heads Citigroup’s energy-trading unit, Phibro LLC, which the Journal describes as “a secretive operation, run from the site of a former Connecticut dairy farm [that] occasionally accounts for a disproportionate chunk of Citigroup’s income.”

The federal government has plowed $45 billion in cash into Citigroup and guaranteed over $300 billion of the bank’s assets. It will soon own 34 percent of the bank’s common stock, making it Citigroup’s largest shareholder.

Yet the Obama administration is tied up in knots over the demands of a single Citigroup energy speculator. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the complete subordination of the government and the entire political system to the financial mafia.

The Journal writes that the payout would set “the stage for a potential showdown between Citigroup and the government’s new pay czar,” Kenneth Feinberg. President Obama recently appointed Feinberg to the Treasury Department to oversee executive compensation at seven corporations holding outstanding TARP (Trouble Asset Relief Program) funds—Citigroup, Bank of America, American International Group, General Motors, Chrysler, and the two automakers’ finance arms.

Far from a “showdown,” a chummy discussion among Wall Street insiders is underway over how to pay Hall. The Journal reports that Citigroup officials have been lobbying Feinberg to approve Hall’s pay package, especially Citigroup Vice Chairman Lewis Kaden, “who has been handling most of the discussions with the pay czar, trying to capitalize on the two men’s longtime friendship.” The newspaper indicates that Citigroup might finesse the TARP pay limits by formally spinning off Phibro.

In a statement on the controversy over Hall’s pay, Citigroup declared, “Retaining and attracting the best talent is very important to the success of Citigroup and all its stakeholders.”

The type of talent so prized on Wall Street is indicated in a separate Journal article, “Traders Blamed for Oil Spike,” published on Tuesday. The article points to the socially destructive nature of Hall’s line of work. It states that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission will issue a report next month attributing the wild swings in oil prices from 2007 to the present largely to the role of energy traders.

Hall’s enormous personal income is bound up with the manipulation of energy markets, which has contributed to the broken finances of millions of American households through higher gas and home heating bills and a run-up in food prices that has dramatically increased hunger in many parts of the world. The volatility on energy markets has played a significant role in the global economic crisis, driving up unemployment to levels not seen since the Great Depression.

Hall’s case only highlights Wall Street’s resumption of multimillion-dollar salaries and bonuses for executives and traders. In recent weeks, other major bailed-out banks, including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, have set aside sharply higher—in the case of Goldman Sachs, record—sums for bonuses and salaries. Last week, Morgan Stanley issued its second quarter financial results, revealing that it set aside 72 percent of revenues for salaries and bonuses, even though it reported a loss for the period.

The Obama administration has worked to block any real restrictions on Wall Street pay. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner and top economic adviser Lawrence Summers publicly opposed modest limits on executive pay at firms receiving TARP funds that were included in the $787 billion economic stimulus bill passed last February.

The following month, Obama intervened to block executive pay limits passed by the House of Representatives and set for a vote in the Senate following public outrage over reports that the bailed-out insurance giant American International Group (AIG) was about to dispense hundreds of millions of dollars in bonuses.

Obama’s July 22 prime time press conference provided a graphic demonstration of the utter servility of the president and the entire government to the barons of Wall Street. Asked by a reporter if new revelations about bank profits did not indicate that the White House should take “a harder line with Wall Street,” Obama acknowledged that the banks’ reckless speculation and profiteering had precipitated the global economic crisis.

“Wall Street,” he said, “took extraordinary risks with other people’s money, they were peddling loans that they knew could never be paid back, they were flipping those loans and leveraging those loans and higher and higher mountains of debt were being built on loans that were fundamentally unsound. And all of us now are paying the price.”

Far from suggesting that there should be any consequences for such crimes against society, Obama hastened to declare that “it’s a good thing that they’re profitable again, because if they’re profitable that means that they have reserves in place and they can lend.” (In fact, the banks have refused to significantly expand their lending to businesses and consumers). Obama added, “And this is America, so if you’re profitable in the free market system, then you benefit.”

As for the bankers’ use of taxpayer money to reward themselves with colossal salaries and bonuses, the president could do no more than make a lame appeal for greater restraint. “With respect to compensation, I’d like to think that people would feel a little remorse and feel embarrassed and would not get million-dollar or multimillion-dollar bonuses,” Obama said.

The same White House that dictates wage cuts, layoffs and poverty for auto workers dares not infringe on the wealth or prerogatives of the financial aristocracy. Such are the class realities of America and the dictatorial power exerted by the financial elite behind the trappings of American democracy.

Tom Eley and Barry Grey

Sunday, May 17, 2009

"The Greatest Boondoggle in History":

http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/article/244222/%22The-Greatest-Boondoggle-in-History%22-Banks-Buoyed-at-Taxpayers%27-Expense

"The Greatest Boondoggle in History": Banks Buoyed at Taxpayers' Expense
Posted May 08, 2009
by Aaron Task

Bank stocks soared Friday, including Wells Fargo and Morgan Stanley, which sold shares a discounts of more than 10% below Thursday's close.

