Russ Baker
russ@russbaker.com
Jul 14, 2011
http://whowhatwhy.com/2011/07/14/how-has-murdoch-improved-with-age
Here’s an old article that WhoWhatWhy editor Russ Baker wrote about Rupert Murdoch, the media titan whose News Corp is currently the focus of so much controversy. This ran in the Columbia Journalism Review in 1998. But it is useful for comparing the company’s (non-hacking) practices, then and now.
Please share widely with your lists.
From the Columbia Journalism Review, May/June 1998:
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Synergy
Murdoch’s Mean Machine
How Rupert uses his vast media power to help himself and hammer his foes
Russ Baker
Free-lance writer Russ Baker’s last piece for CJR, in the September/October issue, was about increasing pressure by advertiser on editors.
Anyone but Rupert Murdoch might have been shamefaced over an article that appeared March 9 in his New York Post. It announced, in the tone of chest-thumping bravado identified with the paper, that the movie Titanic (which happens to be a co-production of Murdoch’s Twentieth Century Fox) “is believed to be the first Hollywood film” to be endorsed by a Chinese leader. The writer characterized the Chinese masses as clamoring for the film — though it was not scheduled to open in Beijing for another month.
To even a slightly trained eye, this article, which bore none of the signs of traditional reporting, was a disturbing non-coincidence. Contemporaneously, Murdoch was under heavy criticism after his publishing company, HarperCollins, cancelled a book by former Hong Kong governor Chris Patten, that was critical of the Chinese leadership. Nor was this the first time that Murdoch had been accused of placing profit before principle with regard to China. In 1994, he removed the BBC World Service from his satellite broadcasts into China at the request of the authorities there, who did not like a program BBC aired about Mao Tse-tung. Murdoch also had been reproached for giving Deng Xiaoping’s daughter a huge (reportedly $1 million-plus) HarperCollins book contract for a fawning — and historically flawed and commercially nonviable — portrait of her father at a time when Murdoch was seeking approval to expand his broadcasting ventures in China. The book was pure propaganda, less suited to American nightstands than to loudspeakers in Tiananmen Square.
If there was ever an enterprise that needed a Chinese wall — in this case literally — it is Rupert Murdoch’s News Corp. Yet the very concept of such a wall, meant to protect one part of a large conglomerate from the depredations of another, seems foreign to News Corp’s chief. Rupert’s Rule appears to be that all lines are permeable. And the notion of synergy, so logical and beneficial in many commercial enterprises, takes on a cynical and even malevolent cast when the corporation is a multimedia empire with Murdoch at the helm. This is particularly so in view of News Corp.’s recent boast that through its satellite, broadcast, and cable units, it will soon be able to reach more than three-quarters of the wired world.
Murdoch uses his diverse holdings, which include newspapers, magazines, sports teams, a movie studio, and a book publisher, to promote his own financial interests at the expense of real newsgathering, legal and regulatory rules, and journalistic ethics. He wields his media as instruments of influence with politicians who can aid him, and savages his competitors in his news columns. If ever someone demonstrated the dangers of mass power being concentrated in few hands, it would be Murdoch.
To understand the effects of Murdoch’s special brand of synergy, one must begin where it all began for Keith Rupert Murdoch — in Australia. Down under, Murdoch owns half of a major airline group, co-owns one of the country’s pay TV operators and a Rugby league, and controls more than 60 percent of the country’s metro, regional, and suburban newspapers, from an upscale national broadsheet, The Australian, to mass-market daily tabloids.
Murdoch’s taste for corporate cross-pollination was never more apparent than on March 3, 1995, when readers of his hometown paper, TheAdelaide Advertiser, might understandably have mistaken the front page for a paid ad. An article told them they could soon enjoy the most advanced pay television channel in the world, including sports and the latest releases from Twentieth Century Fox; it was a “gateway to a new era.” The newspaper neglected to mention that many of the same movies had already been shown on free channels. Murdoch’s other Australian papers ran similar, ad-style copy. The Herald-Sun of Melbourne headlined, finally, a clear vision on pay TV. Then, the paper cheekily asked readers to call in on its “Vote Line,” and answer the question, “Do you plan to subscribe to pay TV?” (The paper then actually charged for each incoming call). Even Murdoch’s quality paper, The Australian, ran eleven full pages on the non-story.
A Murdoch financial columnist went as far as to advise readers to buy stock of News Corp., claiming both objectivity and insight. “I do have that insider’s advantage of knowing what’s it all about,” wrote Terry McCrann in the Daily Times-Mirror of Sydney. Four days later, he popped up in Murdoch’s Adelaide Sunday Mailinterviewing the boss: “You’ve certainly led one of the most extraordinary lives in the twentieth century and it’s been entirely of your own making. Can you accept the accolade that you are probably the most remarkable Australian in about 200 years?” “Oh, I don’t believe that for a minute,” a modest Murdoch demurred.
Over the years, a feisty dialogue over Murdoch’s methods has grown, and not only in Australia. In England, the decision not to publish Chris Patten’s book critical of the Chinese sparked an unexpected revolt. British papers jumped on the story with gusto. Their readers learned of a “smoking memo” in which HarperCollins UK chairman Eddie Bell revealed that “KRM [Keith Rupert Murdoch] has outlined to me the negative aspects of publication.” The Daily Telegraph, The Independent, The Guardian, and many other papers also reported that the literary editor who handled the book had left the company and sued over it.
But Murdoch’s British papers, including his flagship, The Times of London, ignored the story — until their ostrich act became the story. Then, they concentrated on putting out Murdoch’s version of events, a rendition that lacked credibility. Meanwhile, it emerged that the recently retired East Asia editor of The Times, Jonathan Mirsky, had told a January Freedom Forum gathering that the paper “has simply decided, because of Murdoch’s interests, not to cover China in a serious way.” Mirsky also said that he has a transcript of a 1997 conversation between The Times‘s editor, Peter Stothard, and the Chinese vice premier in which Stothard apologizes for having inquired about a Chinese dissident.
Murdoch’s British tabloid, The Sun, recently reversed its opposition to the controversial Millennium Dome — an enormous exhibition hall (“the world’s largest dome”) to be built in London — after Murdoch’s British Sky Broadcasting (BSkyB) satellite service became a key investor. The English reading public had seen this before. Murdoch’s firing of editors Harold Evans of The Times (in 1982) and Andrew Neil of theSunday Times (in 1994) were both widely felt to be over reporting by the papers that angered the Tory governments — during a period when government decisions were massively enriching the tycoon.
This press lord uses some of his media outlets for more than simple financial gain. HarperCollins has repeatedly paid stunning book advances to public figures who can be — or have been — enormously helpful on the political front. Since such books rarely earn back their advances, they appear to be outright gifts — or worse. HarperCollins, for instance, offered a $4.5 million book advance to U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich (who renounced part of it under withering criticism) while major telecommunications legislation was before Congress.
During the regimes of Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major in Britain, Murdoch ventures — especially his purchase of newspapers and the launch of his BSkyB service — were repeatedly favored with easing of regulations and with government failure to invoke monopoly oversight. Murdoch’s papers, in turn, played a central role in bolstering Thatcher’s career and virulently attacked her opponents. Thatcher’s memoirs, for which she is believed to have accepted at least $3 million, were published by HarperCollins. John Major, too, is believed to have accepted a seven-figure advance from Murdoch. Now there is talk that a coalition of other publishing companies should jointly outbid Murdoch for Prime Minister Tony Blair’s future memoirs, in an effort to blunt News Corp.’s influence with the Laborite, which is already strong.
In the United States, Murdoch’s percentage of media ownership is lower (except for television) than in England and Australia, but his influence and reach are growing quickly. His U.S. properties include Twentieth Century Fox, HarperCollins, TV Guide, the New York Post, Fox Broadcasting, Fox News Channel, Fox Sports Net, The Weekly Standard, and television stations in New York (WNYW), Washington (WTTG), Los Angeles (KTTV), Philadelphia (WTXF), Chicago (WFLD), Atlanta (WAGA), Boston (WFXT), Phoenix (KSAZ), and fourteen other cities.
“His company has grown so rapidly I’m not sure people have stopped to look at how he got where he is,” says Washington Post staff writer Paul Farhi. Late last year, theWashington Post front-paged Farhi’s examination of possible accounting sleight of hand by News Corp. The article explored ways the company, which is run chiefly from Los Angeles and New York but calls Australia its corporate headquarters, is able to use that country’s arcane accounting methods to turn a potential net loss of $155 million (under tough U.S. standards) into a gain of $561 million — thereby enabling acquisition binges. Ironically, while putting the best face on its financial fortunes, News Corp. has been able to keep its worldwide corporate tax rates surprisingly low (roughly one-fifth those paid by Disney, Time Warner, and Viacom), largely by shifting income through an almost unfathomable web to low-tax and no-tax havens in places as far-flung as the Cayman Islands, Fiji, and even Cuba. Virtually no other media organizations followed up on this story.