The ability of banks to raise capital is certainly positive but the idea of shares rallying amid the capital raising and dilution is "counterintuitive," Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis said on CNBC this morning.

BofA shares were also rallying even as the government said it needs to raise an industry-leading $33.9 billion. Citigroup stock was also a big winner after the government's curious declaration that it "only" needs to raise $5 billion.

While much of the focus is on the stress tests and banks' efforts to raise cash, the real story is Geithner's Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP), says William Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri - Kansas City.

The PPIP is the "greatest boondoggle in the history of the world," says Black, a former bank regulator who was counsel to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board during the S&L crisis. As occurred during the S&L era, Black says the PPIP will allow banks to exchange "trash for cash" and turn "real losses into faulty gains."

If the goal of Tim Geithner and other regulators was "to rip off the American taxpayer for the benefit of the least-deserving wealthiest people you can imagine, well - mission accomplished," Black says.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

‘Dow Theory’ Says Worst Isn’t Over for U.S. Stocks

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=agapqPsrRIEY&refer=home

‘Dow Theory’ Says Worst Isn’t Over for U.S. Stocks as YRC Falls
By Eric Martin and Cristina Alesci

Feb. 21 (Bloomberg) -- A 125-year-old method for forecasting the market is telling investors the worst isn’t over for stocks.

Dow Theory, which holds that simultaneous moves in industrial and transportation shares foreshadow economic activity, indicates the Dow Jones Industrial Average’s drop to a six-year low yesterday may presage more losses.

The Dow industrials slumped to 7,365.67 on concern the deepening recession will force the U.S. government to bail out banks. Adherents of Dow Theory say the 30-stock gauge will fall farther because the Dow Jones Transportation Average has slipped to the worst level since September 2003.

“When you have that confirmation in both legs, that’s clearly negative,” said Ryan Detrick, senior technical analyst at Schaeffer’s Investment Research in Cincinnati. “There’s some validity to Dow Theory.”

This week’s retreat left the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index, the benchmark for U.S. stocks, within 2.3 percent of breaking through its Nov. 20 low to the worst level since 1997.

Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. declined the most in the Dow this week, losing more than 31 percent, on concern shareholders will be wiped out through nationaliGzation. General Motors Corp. had the third-biggest slump, losing 29 percent on concern about its solvency. General Electric Co. dropped 18 percent to $9.38, becoming the fifth stock in the average since last year to sink below $10.

“The direction of the market is clearly down,” said Richard Moroney, who manages $150 million at Hammond, Indiana- based Horizon Investment Services and edits the Dow Theory Forecasts newsletter. “We’re holding a lot more cash than we normally do.”

‘Clearly Down’

Dow Theory, created by Wall Street Journal co-founder Charles Dow in 1884, argues that transportation companies are harbingers of economic activity. The transportation gauge slipped below its November nadir in January and has kept retreating. YRC Worldwide Inc. and JetBlue Airways Corp. fell the most this week, losing more than 27 percent.

Dow Theory is showing that “the bear market is in force,” said Philip Roth, the New York-based chief technical analyst at Miller Tabak & Co. “It doesn’t tell you whether it’s going to last another year or another day. It isn’t a forecaster of magnitude, just direction.”

In November 2007, one month after the Dow industrials and S&P 500 surged to record highs, Dow Theory suggested the rally was over. The S&P 500 went on to tumble 38 percent in 2008, the most since 1937.

Bullish Strategists

The Dow Theory signal goes against all 10 Wall Street strategists tracked by Bloomberg, who on average project the S&P 500 will end the year at 1,059, a 38 percent gain from yesterday’s close of 770.05. Almost $800 billion in federal spending and the cheapest valuations in two decades will spur the rally, the strategists say.

The S&P 500 is a better indicator of the market’s direction because it has almost 17 times more companies than the Dow average and uses market value, not share prices, to determine company weightings, said Roger Volz, New York-based senior vice president at Hampton Securities Ltd. and a technical analyst since 1982.

The index would probably plunge to 681 should it fall below the 11-year-low of 752.44 reached in November, according to Volz. His chart-based techniques include Fibonacci analysis.

“I don’t think we get out of the woods for 14 months,” he said. “The destruction is severe.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Cristina Alesci in New York at calesci2@bloomberg.net; Eric Martin in New York at emartin21@bloomberg.net.

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Banks Agree To Foreclosure Moratoriums

http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/200902131828DOWJONESDJONLINE000900_FORTUNE5.htm
Banks Agree To Foreclosure Moratoriums
February 13, 2009
By Meena Thiruvengadam

WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Citigroup Inc. (C), Bank of America Corp. (BAC) and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) have committed to temporary moratoriums on foreclosures as the government works on a financial stability plan slated to include billions of dollars aimed at keeping people in their homes.

"We will not add to the foreclosure process any new owner-occupied residential loans that are owned and serviced by JPMorgan Chase," the company's chief executive, Jamie Dimon, said in a letter Thursday to Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.

The moratorium on new foreclosure actions will remain in effect through March 6 and is similar to a 90-day foreclosure freeze JPMorgan announced Oct. 31.

"We believe three weeks is adequate time for the Treasury to announce - and for us to implement - a new plan," Dimon said.

Citigroup in a statement issued Friday said it will place a moratorium on foreclosures for all Citi-owned first mortgage loans that are on principal residences and on loans for which understandings with investors have been reached. The moratorium is scheduled to last until March 12 unless the government finalizes a loan-modification program before that date.

Bank of America on Friday said it will delay foreclosure sales on owner- occupied properties whose mortgage loans are owned and serviced by it or Countrywide Financial Corp. through March 6. Bank of America acquired Countrywide in July.

"If the program's development is not complete in three weeks, we will consider a possible extension," a Bank of America spokeswoman said.

Wells Fargo, which recently acquired Wachovia Corp., has imposed a moratorium on foreclosures for loans it holds, company spokesman Kevin Waetke said Friday. That moratorium is expected to remain in place until the government's foreclosure prevention plan is announced.

The majority of Wells Fargo's mortgage loans, however, are serviced by it and owned by other investors. The company is "working with these investors and related contractual commitments to determine how we will support the moratorium request," it said in a statement issued Friday.

Lawmakers in a congressional hearing Wednesday asked the executives of several of the nation's largest banks to institute a moratorium on foreclosures until the details of a revamped government bailout effort are announced. The Office of Thrift Supervision, which regulates U.S. thrifts, on Wednesday also called for institutions it oversees to suspend foreclosures for the next few weeks.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Tuesday unveiled the outlines of the revamped government effort and said details will be released later. Geithner has been meeting with other members of President Barack Obama's economic team and the secretary of housing and urban development to discuss foreclosure prevention.

Obama is scheduled to outline his plan to stem foreclosures next week.

"I am asking you at this time to commit to this committee and to the people across America that you will do something here ... and that is to commit to having a moratorium on all foreclosures that each of your banks and affiliates deal with until the Treasury secretary can put together this package," Rep. David Scott, D-Ga., said at Wednesday's hearing.

Citigroup Chief Executive Vikram Pandit in that hearing first told lawmakers of his company's intent to institute a foreclosure moratorium, saying Citigroup "would commit to making sure that people stay in their houses."

Also in that hearing, Bank of America Chief Executive Ken Lewis indicated his firm would consider freezing its foreclosure activity. "If we could put a time frame on it, ... say it's two weeks or three weeks, we would do that," he told lawmakers.

Some lawmakers have suggested Geithner "strongly encourage" banks receiving government capital through the controversial $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, to temporarily stop foreclosures. "TARP-assisted financial institutions should allow struggling homeowners more time to qualify for any systematic loan modification plan," Frank and Rep. Doris Matsui, D-Calif., wrote in a letter to Geithner on Wednesday.

JPMorgan, Citigroup, Bank of America and Wells Fargo each have received billions of dollars in federal aid through TARP.

-By Meena Thiruvengadam, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-6629; meena.thiruvengadam@dowjones.com

(Henry J. Pulizzi contributed to this article.)

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Bank crisis reignites

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bank-crisis-reignites-as-us-giants-post-massive-losses-1418310.html

Bank crisis reignites as US giants post massive losses
Bank of America needs $20bn bailout while Citigroup forced to unveil break-up. Barclays Bank shares plummet 25 per cent as turmoil spreads to Europe
By Sean Farrell, Financial Editor
Saturday, 17 January 2009

Hopes that the global banking crisis was past its worst were dashed yesterday when Bank of America was forced to accept $138bn (£94bn) of government support and Citigroup unveiled new losses of $8.3bn.

The US announcements led another day of turmoil in the international financial sector, with Barclays' shares plunging 25 per cent in the last hour of trading on the London Stock Exchange.

Bank of America, the biggest US lender by assets, posted a $1.79bn loss for the last three months of 2008 – its first quarterly loss since 1991 – and slashed its dividend to one cent. The bank was forced to seek government support to prop up its acquisition of Merrill Lynch, which suffered a record $15.3bn quarterly loss.

The federal government will inject $20bn into Bank of America in return for preferred stock paying a coupon of 8 per cent. The government will also guarantee $118bn of assets to ease the strain of absorbing Merrill's battered balance sheet.

Citigroup, another stricken US banking giant, posted a bigger-than-expected fourth-quarter loss and said it would split itself in two to shelter its key businesses from risky operations.

Bank of America was relatively unscathed by the financial crisis before the acquisition-hungry bank agreed to buy Washington Mutual and Merrill last year in what it believed were cheap deals. Merrill suffered massive losses in December, prompting Bank of America to consider calling the deal off, but the government insisted it must go through and offered assistance.

"The loss materialised late in the quarter and presented us with a decision," Ken Lewis, the chief executive of Bank of America, said. "We went to our regulators and told them we could not close the deal without their assistance. We believe those actions [by the government] were in the best interests of Bank of America and the financial system by limiting the downside."