Farhi says that when he began his own reporting, he found that no one would talk to him — not even Murdoch’s competitors. Similarly, CJR found competitors refusing to speak for the record. Some noted ruefully how the range of possible employers has narrowed with media consolidation.
Americans know little about Murdoch. And no wonder. In the U.S., he truly has been the Teflon man. When the $4.5 million advance to Gingrich became public, nearly all of the criticism was leveled at Gingrich, not the publishing company, which was willing to pay far more than seemed to make business sense. The story that News Corp. had hidden from the Federal Communications Commission the extent of its ownership of Fox in 1985, when that company began assembling a new television network, also got relatively little play.
Not much has been reported on the wide range of loopholes, operating waivers, and other gambits employed by News Corp. in its U.S. television expansion. One was getting around former FCC rules limiting the number of stations owned to twelve by investing in — and thus influencing — some twice that number. Staffers departed from Murdoch’s employ, miraculously reappearing as managers at the stations he technically did not control. Another was receiving unusual permission to provide National Football League broadcasts to border-region Mexican television stations that beam those games back into the United States.
Murdoch employees seldom express the sort of skepticism of bosses common among journalists. That’s a stark contrast, for example, to the atmosphere at the New York Post‘s cross-town rival, the Daily News, where some employees openly exhibit disdain for owner Mortimer Zuckerman and his trademark fickleness and incessant meddling. SaysPost reporter Gersh Kuntzman of Murdoch: “In the newsroom, everyone loves him. He’s really charismatic, a very intelligent person. Not just a figurehead.”
So dynamic and larger-than-life is Murdoch that even top people who are fired by him (almost always through intermediaries) continue to hymn his virtues. Says David Salter, longtime executive producer of the Australian Broadcasting Company’s program, Media Watch: “His executives fall over each other trying to out-praise his business acumen and flair, conveniently forgetting that not so long ago the whole News Corporation empire was one tiny financial heartbeat away from total collapse. How that unique News Corp. culture has been developed and sustained is one of the enduring mysteries.”
Another factor is that many employees enjoy working at Murdoch’s freewheeling tabloid properties, both for the sheer Front Page exuberance and for a general sense that the company takes care of its employees. Almost no one except the highest-ranking editors ever experiences direct interference from Murdoch. Harold Evans, forced out as editor ofThe Times of London, said in his memoirs that critics were wrong in suggesting that Murdoch was dictating language to his editors. “He is not a miniaturist,” Evans wrote. “He creates an aura.” Murdoch makes his wishes known, according to Evans, by constantly disparaging politicians or others he doesn’t like, generally criticizing articles (“Now what do you want to do that for?”), and sending along screeds from other publications, often right-wing magazines, with notes like “Worth reading!” The message is unmistakable.
Jetting from one continent to another and working the phones incessantly, Murdoch does maintain a constant personal presence among his top editors and producers. Kuntzman, a popular Post reporter who says he loves his job and isn’t pressured on what he writes, nevertheless points to page two, which is internally referred to as the “Pravda Page.” Says he: “When there’s a major [Murdoch] business deal going down, with no interest to readers, it’s on page two. Or when [Senator Alfonse] D’Amato [a Murdoch favorite] makes a pronouncement of no particular interest to readers, it’s on page two. Maybe our editor, Ken Chandler, is trying to catch Murdoch’s eye.”
Murdoch did what he could to prevent Bill Clinton’s election in 1992, including running stories in his British papers, which were then picked up and published stateside (“blowback” in espionage argot) about matters like Clinton’s visit to Moscow during his college days. Since 1992, the New York Post has often taken the lead in initiating and running with leaks, tips, and speculation about Clinton, especially on the wild question of whether Vincent Foster was murdered, and examinations of Clinton’s personal behavior.Post editors, employing a favorite Murdoch technique, use headlines to indict when the material in the article is itself inconclusive. (“Caught in the Act” was one early header in both the Post and the Daily News during the Monica Lewinsky saga.) Post reporters were so weary of their relentless coverage of Clinton scandals that when word came that a judge had thrown out the Paula Jones case, a cheer rose in the newsroom.
Clinton’s FCC, unlike those of the Reagan and Bush eras, has at least made Murdoch sweat by reviewing the circumstances under which he was able to assemble the Fox network. “He can get more done with a Republican administration, whether it’s FCC approvals, environmental concerns, or trade issues,” says former Post editor Lou Colasuonno.
Here again, his years of courting Republicans has paid off. After ten years of indifference, the FCC looked at Fox Television in 1994 to see if it was foreign-owned (Murdoch became a U.S. citizen although his company is registered in Australia). Conservative Republicans, who might otherwise have opposed foreign ownership, instead attacked the FCC. “They lambasted me for the audacity of having looked into the question,” recalls former FCC chair Reed Hundt. (Consistent with Murdoch’s good fortune, the panel, led by the GOP appointees, ultimately voted with Murdoch.)
Another target of Murdoch, historically, has been the Kennedy family. A big factor in his disdain was Senator Ted Kennedy’s sponsorship of legislation that forced him to sell his beloved Post in 1988 because of his cross-ownership of the local New York television station, WNYW. His bitterness toward Kennedy seemed to ease when Kennedy, of all people, backed his right to re-purchase the Post in 1993 on the basis that the Post might otherwise fold. Soon after he regained the Post, Murdoch bought back his Boston television station after selling his Kennedy-tormenting Boston Herald, raising questions in some minds about a quid pro quo.
In New York City politics, Murdoch’s power is legendary. “Murdoch created Ed Koch as mayor, and they had a very good relationship,” says Dick Belsky, city editor during Murdoch’s first round of Post ownership. Murdoch’s influence waned somewhat during the tenure of Mayor David Dinkins, whom the Post relentlessly attacked. His successor, Rudy Giuliani, has felt the full force of Murdoch’s favor on both the editorial and news pages.
During Giuliani’s first term, News Corp. received a $20.7 million tax break for the mid-Manhattan office building that houses the Post, Fox News Channel, TV Guide and other operations. During Giuliani’s 1997 reelection campaign, News Corp. was also angling for hefty city tax breaks and other incentives to set up a new printing plant in New York City rather than move to New Jersey. Most dramatically, Giuliani jumped in to aggressively champion News Corp. when it battled Time Warner over a slot for the Fox News Channel on Time Warner’s local cable system. (Beyond the existing synergy, the mayor’s wife, Donna Hanover, is a correspondent on the local Fox TV station, WNYW. )
Three years into Giuliani’s first term, veteran Village Voice political reporter Wayne Barrett asked Post editorial page editor Eric Breindel if the paper had run a single editorial critical of the administration; Breindel, he says, admitted it had not. According to Barrett, the paper pulled off a perfect four-year streak before finding disagreement with the mayor late last year — over his harsh treatment of a fiscally conservative business-funded “watchdog” organization that investigates waste in government.
“It’s not only what they write, it’s what they won’t write, what they won’t say,” argues Barrett. The Post, for example, has not run any major stories about a serious conflict involving top Giuliani political advisers Raymond Harding and Herman Badillo lobbying city agencies for private clients of their law firm. By comparison, the Daily News — whose owner Zuckerman is a Giuliani loyalist with real estate projects before the city and who has saved millions based on Giuliani administration decisions — has run more than a dozen stories on the Harding-Badillo situation. And when Vanity Fairpublished a story about the mayor’s seemingly rocky marriage and closeness to his female communications director — a scandal of the sort the Post typically loves — the paper took off after Vanity Fair with the energy and enthusiasm of a converted sinner.
Almost completely absent are stories highlighting problems in the police department, in the mayor’s workfare program, in social services. “Nobody is doing enterprise stories in those areas,” says a former reporter. “They don’t want it.” Any negative stories about the administration tend to be about bureaucracy stepping on the little guy. The mayor is usually a bystander, as outraged as anyone.
In playing political hardball with his news columns, Murdoch is guilty of degree rather than kind. Many media barons do it, but with more decorum and finesse. In other areas, however, Murdoch seems to stand almost alone, and very exposed. One obvious Murdoch trademark is his use of bathing beauties and sex to sell copies, a tendency that has even afflicted the once-staid TV Guide. Another is race-baiting. During the interregnum, when Murdoch did not own the Post, that paper’s tendency to inflame racial passions in New York diminished remarkably. But Murdoch is back in force. “The one enduring theme at the Post is exposing the bad Negro wherever he or she may be,” says Jim Dwyer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist at the arch-rival Daily News.
One variation appeared in a Post editorial last December 3. Titled “john hopeless franklin,” it was a vicious attack on eighty-three-year-old John Hope Franklin, the eminent black historian whom President Clinton named to head his advisory commission on race. Franklin had had the effrontery to speak about the notion of white superiority following the Civil War and the country’s failure to confront “its own Holocaust, its own violence.” ThePost labeled this “a slander against the United States and its white citizens,” and ended with the words: “Now it’s long past time for him to shut the hell up.”