The losses and government bailout will put extra pressure on Mr Lewis, who said in late 2007 that he had had "all the fun I can stand" in investment banking but then changed course by acquiring Merrill in the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.

Bank of America wrote off $5.5bn of loans in the final quarter and took a bad-debt provision of $8.5bn, with "market-disruption" hits of $4.6bn. Merrill's losses included $1.9bn of writedowns on leveraged loans, $1.2bn on investment securities and $1.1bn on commercial property.

Citi's chief executive, Vikram Pandit, announced plans to break up the empire created by Sandy Weill by separating the conglomerate's core commercial banking business from its brokerage and asset management divisions. The bank announced its fifth straight quarterly loss, with Mr Pandit blaming the results on "unprecedented dislocation in capital markets and a weak economy".

Investors had hoped that Government bailouts at the end of last year had stabilised the banking sector after more than a year of massive writedowns on toxic debts. But the World Economic Forum warned last week that more asset falls, both in credit markets and ordinary loans to customers, would make this year just as painful for lenders as they pay the price of the global debt binge.

Some analysts in the US now believe that Citi and possibly Bank of America may have to be nationalised to draw a line under their woes. Ireland announced the nationalisation of Anglo Irish Bank late on Thursday to stop a run on its deposits and shares.

Bank of America shares shed 13.7 per cent in New York yesterday, and have lost nearly half their value this year. Citi shares fell 8.6 per cent.

Jitters about the banking industry spread to Britain's lenders yesterday afternoon as speculation mounted about the Government's plans for supporting the sector. New guarantees on mortgage bonds and other securities could be announced as early as next week, but the market was hoping the authorities would set up a "bad bank" to take illiquid assets off lenders' books. That idea is said to have dropped down the Government's list of priorities because of the complexity involved in valuing the assets.

A meeting between the banks and the Treasury, scheduled for last night, was called off, suggesting that the Government is taking longer to come up with its plans than expected. But bank executives were said to be on alert for weekend meetings with the Treasury.

Barclays was the biggest faller in the FTSE 100, losing a quarter of its value in late trading as rumours swirled that the bank, which has resisted taking state funding, had applied to the Treasury for a capital injection, or that one of its top directors had quit. The slump in the shares, which closed near a 15-year low, forced Barclays to issue a statement after the market closed saying it knew of no reason for the drop.

The bank's plunge coincided with the lifting of the Financial Services Authority's ban on short-selling financial stocks. Barclays, without the explicit backing of the Government, would have been more vulnerable to rumours spread by short sellers hoping to drive the bank's shares down.

Industry sources suggested that even without the end of the shorting ban the sector may have been hit by a combination of bad news from the US and uncertainty about the Government's plans, prompting investors to close long positions in anticipation of a potentially dilutive new bailout plan.

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

Government bailout hits $8.5 trillion

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/11/26/MNVN14C8QR.DTL
Government bailout hits $8.5 trillion
Kathleen Pender
Wednesday, November 26, 2008

The federal government committed an additional $800 billion to two new loan programs on Tuesday, bringing its cumulative commitment to financial rescue initiatives to a staggering $8.5 trillion, according to Bloomberg News.

That sum represents almost 60 percent of the nation's estimated gross domestic product.

Given the unprecedented size and complexity of these programs and the fact that many have never been tried before, it's impossible to predict how much they will cost taxpayers. The final cost won't be known for many years.

The money has been committed to a wide array of programs, including loans and loan guarantees, asset purchases, equity investments in financial companies, tax breaks for banks, help for struggling homeowners and a currency stabilization fund.

Most of the money, about $5.5 trillion, comes from the Federal Reserve, which as an independent entity does not need congressional approval to lend money to banks or, in "unusual and exigent circumstances," to other financial institutions.

To stimulate lending, the Fed said on Tuesday it will purchase up to $600 billion in mortgage debt issued or backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and government housing agencies. It also will lend up to $200 billion to holders of securities backed by consumer and small-business loans. All but $20 billion of that $800 billion represents new commitments, a Fed spokeswoman said.

About $1.1 trillion of the $8.5 trillion is coming from the Treasury Department, including $700 billion approved by Congress in dramatic fashion under the Troubled Asset Relief Program.

The rest of the commitments are coming from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and the Federal Housing Administration.

Only about $3.2 trillion of the $8.5 trillion has been tapped so far, according to Bloomberg. Some of it might never be.

Relatively little of the money represents direct outlays of cash with no strings attached, such as the $168 billion in stimulus checks mailed last spring.

Where it's going

Most of the money is going into loans or loan guarantees, asset purchases or stock investments on which the government could see some return.

"If the economy were to miraculously recover, the taxpayer could make money. That's not my best guess or even a likely scenario," but it's not inconceivable, says Anil Kashyap, a professor at the University of Chicago's Booth School of Business.

The risk/reward ratio for taxpayers varies greatly from program to program.

For example, the first deal the government made when it bailed out insurance giant AIG had little risk and a lot of potential upside for taxpayers, Kashyap said. "Then it turned out the situation (at AIG) was worse than realized, and the terms were so brutal (to AIG) that we had to renegotiate. Now we have given them a lot more credit on more generous terms."

Kashyap says the worst deal for taxpayers could be the Citigroup deal announced late Sunday. The government agreed to buy an additional $20 billion in preferred stock and absorb up to $249 billion in losses on troubled assets owned by Citi.

Given that Citigroup's entire market value on Friday was $20.5 billion, "instead of taking that $20 billion in preferred shares we could have bought the company," he says.

It's hard to say how much the overall rescue attempt will add to the annual deficit or the national debt because the government accounts for each program differently.

If the Treasury borrows money to finance a program, that money adds to the federal debt and must eventually be paid off, with interest, says Diane Lim Rogers, chief economist with the Concord Coalition, a nonpartisan group that aims to eliminate federal deficits.

The federal debt held by the public has risen to $6.4 trillion from $5.5 trillion at the end of August. (Total debt, including that owed to Social Security and other government agencies, stands at more than $10 trillion.)

However, a $1 billion increase in the federal debt does not necessarily increase the annual budget deficit by $1 billion because it is expected to be repaid over time, Rogers said.

Annual deficit

A deficit arises when the government's expenditures exceed its revenues in a particular year. Some estimate that the federal deficit will exceed $1 trillion this fiscal year as a result of the economic slowdown and efforts to revive it.

The Fed's activities to shore up the financial system do not show up directly on the federal budget, although they can have an impact. The Fed lends money from its own balance sheet or by essentially creating new money. It has been doing both this year.

The problem is, "if you print money all the time, the money becomes worth less," Rogers says. This usually leads to higher inflation and higher interest rates. The value of the dollar also falls because foreign investors become less willing to invest in the United States.

Today, interest rates are relatively low and the dollar has been mostly strengthening this year because U.S. Treasury securities "are still for the moment a very safe thing to be investing in because the financial market is so unstable," Rogers said. "Once we stabilize the stock market, people will not be so enamored of clutching onto Treasurys."

At that point, interest rates and inflation will rise. Increased borrowing by the Treasury will also put upward pressure on interest rates.

Deflation a big concern

Today, however, the Fed is more worried about deflation than inflation and is willing to flood the market with money if necessary to prevent an economic collapse.

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke "has ordered the helicopters to get ready," said Axel Merk, president of Merk Investments. "The helicopters are hovering and the first cash is making it through the seams. Soon, a door may be opened."

Rogers says her biggest fear is not hyperinflation and the social unrest it could unleash. "I'm more worried about a lot of federal dollars being committed and not having much to show for it. My worst fear is we are leaving our children with a huge debt burden and not much left to pay it back."

Economic rescue

Key dates in the federal government's campaign to alleviate the economic crisis.

March 11: The Federal Reserve announces a rescue package to provide up to $200 billion in loans to banks and investment houses and let them put up risky mortgage-backed securities as collateral.

March 16: The Fed provides a $29 billion loan to JPMorgan Chase & Co. as part of its purchase of investment bank Bear Stearns.

July 30: President Bush signs a housing bill including $300 billion in new loan authority for the government to back cheaper mortgages for troubled homeowners.

Sept. 7: The Treasury takes over mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, putting them into a conservatorship and pledging up to $200 billion to back their assets.

Sept. 16: The Fed injects $85 billion into the failing American International Group, one of the world's largest insurance companies.

Sept. 16: The Fed pumps $70 billion more into the nation's financial system to help ease credit stresses.

Sept. 19: The Treasury temporarily guarantees money market funds against losses up to $50 billion.

Oct. 3: President Bush signs the $700 billion economic bailout package. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson says the money will be used to buy distressed mortgage-related securities from banks.

Oct. 6: The Fed increases a short-term loan program, saying it is boosting short-term lending to banks to $150 billion.

Oct. 7: The Fed says it will start buying unsecured short-term debt from companies, and says that up to $1.3 trillion of the debt may qualify for the program.

Oct. 8: The Fed agrees to lend AIG $37.8 billion more, bringing total to about $123 billion.

Oct. 14: The Treasury says it will use $250 billion of the $700 billion bailout to inject capital into the banks, with $125 billion provided to nine of the largest.

Oct. 14: The FDIC says it will temporarily guarantee up to a total of $1.4 trillion in loans between banks.

Oct. 21: The Fed says it will provide up to $540 billion in financing to provide liquidity for money market mutual funds.

Nov. 10: The Treasury and Fed replace the two loans provided to AIG with a $150 billion aid package that includes an infusion of $40 billion from the government's bailout fund.

Nov. 12: Paulson says the government will not buy distressed mortgage-related assets, but instead will concentrate on injecting capital into banks.

Nov. 17: Treasury says it has provided $33.6 billion in capital to another 21 banks. So far, the government has invested $158.6 billion in 30 banks.