Murdoch’s personal conservatism does not necessarily make him an exemplar of political principle. He is at heart a man who knows which way the winds blow. For a staunch anti-communist, Murdoch’s China policy represents a stunning display of pragmatism in service of the bottom line. He moves effortlessly between Republicans and Democrats, Tories and Laborites, capitalists and communists, depending on what deals are cooking. For a time in the 1980s, Murdoch owned the left-leaning Village Voice and had the good sense not to trifle with the profitable weekly. Like Richard Nixon, whom he greatly admired, Murdoch talks an anti-establishment line that belies his real interests. (He also fosters an up-by-the-bootstraps image that hardly squares with a childhood of privilege as son of a wealthy, titled Australian newspaper owner.)
His protean tactics make competing with Murdoch a bewildering and frustrating experience. Only one thing is certain: marshaling all the means at his disposal, he plays to win. Of course, plenty of News Corp. staffers strive to produce quality journalism. Yet those who so aspire face a tough challenge when opportunities for intra-corporation backscratching present themselves. When the Chris Patten book flap erupted, The NewYork Times and the Daily News reported the uproar and ensuing revolt by some of HarperCollins’s other authors. But the Post, known for intensively covering publishing, ran nothing.
At the same time, the launch of Murdoch’s Fox News Channel (FNC) was treated in thePost with the same sort of urgency as his Australian Pay TV launch in his Australian papers. When FNC was told by Time Warner that the New York City cable position it expected would go instead to MSNBC, Murdoch filed suit. Giuliani intervened on his behalf, on the ground that FNC meant jobs for New York. The Post, too, swung into action. Day after day, it ran headlines, gossip items, and cartoons that alternately tweaked and slammed Time Warner vice chairman Ted Turner (who once intemperately compared Murdoch to Hitler).
“The paper was going beyond news you can use or even care about, and settling a personal score,” says a former reporter. Ex-Post editor Lou Colasuonno agrees. “Time Warner employs about 12,000 people in New York, far more than Fox will ever employ. It was complete nonsense, the way he used the Post as a club to the beat the issue to death, for his own monetary gain. He needed that market.”
Some staffers were embarrassed (but not really surprised) when the Post played the FNC’s New York City launch party as big news, even though its own readers couldn’t see the station on their cable systems. “A lot of it was just understood, if there’s something big involving Murdoch, somebody’s going,” says a former reporter. “Any event concerning Murdoch was covered disproportionately with its newsworthiness. We’d run, for example, fluff items any time Murdoch got an award.” By contrast, a regular column devoted to skewering The New York Times — secretly enjoyed by many a journalist elsewhere — is not only self-serving but also a classic pot-calling-the-kettle situation.
And it is easy to see how the Post positions the financial fortunes of News Corp. and its competitors for the consumption of its heavy Wall Street readership. In its February 5 media business section, one headline reads “News corp. posts 23 percent earnings rise” and is accompanied by a box putting News Corp. alongside competitors that are faring poorly, rather than those that are doing well. Next to this is an article about The NewYork Times cutting its suburban price, in a move termed “ganging up on small suburban papers,” although the Post‘s aggressive price-cutting is never couched in such terms. The article, headlined “Prodigal times pares stand price in ‘burbs,” waits eleven paragraphs before noting that the New York Times Company’s just-released earnings report showed profits more than tripled during 1997.
That same issue of the Post was chock full with self-promotional material, including an article on a billboard that has gone up in Times Square promoting Fox’s show, King of the Hill, and plugs for Fox TV specials, which are variously described as “jaw-dropping,” “megasuccessful,” and “highly anticipated,” while shows from other networks earn less-effusive wordplay.
Titanic had unsurpassed popularity and revenues, yet the coverage in the Post still managed to seem excessive. The paper invented endless ways to run articles about the movie (often more than one) almost every day in the period preceding the Academy Awards. This saturation presumably also had a salutary affect on the legions of Wall Streeters who read the Post and judge News Corp. stock’s worthiness.
Covering Advance Publications’s sale of its Random House unit to Bertelsmann, thePosttook an opportunity to slam Harold Evans, former president and publisher of Random House and Murdoch ex-employee, who is now editorial director overseeing the Post’s competitor, the Daily News. The story called him “poster boy for high-spending perks and excessive book deals that flopped.” It used words like “blew,” “failed,” “squandered” while presenting in neutral terms HarperCollins’s $270 million writeoff and drastic publishing schedule cuts and staff firings.
The paper does sometimes report negative news about Murdoch that appears in competing publications. Says a former editor about a reported 1996 raid of News Corp. offices by Israeli authorities looking into whether a Murdoch-controlled company had tried to evade taxes on $150 million in income: “When Rupert was in trouble in Israel with that tax stuff, we’d pick up the wires and not spin it.”
On February 26, the Post‘s TVPlus section ran four short news items — one noting problems at competing cable outlets (Time Warner’s Court TV and NBC’s CNBC), and the other three putting a positive spin on Fox. One item mentioned that several players on Fox’s Melrose Place would be leaving, “part of an attempt by producers to focus on the show’s core cast,” ignoring that the program’s popularity has plummeted and that several of those leaving were core cast. Another item reported that FX (a network that is 50 percent owned by Murdoch) “has snagged the syndicated repeat rights to WB’s hit drama, Buffy the Vampire Slayer.” It went on to point out — or perhaps prod viewers — that FX “is still not available to Time Warner subscribers in New York” and that they are also missing out on reruns of The X-Files and NYPD Blue.
Fox products are peppered throughout the paper. Gossip columnist Liz Smith, for example, often incorporates News Corp. in seemingly tortured ways, such as this mention of two different News Corp. entities in one gratuitous sentence: “I was reading the morning papers in the Fox-TV/Channel 5 green room when in trooped Alex Linz, Fox [Network]‘s replacement for Macaulay Culkin in the studio’s new Home Alone 3.”
Murdoch has opened a new front of corporate synergy with his purchase of the Los Angeles Dodgers. Before agreeing to it, owners of other teams expressed worries that, with his deep pockets, he can afford to woo top players with salaries that will contribute to the spiraling costs that have endangered bottom lines and antagonized fans. Rumors that Murdoch will pick up a stake in the Los Angeles Lakers and a new hockey stadium can only provoke additional concern.
TV Guide, which Murdoch bought in 1988 (along with Seventeen and The Racing Form) for a mind-boggling $3 billion, has 9.8 million subscribers, way down from a peak of 20 million in 1977. But it remains a strong influence on viewers. Last year TV Guidenamed Fox’s King of the Hill the best show on television. Few critics would agree. Within several months last year TV Guide ran three covers on Fox’s Mighty Morphin Power Rangers, three on The X-Files, and a Simpsons Collector’s Edition. In the Simpsons issue, the Cheers & Jeers feature offered one cheer and three jeers. The cheer? A Fox show. In its designation over the last three years of “The Best Show You’re Not Watching” two of the three were either Fox Network (Party of Five) or 20th Century Fox Television (ABC’s The Practice). TV Guide has editorialized in favor of age-based instead of content-based ratings, which would benefit Fox because of the amount of violence in its programming.
TV Guide editors did not return CJR‘s phone calls, but Ari Karpel, editorial publicity director for the magazine, says that “isolated examples can ‘prove’ our slanted support for any network, but a careful reading of the past few years of TV Guide would reveal that we praise and criticize Fox shows with the same frequency with which we praise and criticize shows on every network.” Brian Lowry, who covers television business for theLos Angeles Times, says that “periodically, there is some handwringing [by Fox competitors] over TV Guide playing favorites at Fox, followed by loud protestations and a cover on whatever network complained. Some network execs say they complain aboutTV Guide just to keep them in line.”
Murdoch’s behavior has some competitors up in arms. Says NBC’s colorful West Coast president Don Ohlmeyer, who is regularly held up to ridicule in the New York Post: “Until the rest of the media decide to take a hard look at Rupert’s empire the way his media look at other people’s empires, he’s won. People genuinely fear him, and that’s a good position to be in in this business.”
Murdoch’s Citizen Kane model isn’t going away. At sixty-seven, he’s preparing a new generation to take over his domain. Will his heirs prove to have the man’s heart? Or will they miraculously take heed of the words of the late Roy Thomson, Murdoch’s predecessor as owner of The Times and Sunday Times. Thomson, whose son sold the money-losing Times to Murdoch, was so regularly beset by angry politicians over his papers’ independent spirit that he had his credo set down on cards he would hand out, explaining that he just wasn’t involved with what his employees wrote: “[N]o person or group can buy or influence editorial support . . . I do not believe that a newspaper can be run properly unless its editorial columns are run freely and independently by a highly skilled and educated professional journalist.”
Showing posts with label News Corp. Show all posts
Showing posts with label News Corp. Show all posts
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Appeals Court Rejects More Media Consolidation
Stephen Lendman
Saturday, July 09, 2011
http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2011/07/appeals-court-rejects-more-media.html
In six editions of "The Media Monopoly" and subsequent update titled, "The New Media Monopoly," Ben Bagdikian explained how deregulation let major media corporations consolidate to oligopoly size.
Since 1983, the number of corporations owning most newspapers, magazines, book publishers, recorded music, movie studios, television and radio stations shrunk from 50 to a handful, including Time-Warner, Disney, News Corp., Viacom, Comcast, and Bertelsmann AG.
In 1996, Telecommunications Act backers claimed it would increase competition, lower prices, and improve service. In fact, TV station ownership limits were raised to let broadcast giants own twice as many local stations as before, charge what they wished, and dismiss public concerns in the process.
For radio, all national ownership limits were removed, and, in large urban areas, one company could own up to eight stations in a major market. In smaller ones, two companies could own them all.
The bill also consigned new digital television broadcast spectrum space only to current TV station owners, and let cable companies increase their local monopoly positions. Media and telecom giants were clear winners. Consumers lost out.
Yet in October 2007, FCC chairman Kevin Martin proposed lifting the 1975 media cross-ownership rule, forbidding one company from owning a newspaper and television or radio station in the same city even though some conglomerates already did like News Corp. In November, he amended his plan to allow cross ownership only in large markets where competition already exists, with deceptive loopholes through waivers to permit it anywhere.
In 2003, FCC Michael Powell also tried loosening ownership rules, despite opponents saying relaxing them would further stifle debate, inhibit new ideas, weaken diversity, and more greatly consolidate oligopoly power.
In June 2004, the Third US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled favorably for the Media Access Project (MAP) in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, ordering the agency to reconsider its ill-advised ownership rule changes that included:
-- ending cross-ownership restrictions that prohibits a company from owning a newspaper and TV or radio station in the same city;
-- eliminating the previous ban on radio/TV cross-ownership, and replacing both types with a single set of cross-media limits;
-- a dodgy "diversity index" based on assigning varying weights to different media to determine if markets retained enough. It not, ownership limits would be restricted, but the formula proposed was deceptive and dishonest, including for smaller markets; and
-- redefining National Market Share to let ownership ceilings rise unfairly.
In fact, the public overwhelmingly wants more, not less consolidation. On July 7, an important victory was won when the same Third Circuit Court issued its long-awaited verdict, throwing out proposed FCC rules changes.
The Prometheus Radio Project (PRP) "builds participatory radio as a tool for social justice organizing and a voice for community expression. (It) advocate(s) for a more just media system, and help(s) grassroots organizations build communications infrastructure to strengthen their communities and movements."
PRP explained the court decision on its web site, accessed through the following link:
http://www.prometheusradio.org/node/2532
Headlining "Federal Court Rejects Media Consolidation in Prometheus vs. FCC," it hailed PRP's "second historic victory" this year, saying:
The Third Circuit Court rejected FCC rules changes "that would have allowed one company to own a newspaper and broadcast stations in the same market," despite some already doing it.
Other FCC broadcast ownership limits were also upheld, as well as agreement that proposed changes failed to consider how women and minorities would be affected.
Media Access Project's PRP attorney Andrew Jay Schwartzman hailed the decision, saying:
"We won on almost every point. This decision is a vindication of the public's right to have a diverse media environment," despite how little now exists, except through alternative media sources, especially online.
On January 4, PRP won another victory when the Community Radio Act became law, permitting thousands of new stations nationally. Praising the decision, PRP's Policy Director Brandy Doyle said:
"Media matters. Thousands of people fought to pass the (law), and thousands more spoke out loudly when the FCC tried to further consolidate broadcast media." However, despite important victories, "we must continue to push the FCC to do the right thing for community radio."
On July 12, ahead of implementing the Local Community Radio Act, "the FCC will again propose new rules." Key is ensuring low-power urban FM community radio stations channel space as Congress mandated.
"Commercial broadcasters must share the airwaves with the urban churches, schools, and non-profits who have waited more than a decade to serve their communities with radio."
On July 7, a Free Press.net press release also hailed the court ruling. Corie Wright (who argued with Schwartzman for PRP) called it:
"a sweeping victory for the public interest. In rejecting the arguments of the industry and exposing the FCC's failures, the court wisely concluded that (media) competition....not more concentration will provide Americans with the local news and information they need and want."
Nonetheless, she said dominant media giants still lobby hard for rules changes, very much against the public interest that won this battle but can't relax.
This win, however, prevented one company from owning a city's dominant newspaper, eight radio stations, three television stations, and a major cable operation, shutting out most other voices entirely.
Distorted Major Media Coverage
On July 7, New York Times writer Bill Carter headlined, "Court Overturns FCC Cross-Ownership Rule," downplaying the decision's importance, saying:
"In a narrow ruling unlikely to have an immediate effect on current broadcasters," the court "did not rule on the merits" of FCC's proposed changes. "Instead, (it) said that the FCC had failed to allow sufficient time for official notice and public comment on them," distorting what, in fact, happened in typical Times fashion, suppressing vital information from its readers.
Wall Street Journal writer Amy Schatz was no better, headlining, "Appeals Court Bumps Up Pressure to Overhaul Media-Ownership Rule," unsurprisingly siding with media giants while ignoring the decision's importance.
Bloomberg's Sophia Pearson and Todd Shields also offered a distorted, biased account, headlining, "FCC's Rules on Media Cross-Ownership Are Vacated by Federal Appeals Court," saying:
The court ruled that the FCC "failed to provide adequate notice," downplaying the decision's importance like The Times, including by quoting Newspaper Association of America president John Sturm calling the decision "very disappointing. We're back to the original rule that was passed in 1975. It strains credulity to understand why that is."
In fact, following daily major print and broadcast media explains clearly why less (lots less), not more, concentration is needed.
Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.
Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network Thursdays at 10AM US Central time and Saturdays and Sundays at noon. All programs are archived for easy listening.
http://www.progressiveradionetwork.com/the-progressive-news-hour
Saturday, July 09, 2011
http://sjlendman.blogspot.com/2011/07/appeals-court-rejects-more-media.html
In six editions of "The Media Monopoly" and subsequent update titled, "The New Media Monopoly," Ben Bagdikian explained how deregulation let major media corporations consolidate to oligopoly size.
Since 1983, the number of corporations owning most newspapers, magazines, book publishers, recorded music, movie studios, television and radio stations shrunk from 50 to a handful, including Time-Warner, Disney, News Corp., Viacom, Comcast, and Bertelsmann AG.
In 1996, Telecommunications Act backers claimed it would increase competition, lower prices, and improve service. In fact, TV station ownership limits were raised to let broadcast giants own twice as many local stations as before, charge what they wished, and dismiss public concerns in the process.
For radio, all national ownership limits were removed, and, in large urban areas, one company could own up to eight stations in a major market. In smaller ones, two companies could own them all.
The bill also consigned new digital television broadcast spectrum space only to current TV station owners, and let cable companies increase their local monopoly positions. Media and telecom giants were clear winners. Consumers lost out.
Yet in October 2007, FCC chairman Kevin Martin proposed lifting the 1975 media cross-ownership rule, forbidding one company from owning a newspaper and television or radio station in the same city even though some conglomerates already did like News Corp. In November, he amended his plan to allow cross ownership only in large markets where competition already exists, with deceptive loopholes through waivers to permit it anywhere.
In 2003, FCC Michael Powell also tried loosening ownership rules, despite opponents saying relaxing them would further stifle debate, inhibit new ideas, weaken diversity, and more greatly consolidate oligopoly power.
In June 2004, the Third US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled favorably for the Media Access Project (MAP) in Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, ordering the agency to reconsider its ill-advised ownership rule changes that included:
-- ending cross-ownership restrictions that prohibits a company from owning a newspaper and TV or radio station in the same city;
-- eliminating the previous ban on radio/TV cross-ownership, and replacing both types with a single set of cross-media limits;
-- a dodgy "diversity index" based on assigning varying weights to different media to determine if markets retained enough. It not, ownership limits would be restricted, but the formula proposed was deceptive and dishonest, including for smaller markets; and
-- redefining National Market Share to let ownership ceilings rise unfairly.
In fact, the public overwhelmingly wants more, not less consolidation. On July 7, an important victory was won when the same Third Circuit Court issued its long-awaited verdict, throwing out proposed FCC rules changes.
The Prometheus Radio Project (PRP) "builds participatory radio as a tool for social justice organizing and a voice for community expression. (It) advocate(s) for a more just media system, and help(s) grassroots organizations build communications infrastructure to strengthen their communities and movements."
PRP explained the court decision on its web site, accessed through the following link:
http://www.prometheusradio.org/node/2532
Headlining "Federal Court Rejects Media Consolidation in Prometheus vs. FCC," it hailed PRP's "second historic victory" this year, saying:
The Third Circuit Court rejected FCC rules changes "that would have allowed one company to own a newspaper and broadcast stations in the same market," despite some already doing it.