Sunday: The Treasury says it will invest $20 billion in Citigroup Inc., on top of $25 billion provided Oct. 14. The Treasury, Fed and FDIC also pledge to backstop large losses Citigroup might absorb on $306 billion in real estate-related assets.

Tuesday: The Fed says it will purchase up to $600 billion more in mortgage-related assets and will lend up to $200 billion to the holders of securities backed by various types of consumer loans.

Source: Associated Press

Net Worth runs Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. E-mail Kathleen Pender at kpender@sfchronicle.com.

This article appeared on page A - 1 of the San Francisco Chronicle

Citigroup says gold could rise above $2,000

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/3526645/Citigroup-says-gold-could-rise-above-2000-next-year-as-world-unravels.html

Citigroup says gold could rise above $2,000 next year as world unravels
Gold is poised for a dramatic surge and could blast through $2,000 an ounce by the end of next year as central banks flood the world's monetary system with liquidity, according to an internal client note from the US bank Citigroup.
By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
27 Nov 2008

An employee of Tanaka Kikinzoku Jewelry K.K. displays a gold bar at the company's store in Tokyo Photo: Reuters
The bank said the damage caused by the financial excesses of the last quarter century was forcing the world's authorities to take steps that had never been tried before.

This gamble was likely to end in one of two extreme ways: with either a resurgence of inflation; or a downward spiral into depression, civil disorder, and possibly wars. Both outcomes will cause a rush for gold.

"They are throwing the kitchen sink at this," said Tom Fitzpatrick, the bank's chief technical strategist.

"The world is not going back to normal after the magnitude of what they have done. When the dust settles this will either work, and the money they have pushed into the system will feed though into an inflation shock.

"Or it will not work because too much damage has already been done, and we will see continued financial deterioration, causing further economic deterioration, with the risk of a feedback loop. We don't think this is the more likely outcome, but as each week and month passes, there is a growing danger of vicious circle as confidence erodes," he said.

"This will lead to political instability. We are already seeing countries on the periphery of Europe under severe stress. Some leaders are now at record levels of unpopularity. There is a risk of domestic unrest, starting with strikes because people are feeling disenfranchised."

"What happens if there is a meltdown in a country like Pakistan, which is a nuclear power. People react when they have their backs to the wall. We're already seeing doubts emerge about the sovereign debts of developed AAA-rated countries, which is not something you can ignore," he said.

Gold traders are playing close attention to reports from Beijing that the China is thinking of boosting its gold reserves from 600 tonnes to nearer 4,000 tonnes to diversify away from paper currencies. "If true, this is a very material change," he said.

Mr Fitzpatrick said Britain had made a mistake selling off half its gold at the bottom of the market between 1999 to 2002. "People have started to question the value of government debt," he said.

Citigroup said the blast-off was likely to occur within two years, and possibly as soon as 2009. Gold was trading yesterday at $812 an ounce. It is well off its all-time peak of $1,030 in February but has held up much better than other commodities over the last few months – reverting to is historical role as a safe-haven store of value and a de facto currency.

Gold has tripled in value over the last seven years, vastly outperforming Wall Street and European bourses.

The truth behind the Citigroup nationalization

http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_4062.shtml

The truth behind the Citigroup nationalization
By F. William Engdahl
Online Journal Contributing Writer
Nov 27, 2008

On Friday, November 21, the world came within a hair’s breadth of the most colossal financial collapse in history, according to bankers on the inside of events with whom we have contact.

The trigger was the bank which only two years ago was America’s largest, Citigroup. The size of the US government de facto nationalization of the $2 trillion banking institution is an indication of shocks yet to come in other major US and perhaps European banks thought to be ‘too big to fail.’

The clumsy way in which US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, himself not a banker but a Wall Street ‘investment banker,’ whose experience has been in the quite different world of buying and selling stocks or bonds or underwriting and selling same, has handled the unfolding crisis has been worse than incompetent. It has made a grave situation into a globally alarming one.

‘Spitting into the wind’

A case in point is the secretive manner in which Paulson has used the $700 billion in taxpayer funds voted him by a pliable Congress in September. Early on, Paulson put $125 billion into the nine largest banks, including $10 billion for his old firm, Goldman Sachs. However, if we compare the value of the equity share that $125 billion bought with the market price of those banks’ stock, US taxpayers have paid $125 billion for bank stock that a private investor could have bought for $62.5 billion, according to a detailed analysis from Ron W. Bloom, economist with the United Steelworkers union, whose members as well as pension fund face devastating losses were GM to fail.

That means half of the public’s money was a gift to Paulson’s Wall Street cronies. Now, only weeks later, the Treasury is forced to intervene to de facto nationalize Citigroup. It won’t be the last.

Paulson demanded, and got from a pliable US Congress, Democrats as well as Republicans, sole discretion over how and where he can invest the $700 billion, to date with no effective oversight. It amounts to the Treasury secretary in effect ‘spitting into the wind’ in terms of resolving the fundamental crisis.