Other FCC broadcast ownership limits were also upheld, as well as agreement that proposed changes failed to consider how women and minorities would be affected.
Media Access Project's PRP attorney Andrew Jay Schwartzman hailed the decision, saying:
"We won on almost every point. This decision is a vindication of the public's right to have a diverse media environment," despite how little now exists, except through alternative media sources, especially online.
On January 4, PRP won another victory when the Community Radio Act became law, permitting thousands of new stations nationally. Praising the decision, PRP's Policy Director Brandy Doyle said:
"Media matters. Thousands of people fought to pass the (law), and thousands more spoke out loudly when the FCC tried to further consolidate broadcast media." However, despite important victories, "we must continue to push the FCC to do the right thing for community radio."
On July 12, ahead of implementing the Local Community Radio Act, "the FCC will again propose new rules." Key is ensuring low-power urban FM community radio stations channel space as Congress mandated.
"Commercial broadcasters must share the airwaves with the urban churches, schools, and non-profits who have waited more than a decade to serve their communities with radio."
On July 7, a Free Press.net press release also hailed the court ruling. Corie Wright (who argued with Schwartzman for PRP) called it:
"a sweeping victory for the public interest. In rejecting the arguments of the industry and exposing the FCC's failures, the court wisely concluded that (media) competition....not more concentration will provide Americans with the local news and information they need and want."
Nonetheless, she said dominant media giants still lobby hard for rules changes, very much against the public interest that won this battle but can't relax.
This win, however, prevented one company from owning a city's dominant newspaper, eight radio stations, three television stations, and a major cable operation, shutting out most other voices entirely.
Distorted Major Media Coverage
On July 7, New York Times writer Bill Carter headlined, "Court Overturns FCC Cross-Ownership Rule," downplaying the decision's importance, saying:
"In a narrow ruling unlikely to have an immediate effect on current broadcasters," the court "did not rule on the merits" of FCC's proposed changes. "Instead, (it) said that the FCC had failed to allow sufficient time for official notice and public comment on them," distorting what, in fact, happened in typical Times fashion, suppressing vital information from its readers.
Wall Street Journal writer Amy Schatz was no better, headlining, "Appeals Court Bumps Up Pressure to Overhaul Media-Ownership Rule," unsurprisingly siding with media giants while ignoring the decision's importance.
Bloomberg's Sophia Pearson and Todd Shields also offered a distorted, biased account, headlining, "FCC's Rules on Media Cross-Ownership Are Vacated by Federal Appeals Court," saying:
The court ruled that the FCC "failed to provide adequate notice," downplaying the decision's importance like The Times, including by quoting Newspaper Association of America president John Sturm calling the decision "very disappointing. We're back to the original rule that was passed in 1975. It strains credulity to understand why that is."
In fact, following daily major print and broadcast media explains clearly why less (lots less), not more, concentration is needed.
Stephen Lendman lives in Chicago and can be reached at lendmanstephen@sbcglobal.net.
Also visit his blog site at sjlendman.blogspot.com and listen to cutting-edge discussions with distinguished guests on the Progressive Radio News Hour on the Progressive Radio Network Thursdays at 10AM US Central time and Saturdays and Sundays at noon. All programs are archived for easy listening.
http://www.progressiveradionetwork.com/the-progressive-news-hour
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Murdoch vows to charge for all online content
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7f6edc2c-821f-11de-9c5e-00144feabdc0.html
Murdoch vows to charge for all online content
By Kenneth Li and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson in New York
August 6 2009
Rupert Murdoch has vowed to charge for all the online content of his newspapers and television news channels, going well beyond his prediction in May that the company would test pay models on one of its stronger papers within the year.
The comments by News Corp's chairman came as he predicted a "high single digit" rebound in the group's operating profits next year. The worst of the media sector slump might be behind the company, he said, as he reported "some good signs of life" in advertising.
Newspaper and television revenues would be down "very low double digits" next year, but growth in cable properties such as Fox News would leave advertising revenues flat and total revenue up 4 per cent.
News Corp put the seal on a brutal fiscal year with a fourth- quarter net loss of $203m (£119m), dragged down by $680m in impairment and restructuring charges at Fox Interactive Media, whose MySpace social networking site cut more than 700 jobs in the period.
The latest writedown to boom-era acquisitions masked a 30 per cent fall in quarterly adjusted operating profit to $948m, in line with lowered projections, and adjusted earnings of 19 cents per share, narrowly ahead of Wall Street forecasts of 18 cents.
However, they resulted in a $3.4bn net loss for the full year, down from net income of $5.4bn a year earlier, reflecting $8.9bn in impairment charges.
The sweeping decision by the owner of titles including The News of the World and The Australian to abandon the practice of giving away news in exchange for attracting a large audience for advertisers could embolden other publishers warily examining paid content models.
"We intend to charge for all our news websites," Mr Murdoch said.
"If we're successful, we'll be followed by all media," he added, predicting "significant revenues" from charging for differentiated news online.
He warned that "the big competition will be coming from the BBC," which offers online news for free, but said: "Our policy is to win."
Mr Murdoch said News Corp was highly unlikely to develop its own electronic reader, but took aim at Amazon's Kindle device by praising the rival Sony Reader.
He insisted that News Corp would retain a direct relationship with its subscribers to its content via e-readers, information that Amazon has refused to hand over.
Chase Carey, who recently returned to News Corp as chief operating officer, said the online charging policy would extend to cable networks such as Fox News.
However, he criticised TV Everywhere, the cable industry strategy championed by Time Warner to offer shows online to paying subscribers, as a "defensive" response and said News Corp aimed instead to develop "offensive" models.
Declines in revenue and profit across television and newspaper assets offset strong gains from cable networks businesses in the quarter, in which News Corp's cash pile grew to $6.5bn.
Murdoch vows to charge for all online content
By Kenneth Li and Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson in New York
August 6 2009
Rupert Murdoch has vowed to charge for all the online content of his newspapers and television news channels, going well beyond his prediction in May that the company would test pay models on one of its stronger papers within the year.
The comments by News Corp's chairman came as he predicted a "high single digit" rebound in the group's operating profits next year. The worst of the media sector slump might be behind the company, he said, as he reported "some good signs of life" in advertising.
Newspaper and television revenues would be down "very low double digits" next year, but growth in cable properties such as Fox News would leave advertising revenues flat and total revenue up 4 per cent.
News Corp put the seal on a brutal fiscal year with a fourth- quarter net loss of $203m (£119m), dragged down by $680m in impairment and restructuring charges at Fox Interactive Media, whose MySpace social networking site cut more than 700 jobs in the period.
The latest writedown to boom-era acquisitions masked a 30 per cent fall in quarterly adjusted operating profit to $948m, in line with lowered projections, and adjusted earnings of 19 cents per share, narrowly ahead of Wall Street forecasts of 18 cents.
However, they resulted in a $3.4bn net loss for the full year, down from net income of $5.4bn a year earlier, reflecting $8.9bn in impairment charges.
The sweeping decision by the owner of titles including The News of the World and The Australian to abandon the practice of giving away news in exchange for attracting a large audience for advertisers could embolden other publishers warily examining paid content models.
"We intend to charge for all our news websites," Mr Murdoch said.
"If we're successful, we'll be followed by all media," he added, predicting "significant revenues" from charging for differentiated news online.
He warned that "the big competition will be coming from the BBC," which offers online news for free, but said: "Our policy is to win."
Mr Murdoch said News Corp was highly unlikely to develop its own electronic reader, but took aim at Amazon's Kindle device by praising the rival Sony Reader.
He insisted that News Corp would retain a direct relationship with its subscribers to its content via e-readers, information that Amazon has refused to hand over.
Chase Carey, who recently returned to News Corp as chief operating officer, said the online charging policy would extend to cable networks such as Fox News.
However, he criticised TV Everywhere, the cable industry strategy championed by Time Warner to offer shows online to paying subscribers, as a "defensive" response and said News Corp aimed instead to develop "offensive" models.
Declines in revenue and profit across television and newspaper assets offset strong gains from cable networks businesses in the quarter, in which News Corp's cash pile grew to $6.5bn.
Saturday, May 9, 2009
You Tube In Egregious Censorship Of Alex Jones
http://www.prisonplanet.com/you-tube-in-egregious-censorship-of-alex-jones-channel.html
You Tube In Egregious Censorship Of Alex Jones Channel
Corporate gatekeeper claims that showing a print out of an article on live TV, something which happens on every mainstream TV news network every day, equates to copyright violation
Paul Joseph Watson & Kurt Nimmo
Prison Planet.com
Monday, May 4, 2009
You Tube has once again proven itself to be a corporate gatekeeper working to destroy free speech and the alternative media after it suspended the popular ‘Alex Jones Channel’ - primarily because Alex Jones showed a print out of a news article during a live show.
The Alex Jones Channel, started by a fan but since embraced as the “official” Alex Jones micro-site on You Tube, has routinely featured in the website’s most popular ranking charts and has collectively attracted millions of views for videos painstakingly catalogued and uploaded over the past two years.
Those videos are now completely gone after You Tube bosses deleted the channel, primarily because the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette complained that Alex Jones had shown a computer print out of one of their articles about the Poplawski cop killer incident last month.
To claim that showing a print out of an article is a violation of copyright is of course completely insane - not a day goes by without TV news anchors showing newspaper stories on live television. Indeed, C-Span’s popular Washington Journal program almost entirely consists of the host showing clippings of newspaper stories every morning.
The real reason for the deletion in undoubtedly the fact that Alex Jones has been on the forefront of exposing stories that have later become major national scandals, such as the MIAC report. Our coverage of the swine flu hoax has again propelled us to the top of the video ranking charts and this no doubt had You Tube’s corporate owners Google running scared. As we have previously documented - Google has intimate ties with the CIA and the military-industrial complex.
To counter such egregious censorship, we are encouraging everyone to subscribe to and bookmark the new Infowarrior channel and alert people to the fact that this will be the new home for Alex Jones on You Tube (at least until they invent a reason to pull that one too).
YouTube is engaged in a hunting expedition against Alex Jones and other truth tellers. Truth is no longer acceptable on the site as it transforms itself into a pale reflection of Hulu, a site owned and operated by NBC Universal (GE) and Fox Entertainment Group (News Corp), that is to say a joint venture by a corporation owned by a death merchant (GE manufactures attack helicopters and jet engines) and a disinformation platform owned by a notorious neocon, Rupert Murdoch.
In the Hulu-ized universe, there is no room for truth or alternative media — all channels will contain the same schlock and mindless pablum already available on cable and broadcast television.
YouTube, the emerging Hulu-ized version, has no use for Alex Jones and has specifically targeted him because his videos invariably draw a large (in the millions) number of people. His message is not welcome in a commercial space dominated by Wall Street bankers and the “entertainment” transnational corporations they own, operate, and use to disseminate their opiated propaganda.
YouTube is owned by Google, the mega-internet corporation that has as its motto “Don’t be evil.” Of course, for Google evil is a relative matter, especially when it comes to the corporation’s removal or omission of information from its services, especially in the totalitarian gulag of China.
Google is infamous for its politically motivated removal of information. In February 2003, Google stopped showing the adverts of Oceana, a non-profit organization protesting a major cruise ship operation’s sewage treatment practices. In October 2007, Google banned advertisements from Maine U.S. Senator Susan Collins’ reelection campaign because she criticized the Soros operation MoveOn.org. In April 2008, Google refused to run ads for a UK Christian group opposed to abortion.
In addition to taking down Alex Jones videos, YouTube has blocked videos produced by Wael Abbas, an activist who posted videos of police brutality, and the American Life League which is critical of Planned Parenthood.
YouTube has its agenda… and it fits in snugly with the agenda of the New World Order.
You Tube In Egregious Censorship Of Alex Jones Channel
Corporate gatekeeper claims that showing a print out of an article on live TV, something which happens on every mainstream TV news network every day, equates to copyright violation
Paul Joseph Watson & Kurt Nimmo
Prison Planet.com
Monday, May 4, 2009
You Tube has once again proven itself to be a corporate gatekeeper working to destroy free speech and the alternative media after it suspended the popular ‘Alex Jones Channel’ - primarily because Alex Jones showed a print out of a news article during a live show.
The Alex Jones Channel, started by a fan but since embraced as the “official” Alex Jones micro-site on You Tube, has routinely featured in the website’s most popular ranking charts and has collectively attracted millions of views for videos painstakingly catalogued and uploaded over the past two years.
Those videos are now completely gone after You Tube bosses deleted the channel, primarily because the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette complained that Alex Jones had shown a computer print out of one of their articles about the Poplawski cop killer incident last month.
To claim that showing a print out of an article is a violation of copyright is of course completely insane - not a day goes by without TV news anchors showing newspaper stories on live television. Indeed, C-Span’s popular Washington Journal program almost entirely consists of the host showing clippings of newspaper stories every morning.
The real reason for the deletion in undoubtedly the fact that Alex Jones has been on the forefront of exposing stories that have later become major national scandals, such as the MIAC report. Our coverage of the swine flu hoax has again propelled us to the top of the video ranking charts and this no doubt had You Tube’s corporate owners Google running scared. As we have previously documented - Google has intimate ties with the CIA and the military-industrial complex.
To counter such egregious censorship, we are encouraging everyone to subscribe to and bookmark the new Infowarrior channel and alert people to the fact that this will be the new home for Alex Jones on You Tube (at least until they invent a reason to pull that one too).
YouTube is engaged in a hunting expedition against Alex Jones and other truth tellers. Truth is no longer acceptable on the site as it transforms itself into a pale reflection of Hulu, a site owned and operated by NBC Universal (GE) and Fox Entertainment Group (News Corp), that is to say a joint venture by a corporation owned by a death merchant (GE manufactures attack helicopters and jet engines) and a disinformation platform owned by a notorious neocon, Rupert Murdoch.
In the Hulu-ized universe, there is no room for truth or alternative media — all channels will contain the same schlock and mindless pablum already available on cable and broadcast television.
YouTube, the emerging Hulu-ized version, has no use for Alex Jones and has specifically targeted him because his videos invariably draw a large (in the millions) number of people. His message is not welcome in a commercial space dominated by Wall Street bankers and the “entertainment” transnational corporations they own, operate, and use to disseminate their opiated propaganda.
YouTube is owned by Google, the mega-internet corporation that has as its motto “Don’t be evil.” Of course, for Google evil is a relative matter, especially when it comes to the corporation’s removal or omission of information from its services, especially in the totalitarian gulag of China.
Google is infamous for its politically motivated removal of information. In February 2003, Google stopped showing the adverts of Oceana, a non-profit organization protesting a major cruise ship operation’s sewage treatment practices. In October 2007, Google banned advertisements from Maine U.S. Senator Susan Collins’ reelection campaign because she criticized the Soros operation MoveOn.org. In April 2008, Google refused to run ads for a UK Christian group opposed to abortion.
In addition to taking down Alex Jones videos, YouTube has blocked videos produced by Wael Abbas, an activist who posted videos of police brutality, and the American Life League which is critical of Planned Parenthood.
YouTube has its agenda… and it fits in snugly with the agenda of the New World Order.
Sunday, January 25, 2009
When a Rock Star CEO Leaves the Stage
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/17/AR2009011700356.html
When a Rock Star CEO Leaves the Stage
Sunday, January 18, 2009; Page F02
Frank Ahrens
Companies run by charismatic, high-profile chief executives are exciting to follow, but are they a good investment? Can too much of the company's value depend on one person?
An example to look at is Apple and its founder and rock star chief executive, Steve Jobs.
Jobs, a pancreatic-cancer survivor, has lost a great deal of weight and has appeared less frequently over the past year, stoking rumors of poor health.
Last week, Jobs said his health problems turned out to be "more complex" than previously revealed. He's taking a five-month leave of absence from Apple, turning over day-to-day operations to Chief Operating Officer Tim Cook.
Shares of Apple took a hit. Maybe no American chief executive is perceived as being more crucial to his company's future than Jobs is to Apple's.
Jobs co-founded Apple in 1976 but was ousted in a power struggle in 1985. Apple's results were mixed without him, and the company wandered strategically. In late 1997, Jobs returned. Apple's share price immediately began climbing as Jobs focused his company.
It soared when he introduced the revolutionary iPod and iTunes in 2001 and kept rising with the rollout of the innovative iPhone, hitting nearly $200 per share in December 2007, from about $3 in 1997, adjusted for splits and dividends. It has dropped by more than half since that peak, closing yesterday at $82.33 per share, clearly hurt by the recession. Its losses over the past half-year have been comparable in percentage to those at Dell and Microsoft, but analysts speculate that the stock would be trading higher were Jobs healthy and visible.
If you're an Apple shareholder, you're wondering how deep Apple's bench is.
If you're not, you may be looking around at other "cult of personality" companies with a wary eye.
Consider Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. -- a vast media and entertainment empire that includes movies, newspapers and satellite networks. All of which the 77-year-old Murdoch will turn over to his 36-year-old son James at some point.
World's Richest Man Warren E. Buffett is inextricably linked to his Berkshire Hathaway investment firm. The 78-year-old Buffett has said he has identified potential successors.
An example of a cult stock that has managed the exit of its leader while keeping a relative handle on investor value is Microsoft. Shares of the company's stock held fairly steady in the upper $20s throughout the beginning and middle of last year as founder and icon Bill Gates stepped aside to make way for the company's new chief executive, Steve Ballmer.