It should be clear to any serious analyst by now that the September decision by Paulson to defer to rigid financial ideology and let the fourth largest US investment bank, Lehman Brothers fail, was the proximate trigger for the present global crisis. Lehman Brothers’ surprise collapse triggered the current global crisis of confidence. It was simply not clear to the rest of the banking world which US financial institution bank might be saved and which not, after the government had earlier saved the far smaller Bear Stearns, while letting the larger, far more strategic Lehman Brothers fail.

Some Citigroup details

The most alarming aspect of the crisis is the fact that we are in an inter-regnum period when the next president has been elected but cannot act on the situation until after January 20, 2009, when he is sworn in.

Consider the details of the latest Citigroup government de facto nationalization (for ideological reasons Paulson and the Bush administration hysterically avoid admitting they are in the process of nationalizing key banks). Citigroup has more than $2 trillion of assets, dwarfing companies such as American International Group Inc. that got some $150 billion in US taxpayer funds in the past two months. Ironically, only eight weeks before, the government had designated Citigroup to take over the failing Wachovia Bank. Normally, authorities have an ailing bank absorbed by a stronger one. In this instance the opposite seems to have been the case. Now it is clear that the Citigroup was in deeper trouble than Wachovia. In a matter of hours in the week before the US government nationalization was announced, the stock value of Citibank plunged to $3.77 in New York, giving the company a market value of about $21 billion. The market value of Citigroup stock in December 2006 had been $247 billion. Two days before the bank’s nationalization, the CEO, Vikram Pandit, had announced a huge 52,000 job slashing plan. It did nothing to stop the slide.

The scale of the hidden losses of perhaps the 20 largest US banks is so enormous that if not before, the first presidential decree of President Barack Obama will likely have to be declaration of a US ‘Bank Holiday’ and the full nationalization of the major banks, taking on the toxic assets and losses until the economy can again function with credit flowing to industry once more.

Citigroup and the government have identified a pool of about $306 billion in troubled assets. Citigroup will absorb the first $29 billion in losses. After that, remaining losses will be split between Citigroup and the government, with the bank absorbing 10 percent and the government absorbing 90 percent. The US Treasury Department will use its $700 billion TARP or Troubled Asset Recovery Program bailout fund, to assume up to $5 billion of losses. If necessary, the government’s Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) will bear the next $10 billion of losses. Beyond that, the Federal Reserve will guarantee any additional losses. The measures are without precedent in US financial history. It’s by no means certain they will salvage the dollar system.

The situation is so intertwined, with six US major banks holding the vast bulk of worldwide financial derivatives exposure, that the failure of a single major US financial institution could result in losses to the OTC derivatives market of $300-$400 billion, a new IMF working paper finds. What’s more, since such a failure would likely cause cascading failures of other institutions. total global financial system losses could exceed another $1,500 billion according to an IMF study by Singh and Segoviano.

The madness over a Detroit GM rescue deal

The health of Citigroup is not the only gripping crisis that must be dealt with. At this point, political and ideological bickering in the US Congress has so far prevented a simple emergency $25 billion loan extension to General Motors and others of the US Big Three automakers -- Ford and Chrysler. The absurd spectacle of US congressmen attacking the chairmen of the Big Three for flying to the emergency congressional hearings on a rescue loan in their private company jets, while largely ignoring the issue of consequences to the economy of a GM failure underscores the utter lack of touch with reality that has overwhelmed Washington in recent years.

For GM to go into bankruptcy risks a disaster of colossal proportions. Although Lehman Brothers, the biggest bankruptcy in US history, appears to have had an orderly settlement of its credit defaults swaps, the disruption occurred beforehand, as protection writers had to post additional collateral prior to settlement. That was a major factor in the dramatic global market selloff in October. GM is bigger by far, meaning bigger collateral damage, and this would take place when the financial system is even weaker than when Lehman failed.

In addition, a second, and potentially far more damaging issue, has been largely ignored. The advocates of letting GM go bankrupt argue that it can go into Chapter 11 just like other big companies that get themselves in trouble. That may not happen however, and a Chapter 7 or liquidation of GM that would then result would be a tectonic event.

The problem is that under Chapter 11, it takes time for the company to get the protection of a bankruptcy court. Until that time, which may be weeks or months, the company would need urgently ‘bridge financing’ to continue operating. This is known as ‘Debtor-in-Possession’ or DIP financing. DIP is essential for most Chapter 11 bankruptcies, as it takes time to get the plan of reorganization approved by creditors and the courts. Most companies, like GM today, go to bankruptcy court when they are at the end of their liquidity.

DIP is specifically for companies in, or on the verge of bankruptcy, and the debt is generally senior to other outstanding creditor claims. So it is actually very low risk, as the amount spent is usually not large, relatively speaking. But DIP lending is being severely curtailed right now, just when it is most needed, as healthier banks drastically curtail loans in the severe credit crunch situation.