When a Rock Star CEO Leaves the Stage
Sunday, January 18, 2009; Page F02
Frank Ahrens
Companies run by charismatic, high-profile chief executives are exciting to follow, but are they a good investment? Can too much of the company's value depend on one person?
An example to look at is Apple and its founder and rock star chief executive, Steve Jobs.
Jobs, a pancreatic-cancer survivor, has lost a great deal of weight and has appeared less frequently over the past year, stoking rumors of poor health.
Last week, Jobs said his health problems turned out to be "more complex" than previously revealed. He's taking a five-month leave of absence from Apple, turning over day-to-day operations to Chief Operating Officer Tim Cook.
Shares of Apple took a hit. Maybe no American chief executive is perceived as being more crucial to his company's future than Jobs is to Apple's.
Jobs co-founded Apple in 1976 but was ousted in a power struggle in 1985. Apple's results were mixed without him, and the company wandered strategically. In late 1997, Jobs returned. Apple's share price immediately began climbing as Jobs focused his company.
It soared when he introduced the revolutionary iPod and iTunes in 2001 and kept rising with the rollout of the innovative iPhone, hitting nearly $200 per share in December 2007, from about $3 in 1997, adjusted for splits and dividends. It has dropped by more than half since that peak, closing yesterday at $82.33 per share, clearly hurt by the recession. Its losses over the past half-year have been comparable in percentage to those at Dell and Microsoft, but analysts speculate that the stock would be trading higher were Jobs healthy and visible.
If you're an Apple shareholder, you're wondering how deep Apple's bench is.
If you're not, you may be looking around at other "cult of personality" companies with a wary eye.
Consider Rupert Murdoch's News Corp. -- a vast media and entertainment empire that includes movies, newspapers and satellite networks. All of which the 77-year-old Murdoch will turn over to his 36-year-old son James at some point.
World's Richest Man Warren E. Buffett is inextricably linked to his Berkshire Hathaway investment firm. The 78-year-old Buffett has said he has identified potential successors.
An example of a cult stock that has managed the exit of its leader while keeping a relative handle on investor value is Microsoft. Shares of the company's stock held fairly steady in the upper $20s throughout the beginning and middle of last year as founder and icon Bill Gates stepped aside to make way for the company's new chief executive, Steve Ballmer.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Yahoo’s Unlikely Alternatives to Microsoft
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/02/13/a-guide-to-yahoos-unlikely-alternatives-to-microsoft/
February 13, 2008
A Guide to Yahoo’s Unlikely Alternatives to Microsoft
By Saul Hansell
In the course of a terminal illness, a person will often start to cast about for alternative therapies: herbs, acupuncture, fasting on a Tibetan mountain. This exploration is simply part of the process of coming to terms with the painful truth.
That’s the best way to understand all the reports of possible deals coming from Yahoo. Jerry Yang, Yahoo’s chief executive, has engaged a bevy of creative bankers who are busy trying to concoct all sorts of fanciful business arrangements. They tried and failed to find any takers in the private equity world, and they have run proposals by the business development departments at all the usual suspects -– Google, AOL and News Corporation, among them, according to executives at those companies.
There is indeed some active discussion between News Corporation and Yahoo now (as first reported by Silicon Alley Insider). But News Corporation senior executives say they don’t believe anything will come of this.
The diagnosis is even more clear now than it was 12 days ago when Microsoft first announced its unsolicited bid: Yahoo will get sold to Microsoft. All that’s left to work out is the price.
In the meantime, here is a guide to all of the alternative therapies that Yahoo has been exploring, and why they are not safe or effective.
The key to understanding this is to realize that Yahoo is considering two types of procedures. The simplest would be to sell itself outright to some other company or group willing to outbid Microsoft. This is a long shot. No one but Microsoft and Google have the cash or stock market valuation to make this work. Private equity funds in this market can’t get their Visa credit limits raised, let alone borrow $50 billion.
The other possibility is that Yahoo could restructure in some way, perhaps taking an outside investment, so it can try to convince a majority of shareholders that it is better off as a standalone company than as part of Microsoft. This is unlikely to work because shareholders may well prefer the certainty of Microsoft’s offer, particularly given the lack of confidence in Yahoo’s current management. But it is at least possible to consider such a deal, so that is what is being discussed.
A big variable in any possible deal structure is the role of Google, which has indicated that it would like to help Yahoo fight off Microsoft. Presumably this means having Google sell search ads on Yahoo in return for a stream of guaranteed cash payments. There has been a lot written about how such an arrangement would undergo a lot of antitrust scrutiny. That’s true.
But another problem came up in the negotiations about this last week. Some people who toyed with making a run at Yahoo figured that they would get a big guarantee from Google and then borrow a lot of money against it in order to help finance their bid for Yahoo. It turns out, several dealmakers told me, that Google insists on minimum traffic levels in return for a guarantee of ad revenue. That provision doesn’t stop companies like AOL and News Corporation from cutting search ad deals with Google. But they are enough to stop a bank from backing such a buyout.
And if Yahoo simply announced a deal with Google, and no outside investment, it would have a hard time convincing shareholders that the extra money from search alone is reason enough to turn down Microsoft.
The deal under discussion with News Corporation, according to an executive briefed on the talks, involves a variation of a deal that it proposed to Yahoo last year. It would give Yahoo MySpace, its other Internet properties, some advertising credit and perhaps some cash, in order to take a 20 percent to 30 percent stake in Yahoo. A search deal with Google might be part of that too.
The hope would be that synergies with MySpace, as well as management help from News Corporation, would seem appealing enough to investors to rebuff Microsoft. Moreover, if News Corp. had a 25 percent stake, say, along with the 10 percent of the shares owned by Mr. Yang and David Filo, his co-founder, they would have enough of a voting bloc to win a shareholder vote if it came to that. Whether Yahoo really could play that tough, given its corporate governance structure, is an open question, however.
The deal proposed with Time Warner was similar: Trade AOL and perhaps some cash for a big stake in Yahoo. This has all the problems of the proposed deal with News Corporation and one more: Unlike News Corporation’s chief executive, Rupert Murdoch, who has already expressed interest in Yahoo, Jeff Bewkes, Time Warner’s new chief executive, is skeptical, according to an executive who has spoken to him. He soured on big Internet deals after Time Warner’s disastrous combination with AOL. Still, fixing AOL is one of Mr. Bewkes’s key challenges. So his business development staff is firing up its spreadsheets to consider the possibilities with Yahoo, according to a person familiar with the analysis.
But this person said that like Mr. Murdoch, Mr. Bewkes thinks it would be hard to win this one away from Microsoft.
Internet, AOL, Google, Microsoft, News Corporation, Time Warner, Yahoo, Yahoo In Play
February 13, 2008
A Guide to Yahoo’s Unlikely Alternatives to Microsoft
By Saul Hansell
In the course of a terminal illness, a person will often start to cast about for alternative therapies: herbs, acupuncture, fasting on a Tibetan mountain. This exploration is simply part of the process of coming to terms with the painful truth.
That’s the best way to understand all the reports of possible deals coming from Yahoo. Jerry Yang, Yahoo’s chief executive, has engaged a bevy of creative bankers who are busy trying to concoct all sorts of fanciful business arrangements. They tried and failed to find any takers in the private equity world, and they have run proposals by the business development departments at all the usual suspects -– Google, AOL and News Corporation, among them, according to executives at those companies.
There is indeed some active discussion between News Corporation and Yahoo now (as first reported by Silicon Alley Insider). But News Corporation senior executives say they don’t believe anything will come of this.
The diagnosis is even more clear now than it was 12 days ago when Microsoft first announced its unsolicited bid: Yahoo will get sold to Microsoft. All that’s left to work out is the price.
In the meantime, here is a guide to all of the alternative therapies that Yahoo has been exploring, and why they are not safe or effective.
The key to understanding this is to realize that Yahoo is considering two types of procedures. The simplest would be to sell itself outright to some other company or group willing to outbid Microsoft. This is a long shot. No one but Microsoft and Google have the cash or stock market valuation to make this work. Private equity funds in this market can’t get their Visa credit limits raised, let alone borrow $50 billion.
The other possibility is that Yahoo could restructure in some way, perhaps taking an outside investment, so it can try to convince a majority of shareholders that it is better off as a standalone company than as part of Microsoft. This is unlikely to work because shareholders may well prefer the certainty of Microsoft’s offer, particularly given the lack of confidence in Yahoo’s current management. But it is at least possible to consider such a deal, so that is what is being discussed.
A big variable in any possible deal structure is the role of Google, which has indicated that it would like to help Yahoo fight off Microsoft. Presumably this means having Google sell search ads on Yahoo in return for a stream of guaranteed cash payments. There has been a lot written about how such an arrangement would undergo a lot of antitrust scrutiny. That’s true.