Without access to DIP bridge financing, GM would be forced into a partial, or even a full liquidation. The ramifications are horrendous. Aside from loss of 125,000 US jobs at GM itself, GM is critical to keeping many US auto suppliers in business. If GM failed, soon most, possibly even all, of the US and even foreign auto suppliers will go under. Those parts suppliers are important to other automakers. Many foreign car factories would be forced to close due to loss of suppliers. Some analysts put 2009 job losses from a GM failure as high as 2.5 million jobs due to the follow-on effects. If the impact of that 2.5 million job loss is seen in terms of the overall losses to the economy of non-auto jobs such as services, home foreclosures caused and such, some estimate total impact would be more than 15 million jobs.

So far in the face of this staggering prospect, the members of the US Congress have chosen to focus on the fact the GM chief, Rick Wagoner, flew in his private company jet to Washington. The congressional charade conjures up the image of Nero playing his fiddle as Rome goes up in flames. It should not be surprising that at the recent EU-Asian Summit in Beijing, Chinese officials floated the idea of trading between the EU and Asian nations such as China in euros, renminbi, yen or other national currencies other than the dollar. The Citigroup bailout and GM debacle has confirmed the death of the post-1944 Bretton Woods Dollar System.

The truth behind Citigroup bailout

What neither Paulson nor anyone in Washington is willing to reveal is the truth behind the Citigroup bailout. By his and the Republican Bush administration’s adamant earlier refusal to take an initial resolute action to immediately nationalize the nine or so largest troubled banks, he has created the present debacle. By refusing, on ideological grounds, to instead reorganize the banks’ assets into some form of ‘good bank’ and ‘bad bank,’ similar to what the government of Sweden did with what it called Securum, during its banking crisis in the early 1990s, Paulson and company have created a global financial structure on the brink.

A Securum or similar temporary nationalization would have allowed the healthy banks to continue lending to the real economy so the economy could continue operating, while the state merely sat on the undervalued real estate assets of the Swedish banks for some months until the recovering economy made the assets again marketable to the private sector. Instead, Paulson and his ‘crony capitalists’ in Washington have turned a bad situation into a globally catastrophic one.

His apparent realization of the error of his initial refusal to nationalize came too late. When Paulson reversed policy on September 19 and presented the nine largest banks with an ultimatum to accept partial government equity ownership, abandoning his original bizarre plan to merely buy up the toxic waste asset-backed securities of the banks with his $700 billion TARP taxpayer money, he never revealed why.

Under the original Paulson Plan, as Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray of the Jerome Levy Institute at Bard College in New York point out, Paulson sought to create a situation in which the US ‘Treasury would become an owner of troubled financial institutions in exchange for a capital injection -- but without exercising any ownership rights, such as replacing the management that created the mess. The bailout would be used as an opportunity to consolidate control of the nation’s financial system in the hands of a few large [Wall Street] banks, with government funds subsidizing purchases of troubled banks by “healthy” ones.’

Paulson soon realized the scale of crisis, largely triggered by his inept handling of the Lehman Brothers case, had created an impossible situation. Were Paulson to use the $700 billion to buy up toxic waste ABS from the select banks at today’s market price, the $700 billion would be far too little to take an estimated $2 trillion ($2,000 billion) in Asset Backed Securities off the books of the banks.

The Levy Economics Institute economists state, ‘It is probable that many and perhaps most financial institutions are insolvent today -- with a black hole of negative net worth that would swallow Paulson’s entire $700 billion in one gulp.’

That reality is the real reason Paulson was forced to abandon his original ‘crony bailout’ TARP plan and opt to use some of his money to buy equity shares in the nine largest banks.

That scheme as well is ‘dead on arrival,’ as the latest Citigroup nationalization scheme underscores. The dilemma Paulson has created with his inept handling of the crisis is simple: If the US government paid the true value for these nearly worthless assets, the banks would have to write down huge losses, and, as Levy economists put it, ‘announce to the world that they are insolvent.’ On the other hand, if Paulson raised the toxic waste purchase price high enough to protect the banks from losses, $700 billion ‘will buy only a tiny fraction of the ‘troubled’ assets.’ That is what the latest nationalization of Citigroup is about.

It is only the beginning. The 2009 year will be one of titanic shocks and changes to the global order of a scale perhaps not experienced in the past five centuries. This is why we should speak of the end of the American Century and its Dollar System.

How destructive that process will be to the citizens of the United States who are the prime victims of Paulson’s crony capitalists, as well as to the rest of the world, depends now on the urgency and resoluteness with which heads of national governments in Germany, the EU, China, Russia and the rest of the non-US world react. It is no time for ideological sentimentality and nostalgia of the postwar old order. That collapsed this past September along with Lehman Brothers and the Republican presidency. Waiting for a ‘miracle’ from an Obama presidency is no longer an option for the rest of the world.

F. William Engdahl is author of the book, ‘A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order.’ He is completing work on a new book, ‘Power of Money: The Rise and Decline of the American Century’ due to be released in late Spring 2009. He may be contacted through his website, www.engdahl.oilgeopolitics.net.