But another problem came up in the negotiations about this last week. Some people who toyed with making a run at Yahoo figured that they would get a big guarantee from Google and then borrow a lot of money against it in order to help finance their bid for Yahoo. It turns out, several dealmakers told me, that Google insists on minimum traffic levels in return for a guarantee of ad revenue. That provision doesn’t stop companies like AOL and News Corporation from cutting search ad deals with Google. But they are enough to stop a bank from backing such a buyout.
And if Yahoo simply announced a deal with Google, and no outside investment, it would have a hard time convincing shareholders that the extra money from search alone is reason enough to turn down Microsoft.
The deal under discussion with News Corporation, according to an executive briefed on the talks, involves a variation of a deal that it proposed to Yahoo last year. It would give Yahoo MySpace, its other Internet properties, some advertising credit and perhaps some cash, in order to take a 20 percent to 30 percent stake in Yahoo. A search deal with Google might be part of that too.
The hope would be that synergies with MySpace, as well as management help from News Corporation, would seem appealing enough to investors to rebuff Microsoft. Moreover, if News Corp. had a 25 percent stake, say, along with the 10 percent of the shares owned by Mr. Yang and David Filo, his co-founder, they would have enough of a voting bloc to win a shareholder vote if it came to that. Whether Yahoo really could play that tough, given its corporate governance structure, is an open question, however.
The deal proposed with Time Warner was similar: Trade AOL and perhaps some cash for a big stake in Yahoo. This has all the problems of the proposed deal with News Corporation and one more: Unlike News Corporation’s chief executive, Rupert Murdoch, who has already expressed interest in Yahoo, Jeff Bewkes, Time Warner’s new chief executive, is skeptical, according to an executive who has spoken to him. He soured on big Internet deals after Time Warner’s disastrous combination with AOL. Still, fixing AOL is one of Mr. Bewkes’s key challenges. So his business development staff is firing up its spreadsheets to consider the possibilities with Yahoo, according to a person familiar with the analysis.
But this person said that like Mr. Murdoch, Mr. Bewkes thinks it would be hard to win this one away from Microsoft.
Internet, AOL, Google, Microsoft, News Corporation, Time Warner, Yahoo, Yahoo In Play
Tuesday, January 8, 2008
Who on Earth Would Want to Buy Yahoo?
http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/01/who-on-earth-wo.html
Who on Earth Would Want to Buy Yahoo?
By Betsy Schiffman
January 02, 2008
While pundits yap away about how Yahoo is fresh acquisition meat, we find it hard to believe. The company is pretty pricey, with a market cap of roughly $33.5 billion, and the number of businesses that could actually swing it is minuscule.
We understand why internet industry watchers think Yahoo is in play. At the very least, it's in flux. Former CEO Terry Semel was ousted last spring, management is fleeing the scene in droves, and the stock is drifting.
But even if Yahoo's business has been dwarfed by Google, its revenue is still growing (it grew by about 12 percent in the third quarter); and more importantly, co-founders David Filo and Jerry Yang, who own roughly 10 percent of the company, are dead set on executing on a turnaround plan.
The bigger question is who would want Yahoo? The major media players (Time Warner, News Corp., Viacom) are desperate to build out their online media businesses, but probably not to the tune of $33.5 billion. We asked a slew of analysts to weigh in on the odds of potential acquirers, and here's what they had to say:
NBC - The network, which is owned by conglomerate General Electric, has flailed on the web over the last decade, and while it needs to grow its online business, at least one analyst, who asked not to be named, thinks GE is more likely to sell NBC in the next couple years than it is to grow the business. The upshot? The chances that GE would have any interest in buying Yahoo are slim to none.
Microsoft - It just won't die: For at least a year, gossipers keep rehashing the same old rumor that Microsoft is in talks to buy Yahoo. While the company is one of the few businesses positioned to do it (Microsoft has plenty of cash on hand, a rich market cap, and would have no problem raising additional financing) such a deal would be a total disaster for Microsoft, according to Global Equities Research analyst Trip Chowdhry. "Microsoft has all the pieces it needs to build its Live brand. A Yahoo acquisition will disrupt Microsoft's execution, confuse customers, and dilute -- without repair -- Microsoft's brand," Chowdhry says. "The Live brand is youthful, while Yahoo resonates as an internet site for old people."
News Corp. - Rupert Murdoch is in it to win it, and he's willing to spend exorbitant sums of money to own the internet (as evidenced by his $580 million acquisition of MySpace). Still, an outright acquisition of Yahoo isn't really his style. "I think Rupert's been willing to take minority stakes in companies where he can take control," says Pali Research analyst Richard Greenberg. "I'm skeptical of the portal business in general and with the MySpace acquisition, I think News Corp. has some big opportunities to attack portals' core business."
Time Warner - It's been eight years since AOL announced its bid to buy Time Warner in a $165 billion deal. Since then, the AOL business has deteriorated dramatically, and Time Warner has even toyed with the idea of spinning it off. "We've seen how the AOL Time Warner merger just didn't work," says Greg Gorbatenko, an analyst with Jackson Securities. "Now AOL's dragging Time Warner down. If you were to introduce Yahoo into the mix, it would be like . . . you gotta be kidding me!"
Viacom - Although Viacom is expected to shop around for acquisitions this year, Yahoo is probably not on the shopping list. "We would expect Viacom to be more active in buying online assets in 2008, but these acquisitions would be small-to-medium moderately sized deals. A large acquisition, the size of Yahoo, would surprise us," says Laura Martin, Soleil-Media Metrics analyst. "It's more important for Viacom to get their core business in shape, and resolve issues with DreamWorks."
We're not saying a deal won't happen -- anything is possible -- but it seems a little far fetched to us.
Who on Earth Would Want to Buy Yahoo?
By Betsy Schiffman
January 02, 2008
While pundits yap away about how Yahoo is fresh acquisition meat, we find it hard to believe. The company is pretty pricey, with a market cap of roughly $33.5 billion, and the number of businesses that could actually swing it is minuscule.
We understand why internet industry watchers think Yahoo is in play. At the very least, it's in flux. Former CEO Terry Semel was ousted last spring, management is fleeing the scene in droves, and the stock is drifting.
But even if Yahoo's business has been dwarfed by Google, its revenue is still growing (it grew by about 12 percent in the third quarter); and more importantly, co-founders David Filo and Jerry Yang, who own roughly 10 percent of the company, are dead set on executing on a turnaround plan.
The bigger question is who would want Yahoo? The major media players (Time Warner, News Corp., Viacom) are desperate to build out their online media businesses, but probably not to the tune of $33.5 billion. We asked a slew of analysts to weigh in on the odds of potential acquirers, and here's what they had to say:
NBC - The network, which is owned by conglomerate General Electric, has flailed on the web over the last decade, and while it needs to grow its online business, at least one analyst, who asked not to be named, thinks GE is more likely to sell NBC in the next couple years than it is to grow the business. The upshot? The chances that GE would have any interest in buying Yahoo are slim to none.
Microsoft - It just won't die: For at least a year, gossipers keep rehashing the same old rumor that Microsoft is in talks to buy Yahoo. While the company is one of the few businesses positioned to do it (Microsoft has plenty of cash on hand, a rich market cap, and would have no problem raising additional financing) such a deal would be a total disaster for Microsoft, according to Global Equities Research analyst Trip Chowdhry. "Microsoft has all the pieces it needs to build its Live brand. A Yahoo acquisition will disrupt Microsoft's execution, confuse customers, and dilute -- without repair -- Microsoft's brand," Chowdhry says. "The Live brand is youthful, while Yahoo resonates as an internet site for old people."
News Corp. - Rupert Murdoch is in it to win it, and he's willing to spend exorbitant sums of money to own the internet (as evidenced by his $580 million acquisition of MySpace). Still, an outright acquisition of Yahoo isn't really his style. "I think Rupert's been willing to take minority stakes in companies where he can take control," says Pali Research analyst Richard Greenberg. "I'm skeptical of the portal business in general and with the MySpace acquisition, I think News Corp. has some big opportunities to attack portals' core business."
Time Warner - It's been eight years since AOL announced its bid to buy Time Warner in a $165 billion deal. Since then, the AOL business has deteriorated dramatically, and Time Warner has even toyed with the idea of spinning it off. "We've seen how the AOL Time Warner merger just didn't work," says Greg Gorbatenko, an analyst with Jackson Securities. "Now AOL's dragging Time Warner down. If you were to introduce Yahoo into the mix, it would be like . . . you gotta be kidding me!"
Viacom - Although Viacom is expected to shop around for acquisitions this year, Yahoo is probably not on the shopping list. "We would expect Viacom to be more active in buying online assets in 2008, but these acquisitions would be small-to-medium moderately sized deals. A large acquisition, the size of Yahoo, would surprise us," says Laura Martin, Soleil-Media Metrics analyst. "It's more important for Viacom to get their core business in shape, and resolve issues with DreamWorks."
We're not saying a deal won't happen -- anything is possible -- but it seems a little far fetched to us.
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